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Respect and Power without Resistance

**Investigations of Interpersonal Relations among
the Deed Mongols**

Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by

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**This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the
outcome of work done in collaboration.**

**This dissertation does not exceed the word limit sought approval for from the
Degree Committee at the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology.**

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Abstract

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Respect and Power without Resistance Investigations of Interpersonal Relations among the Deed Mongols

The ethnographic part of this thesis concerns the Deed Mongols in K ok Nuur (Qinghai Sheng), a Tibetan province in the north west of China, where I conducted a twelve-month field study. Deed Mongols (population 80,000) reside in a unique cultural setting, amid three or four different cultures. Many share religious belief, lifestyle, and sometimes language with Tibetans, for instance the Deed Mongols in Henan Mongol Autonomous Xian in Huangnan Zhou. There are also some who have adopted the Chinese language and converted to Islam in the north of Haibei Zhou. However, Deed Mongols in Haixi, Hainan and Haibei *zhous* are pastoral nomads and still use classical Mongolian script and are familiar with Mongolian language and culture. My study focused on the latter group of people, one of the least studied communities of Inner Asia.

This research is on a completely new topic, namely the coexistence of respect and power. I use the term respect with its widest range of meaning, as a socially constructed attitude that exalts the other person or his/her particular characteristics, achievements, talents, etc., or simply regarding someone as important and deserving of recognition. I analyse three main aspects of respect. One is the 'rationale of respect'. This brings up questions such as: What people mean when they respect? What is the meaning of respect? There are two kinds of rationales of respect: one is the 'respect of common courtesy' and the other is the 'respect of hierarchy'. The second aspect is the question of 'expression of respect'. In the expression of respect sometimes it is more important to follow social regulations and to perform repeated, ritualized actions than to express personal intentions. This I call 'performative respect'. There are also cases where people can express their personal intention to respect, which I call 'non-performative respect'. In addition to these two classes of expression, there is also a third, which combines the other two. Following the same path I illustrate the third aspect of respect which is the question of the 'sincerity of respect'. Here, I classify respect into sincere and insincere, and explain when and why it is sincere or insincere. In this way the analysis of respect poses the question of whether any relationship is detached from respect. I have not been able to think of any type of relationship that does not bring up issues of respect or disrespect.

Going beyond these considerations, I use the study of respect to approach the theory of power, something that allows us to see power from a completely new angle. Much of the literature on power suggests that the opposition of agents is essential to power, where one coerces and represses, the other responds with resistance and the dialogical relationship ends in conflict. In the discourse of power with respect that I propose, the powerful one supports and respects, but does not coerce and oppress and the powerless party in return respects and obeys, but does not resist. The overall outcome is not conflict but peace and harmony. I do not argue that human society can be completely peaceful, without any conflict and opposition at all. Instead, what I focus on is the attempt to achieve an ideal relationship based on such a 'formula of respect and power', and I illustrate the extent to which it becomes reality. I show that Deed Mongol villages rely more on the formula of 'respect and power' than that of 'resistance and power'.

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Notes on the transliteration

There is no standard transliteration of Mongolian therefore we have found many words that are differently spelled in different publications. There are several different ways of transliterating Mongolian following Mongolian vertical script (*mongol bichig*), Cyrillic Mongolian and local colloquial dialects. In this thesis I mostly followed the Deed Mongol dialect in which many words are similar to spoken Mongolian among other Mongols, or to the written form of Mongolian vertical script which they use (for example, *gachaga* means a small town or village), and some are words they share with some Inner Mongolians (for example *duh* meaning forehead in Mongolian means back of the skull in Deed Mongol and some areas of Inner Mongolia). There are also words that have been transliterated in European languages for many years and are known in that form, such as the name Chinggis, which is also transliterated as Genghis. Chinggis is the transliteration based on classical vertical Mongol script but according to the Cyrillic Mongolian it can be Chingis. I will use 'Chinggis' since it is used in much academic writing. But for the word "king" or Khan in English and in European languages, I transliterate it as Khaan with a double 'a', because in all Mongolian dialects and writings khan with one 'a' is smaller "khan" of tribe or banner, while the version with two 'a' stands for Khaan of an empire and country.

The other confused transliteration is the 'x' in Cyrillic which is often transliterated as 'kh' in Modern Mongolian, and elsewhere it is found as 'k', 'h' and as the English 'x'. Deed Mongols mostly pronounce the Cyrillic 'x' as 'k' in words with soft vowels such as e, ü, ö and i, same as other Oirat Mongols, which I will follow. For all other cases I transliterate it as 'h' except of the words that is known with 'kh' such as 'Khaan'.

Deed Mongols in K k Nuur

The ethnography of this thesis concerns the Deed Mongols in the K k Nuur (Qinghai Sheng), a Tibetan province in the northwest of China. The area shares borders with Xizang (Tibet), Xinjiang, Gansu and Sichuan Shens (Provinces) (see Map A), where I carried out twelve months fieldwork between August 2003 and October 2005. Qinghai is the Chinese term for the Mongolian K k Nuur¹, which means the ‘‘Blue Lake’’.

At the start of my fieldwork among the Deed Mongols I took the opportunity to visit briefly the surrounding Tibetan, Mongolian and Muslim communities. K k Nuur is a multi-ethnic region with a variety of cultures including Han Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and other peoples of Altaic language origin such as Hoton (Hui) and Salar Muslims. The Deed Mongols are not the only Mongols in the province; there are also Tsagaan (Chagaan) Mongols (Chin. Tu) and Baoans (cf. Appendix A). The Mongols in K k Nuur reside in a unique cultural setting, amidst three or four different cultural groups.

Deed Mongols in K k Nuur are identified by several names, including ‘Mongols in Qinghai’ and ‘Mongols in K k Nuur’, ‘Hoshuud Mongols’, and ‘Deed Mongols’ meaning ‘Upper Mongols’. ‘Deed Mongols’ is a recent name that probably emerged after the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and this is the name I will adopt in the project. There is no documentation concerning the ‘upper’ attached to their name, and it is presumed that it refers their geographical location which is topographically higher than any other Mongol locations. Some people also say that it is because they are descendents of rulers such as G sh Khaan (1582-1656), the ruler of Tibet and K k Nuur in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and his lords. If this latter view is true then it suggests that the political society itself is imagined as vertical, with a top (upper) part and ‘lower’ part (i.e. the non-Deed Mongols people of the region), the structure that will be analyzed in Chapter One. Most of the Deed Mongols are Hoshuud one of the four Oirat

¹ Several different transcriptions and spellings of the name *K k Nuur* can be derived from traditional Mongolian script, Mongolian Cyrillic and the colloquial Deed Mongol dialect. The above is the colloquial Deed Mongol way of pronouncing the name. In Mongolian vertical script it is *K ke Nagur*, in Cyrillic Mongolian it is *H h Nuur*. In many writings it is usually spelled as *K k nuur*, *Koknor* or *Kokonor* and so on. Here I will use the version in the present Deed Mongol dialect K k Nuur.

Mongol tribes, however, the present Deed Mongols include many more ethnic groups, mainly Torguud, Tsoros and a few Halh Mongols.

The total population of Qinghai Shen (Province) (cf. section on administrative structure and Figure 2) is about 5 million. Among them, according to the registration of 2001, the population of the Deed Mongols is around 75, 000, and they inhabit four out of seven different Zhous (prefectures). As a Deed Mongol scholar, Sarangerel, states, there are 32,800 in Huangnan, 25,560 in Haixi, 13,167 in Haibei and 3,000 in Hainan (Sarangerel & Yuki 2002: 55, 53, 58, 67) (see Map 2 the administrative map of Qinghai Shen). In neighbouring Gansu Shen there is another group of Deed Mongols in the Subei Mongolian Autonomous Xian (County) (for general information cf. also Atwood 2004: 521-2). As a local writer Li Xue Wei², and Kevin Stuart (1989), an American scholar who lived in the area for about 15 years, write, their population was 9,516 at the end of 1980s. The Subei Mongols came from Qinghai during the 1860s. Most came from the Khoshuud (Hoshuud) Tribe from the North-Left-Wing-Right Banner [Hoshuu] and the North-Right-Wing-Rear Banner [Hoshuu] (Li & Stuart 1989: 73), two of the twenty-nine banners (an administrative structure introduced by the Qing rulers).

There are at least three different groups of Deed Mongols in K k Nuur, as judged by their language, religion and lifestyle. These can be identified as 'Mongol Deed Mongol', 'Tibetanised Deed Mongol' and 'Hoton (Chi. Hui) Deed Mongol'. I focus on the 'Mongol Deed Mongol', which I classify as those pastoral nomads who still speak Mongolian and learn the classical Mongolian vertical script in Mongol secondary schools. They mostly inhabit the Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Zhou (Prefecture) and also Haibei and Hainan Zhous. The 'Tibetanised Deed Mongols' of Henan Mongol Autonomous Xian (County) (for general information cf. Atwood 2004: 216) are pastoral nomads like the 'Mongol Deed Mongols'; however, apart from a few old people, they do not speak Mongolian but Tibetan,. The third group of Deed Mongols inhabit Haiyan and Qilian Xians of Haibei Zhou in the North East of K k Nuur. They are sedentary Muslim Deed Mongols living in the Hoton community. This is one of the few places I was unable to reach as I was told that there is a Chinese military base in the region and foreigners are restricted from visiting. However, I had the opportunity to speak with a Hoton professor of history in Xining who told me that locally they are called Tomu Dazi, a name of Tibetan origin meaning 'demonstration and break'. According to the Professor, the name

² Li Xue Wei is a lecturer at the Qinghai medical college.

refers to the historical event when those Mongols became Muslim. At the beginning of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, in around 1644, two Hotons led a rebellion against their conquerors in a place called *Uvi*, in the present Gansu Shen region. Eventually they were defeated and escaped to Qilian and the Mongols who then lived there hid them and thus saved their lives. The relationship between the Hotons and the Mongols in the region became very warm and eventually those Mongols were converted to Islam (for different versions of the story cf. also Sarangerel and Yuki 2002: 62-63). He added that the two Hotons were originally from a place called Balken in Xinjiang and until recently old people used to return there to worship their ancestral spirits.

Sarangerel, a Deed Mongol academic from Beijing, did a short period of fieldwork among the 'Hoton Deed Mongols'. She found several Mongol names for the 'Hoton Deed Mongols' such as 'Mongol Hoton', 'Togumad Hoton', 'Tomuga Hoton', 'Tomugog Hoton' and 'Tohmad people' (Sarangerel & Yuki 2002: 60). She also writes that most of the young Hoton Mongols do not speak Mongolian but Chinese, though many of them understand, and older people all speak, Mongolian. In the official registration they are recognised as Hoton, but it was very difficult to discover the exact population of the 'Hoton Deed Mongols' However, according to Sarangerel they numbered about 1,000.

Historical outline of the Area and Deed Mongols

According to historical sources, *Tsiyangs* were the native people of the area. However, after the thirteenth century the area became a no man's land and it at this point at which the history of 'Mongols' in K k Nuur commenced. Until the twentieth century, the K k Nuur area was ruled by various different empires. The historical outline³ of the region is as follows.

- Historical sources claim that around the first century people from the northern part of Central Asia came to K k Nuur and inhabited the area alongside the native *Tsiyang* people. Several other small groups also settled in the area before the thirteenth century

³ The outline is rephrased and cited from Inner Mongolian historian B. Oyunbilig (1991) and some local historians and Mongolists such as Sarangerel (1992) and Mi Yi Hi (1996). There are also other writings about their history which I will discuss in the section on the literature about the Deed Mongols.

(Sarangerel 1992: 2-3). During that period different parts of the region were ruled by either Chinese, Tibetan or Central Asian emperors (Hi 1996: 3-5).

- In 1227, Mongol emperors first conquered the area and throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they ruled the K k Nuur region and  g dei Khaan's⁴ governors settled there.
- In the fifteenth century, a group of Mongols from the Ordos regions lead by Ibirei, a Mongol noble, also settled in the region. Then from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century the Ming Dynasty ruled K k Nuur.
- In the mid-seventeenth century most of China and Mongolia were under the rule of Manchu Qing Empire, but K k Nuur was ruled by a Hoshuud Mongol called G sh Khaan (1582-1656) (See Figure 1), who was the descendent of Chinggis Khaan's brother Hasar.




Figure 1. The name of the painting is 'Mongols can lead a tiger' by a Tibetan artist. Deed Mongols say that this is a painting of G sh Khaan⁵

⁴ Chinggis Khaan's third son, successor of Chinggis Khaan after his death in 1227.

He negotiated with Manchu rulers and had a very peaceful relationship with his great neighbour, the Manchu Empire. He was invited to Tibet by the fifth Dalai Lama to protect the yellow sect (Gelug-pa) branch of Buddhism from the red sect (Nin-ma-pa), which at the same time had invited the Halha⁶ Mongolian Tsogt Khaan to support their religion. By winning the battle, Gūsh Khaan and his sons ruled Tibet and Kōk Nuur from 1655-1723. This is the historical period when Deed Mongols, the descendants and people of Gūsh Khaan settled in Kōk Nuur (cf. also the part of the introduction titled Literature about the Deed Mongols).

- The Manchu Empire ruled Tibet and Kōk Nuur from the mid-eighteenth century until the Chinese conquest of the early twentieth century.

During most of these historical periods, Kōk Nuur region was the borderland of various empires and dynasties. On the fringes of Mongolia, Tibet, China and Manchuria, the Kōk Nuur region never properly belonged to any of its surrounding nations.

English	Chinese	Mongolian
Province	Shen	Shen (also often use Muj)
Prefecture	Zhou	Zhou (also often use Jiü)
County	Xian	Xian
Township	Xiang	Hoshuu (Eng. Banner)
Village	Cong	Tosgon

Figure 2 Names of administrative units

Administrative structure: rural towns and nomads' villages

Mongolian-speaking Deed Mongols in Haixi, Haibei and Hainan Zhous are divided by Chinese administrative units. I did most of my fieldwork in the Haixi Zhou where most of the Deed Mongols live (see Map A and B). Haixi Zhou includes the towns of Delkii Hot,

⁵ There is a story among Tibetans and Mongols. Deed Mongols say that during the rule of Gūsh Khaan some Tibetans protested against his rule. They cursed a tiger and sent it to kill him. When the rabid tiger came to kill him he somehow overcame the curse, tamed the tiger and led it with a chain. This really impressed the Tibetans and they painted a picture of it. Now they often put this painting at the entrance of temples, implying that the Mongols protect their religion.

⁶ The Halh are the ethnic majority in the central and southern Mongolia.

the capital of the Zhou, Golmus Hot and the second biggest city of Kök Nuur, on the main route leading to Lhasa (Tibet), Ulaan Xian, Dulaan Xian, Tianjun Xian, Mangnai, and Ih Tsaidam. At the same time the region is also divided into Hoshuus (Banners), the administrative system adopted during the Manchu rule. The Chinese division of administrative units is based on the earlier Manchu Hoshuu (Banner) division and many of the Xiangs (townships) tend to correlate with the old Hoshuus (Banners), for instance, the former Baruun Hoshuu (Right Banner) is now Baruun Xiang, but this is not always the case, the Züün Hoshuu is now divided into Züün Xiang and Nomhon Xiang, though people still consider them as one unit. My host family belonged to the Züün Hoshuu (Chi. Zong Jia Xiang) of Dulaan Xian region, which is in the South of the Tsaidam valley, bordered with high mountains to the south.

There is a small town in the centre of the Züün Hoshuu which the Deed Mongols call *gachaga* meaning a 'small rural town', where the local government and all the public services are located. This is the second smallest administrative unit and the most local level of government is the *tosgon* (village), which I will describe later. The town has only two main streets centred on a 'T' junction where people usually gather and where the two local buses each stop once a day. Buses run between Dulaan Xian and Golmus City and stop at Hoshuu *gachagas*. From Züün it is about two and half hours ride to Dulaan and three hours to Golmus.

Züün Hoshuu has Mongolian and Chinese elementary schools, a hospital, a bank and a few shops and restaurants which are run by the inhabitants of the *gachaga*, amongst whom there are only about thirty Mongol households who all live in houses. Most of the government staff are local Mongols and in addition to Mongols who work there, there are also the children of relatives and friends, who are enrolled at the school, and some grandparents who take care of their grandchildren. Therefore, in one household there could be one or two old people and three or four elementary school children from different families. If the families do not have any older relatives in the *gachaga* then they have to send their children to the school dormitory. The elders are officially retired and are no longer in charge of running the household and taking care of herds in the countryside and it is tiring for them to move three four times a year to follow the herds. It therefore makes sense for them to live in the *gachaga* and it is a good solution to the problem of the care of schoolchildren who are separated from their parents. However, there are many more Chinese in the *gachaga*, usually inhabitants of the four Chinese

villages who practice agriculture. Unlike the Mongol herding villages, the Chinese villages are geographically attached to the *gachaga* with their plots surrounding it.

There are twelve villages (Chi. Cong, Mon. Tosgon) in the Züün Hoshuu, four of which are the above-mentioned Chinese peasant villages and the rest of the eight are Mongol herding villages scattered across the valley. Each village has 25 to 40 households. There is no public transportation between the *gachaga* and the villages, people usually get around using a motorcycle, small tractor, horse, camel or car if they have one. My family lived in Shish village quite close to the *gachaga* which is an hour's journey by motorbike or two hours by horse but it takes up to four hours by motorbike to reach to the villages farthest from the *gachaga*. Every three or four kilometres along the route there are Mongol *gers* (white felt tents) and herding pastures, usually with goats and sheep. This is not descriptive of a Chinese *cong*, or English village or Mongolian *tosgon*, even though they call it a *tosgon* (village), it is a picture of a pastoral nomads' camp.

Kinship and family

As can be seen from kinship terminology the Deed Mongols have a patrilineal kinship system (cf. Vreeland 1962: 319-325) but this is not as strong as it used to be and only in Taijinar Hoshuu do people still use their clan names. Nowadays seniority, age and gender are more important than kinship, as I will discuss in Chapter One. Elders and men are in the higher ranks, but there are still some elements of the kinship system which are very relevant, for example, *nagats* – relatives on the mother's side – are very important and are considered to be more respected than one's parents, unless they are younger than the nephew or niece (*zee*) in which case they would not be regarded as higher. This means that age is more important than kinship seniority. Another aspect that reduces the importance of kinship is the absence of a family tree.

Villages usually consist of one or two different kin groups. In my village, Shish, there are two kin groups with no specific names but related to each other by marriage. This is one of the reasons for the the harmony and peace (cf. also Chapter Three) in the village. Relationships between people are to some extent governed by kinship hierarchy.

I lived in the family of young couple in their late 30s, the husband is called Baba (his real name is Bat) and his wife is Altantsetseg who we call Bergen meaning a 'bride'. They have two daughters and Namjil, Baba's father, lives with them. The two girls are at

secondary school and they live in Dulaan Xian with Baba's elder sister and only come and stay during the holidays. Namjil had three sons and three daughters, Baba being the eldest son, and he left all his belongings to his six children, two of the sons, Baba and Bayar, and one of the daughters, Hong Hua, received pasture and herds, and the other three received herds but no land. Two sons and one daughter still live on Namjil's land and the youngest daughter married into another village where she and her husband live on the land he inherited there. The eldest daughter Tseder is a teacher and lives in Dulaan and the youngest son Erdemt is still a student. This was a random inheritance of land. Those who had the chance to study and live in town left the land for the others. Their arrangement also went against the patrilineal kinship rules of inheritance. The middle daughter Hong Hua not only inherited land but also the main hearth and lineage of Namjil and 'took a groom' (*kürgen avah*). Since they take Hong Hua's place to be Namjil's main home, the youngest unmarried brother Erdemt lives with Hong Hua's family, and Namjil himself lives with Baba (Bat) his eldest son. This is not very common practice, but neither do they consider it to be particularly unusual. When I asked them why it was Hong Hua, Namjil and Baba told me that she had not wanted to go to a different family and the groom accepted this. This suggests that the kinship system is not strict.

The Deed Mongols have an exogamous marriage practice. Marriage between Mongols is preferred and I did not meet any who were married to a Tsagaan Mongol or a Baoan. Marrying Chinese, Muslims or Tibetans is not regarded as right because it does not maintain "genuine Mongolness", nonetheless there is a lot of marriage between Deed Mongols and Tibetans in areas where they live close to each other.

Traditional Mongol and communist political ideologies

I first visited the rural Deed Mongols in Van Hoshuu in the winter of 2002 to 2003. I stayed in the winter settlement of a herder named Sereeter and his family and was quite surprised by how good the living conditions were in the remote mountain area. Their house has a large guest room, a kitchen, a bedroom and a shrine room with modern equipment such as: power generator, solar generator, mobile phone, cordless telephone, TV with big outdoor aerial, Video CD player, and furniture including a king-size bed with clean sheets and camel-wool duvets etc. The first things that caught my eye were fascinating large portraits of communist leaders: Marx, Lenin, Engels, Stalin, Mao

Zidong and Zhou Enlai on the wall of the respected part of the winter house opposite the door (see Figure 3). Not every family has such nice pictures as these but they usually have at least one picture of Mao Zedong.




Figure 3 Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zidong and Zhou Enlai



Figure 4 Portrait of Chinggis Khaan

Deed Mongol intellectuals sometimes jokingly describe themselves as one of the few remaining genuine Chinese “communists” in the whole country. This somehow briefly describes the nature of their politics. At first I thought they meant “communists” and later I realised that they were talking not only about “communism” but also about their traditional political concepts. In other words, there are ideas shared in both of the political imaginaries. Alongside pictures of communist leaders and thinkers there is also a portrait of Chinggis Khaan and Mongolian traditional figures, images and calligraphy of proverbs believed to be the words of the Mongol Khaans (see Figure 4).

Deed Mongols have two parallel powers: its highly respected Mongol Khaans, ancestors and elders on the one hand, and the Chinese communist party, official governors of the administrative units who serve the Chinese state on the other hand. Frequently this is depicted in the images that hang on the walls of people’s homes. Although community

elders in Kök Nuur do not hold real political power like the official leaders, they are powerful and have a respected status. People usually are keen to take advice from these elders who always sit in the respected places in the home and are always the first to **(be served or take food or receive food?? Or do they serve it for other people?)** serve food, and do or receive anything (cf. also Chapter Two).

The two powers fit quite well with one another and people do not regard them as contradictory because their traditional political ideology was already similar in its conceptions to the later communist teachings. Therefore it not very difficult for them to adopt Chinese communism which was similar to their so-called ancestral concepts which still have “communist” elements in their political ideology, even now after the collapse of communism and on the threshold of the Chinese “capitalist economy”. For example, the old folk’s catch-phrase “respect elders and love juniors” was also cited in the seventeenth-century Law of Kök Nuur (*Kök Nuuryn Tsaaz*) and is repeated in the ten regulations of culturalized peasants and pastoral households declared by the Chinese Communist Party (*Baragun orun-i negen negegen höggigülehi haultsagaza törü-iin bodilga-iin tuhai asagulta harigulta* [Questions and answers about the strategy and law to discover and develop the west of the country] 2002: 205). Moreover, the Mongol conception of *olny hüch* “collective and combined power” and *ey ev* ‘harmony’ that I discuss in Chapter Three is also similar to the socialist idea of “collective”. The Deed Mongols’ respect and obedience to the state and law, illustrated in Chapter Four, is also essential in Chinese communism and it is described as loyalty to the party. The first regulation among the ten household guidelines says “Love the party and love your country” and the third concerns the importance of obeying law and order (*Baragun orun-i negen negegen höggigülehi haultsagaza törü-iin bodilga-iin tuhai asagulta harigulta* [Questions and answers about the strategy and law to discover and develop the west of the country] 2002: 204, 205). In this way most of the ten regulations match their traditional concepts, except for the few rules about ceasing the old-fashioned customs and rituals and the superstitious religions of feudalism. People do not seem to have a great problem with this article and there are many reasons for this (cf. also Chapter Three). Firstly, many of the Deed Mongols are not very religious anyway, unlike the Tibetans for example. Secondly, the less religious Deed Mongols do not conflict with religious ones as the local leaders are also Deed Mongols who usually do not regard their tradition as backward, superstitious and feudalist and this to some extent, blocks the external threat to

their culture. Thirdly, and the most important reason is that China does not take these things as seriously as they used to, for example during the Cultural Revolution.

Revival of religion

An elder, Choinid in Van Hoshuu, told me they worshiped everything from heaven to earth. They believed everything had a spirit master. This kind of so-called 'shamanistic' (shamanistic belief or shamanism??) or more generally, the type of folk religion carried out by elders (cf. also Humphrey and Onon 1996) is no longer present in the community. According to the Deed Mongol scholar, Sarangerel, the last shaman died in 1985. She writes that the shaman Sonom used to pretend to be a Buddhist healer but secretly practiced shamanism (Sarangerel 1992: 82-83). Now, Buddhism is the main religion of the Deed Mongols. Historically they were deeply religious and as mentioned their ancestor Gūsh Khaan was invited by the fifth Dalai Lama to protect Gelug-pa Buddhism. After the strong anti-religious communist years, especially in the areas where I stayed, many Deed Mongols are not as religious as their ancestors. For example, my family and many of their neighbours did not have the usual family shrine and Buddhist images, though this is not the case for all Deed Mongols. For example, the Deed Mongols in Banchin Shan Hoshuu (the Hoshuu given to Banchin, one of the few leading reincarnations) and Van Hoshuu, where I saw the communist leaders' portraits, are very religious. Recently religion has been reviving rapidly, with more annual mountain-worship ceremonies and the rebuilding of monasteries and so on.

It is almost standard to have three sacred things in every Hoshuu. These are a sacred mountain with an *ovoo* (stone and wood cairns), a monastery and a Buddhist wrathful deity which is a *sahius*, guardian of the Hoshuu. For example, in Van Hoshuu: Tumpe is the sacred mountain, Dulaan Hiid is the monastery and Gombo is the guardian god (cf. also Deng Ioi Sheng 2001: 324-345). In Züün Hoshuu they also have three: San Ovoo Mountain, Züünai Hiid meaning the "Monastery of Züün", and Setev Choijin the wrathful guardian god (cf. Appendix C). These guardian, sacred mountains and monasteries of the Hoshuu demonstrate that the scattered nomadic society is constructed as a community.

As previously mentioned, many people are not very religious, especially in the Züün Hoshuu and Taijinar Hoshuu. Firstly this is a result of the communist propaganda

and secondly, it is their way of distinguishing themselves from Tibetans. As will be shown in Chapter Four, they have an unfriendly relationship with the other nationalities including Tibetans and try to keep their Mongolness as genuine (pure?) as possible – not being Buddhist prevents them from Tibetanization.

Literature about the Deed Mongols

Ethnographic study of the Deed Mongols is a completely new area to social anthropology and academic study in both Mongolian and European languages. There are few articles and books in English about the community, and most of those are historical accounts of the Deed Mongols. The first of these, the *Annals of Khökhnuur*⁷, was written by the local lama Sümbe Khambo Ishbaljir⁸ in 1786, and is a historical description of how the Deed (Hoshuud) Mongols dominated Tibet in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The author, Ishbaljir, was born in 1704 and is “an example of the scholars and writers whose work was produced by this cultural fusion. He was writing in Tibetan and he is considered to be one of the great Tibetan scholars, but he belonged originally to one of the Mongolian groups inhabiting the Kök Nuur region. He wrote from the point of view of the Mongolian princes then in control of that area, and he carried out important missions at the imperial court of China as well. He is one of the most prominent examples of those scholars who lived and worked at the interface of overlapping cultures and political domains” (Diemberger 2002: 171). One of the first scholars to give detailed and complete information about the history of the Hoshuud Mongols (ancestors of the deed Mongols) is a British historian Sir Henry H. Howorth. In the first volume of his *History of the Mongols* published in 1876, he included a good description of the Hoshuud history from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. He addressed the importance of the role of Guushi Khan [Güsh Khaan] in the history of Khoshotes [Hoshuud] and praises him for “he had inherited only 5,000 subjects from his father and it was his address and skill in

⁷ K. Ann, *Mtsho sngon gyi lo rgyus sogs bkod pa'I shangs glu gsar snyan zhe bya ba bzhugs so*, published by Lokesh Chandra as an appendix to his book edition of the *Vaidūrya ser po*, New Delhi 1960, pp. 425-458. Later translated by Ho-Chin Yang *The Harmonious New Sacred Song Containing the Annals of Kokonor*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. It also has been translated into Mongolian by D. Dashbadrakh and published in Ulaanbaatar, 1997.

⁸ This is the Mongolian transcription of his name. From Tibetan, it is transcribed as Sumpa Khenpo Yeshe Paljor or more precisely Sum pa mkhan po Yes shes dpal 'byor (Diemberger 2002: 180).

the affairs of Thibet [Tibet] which enabled him so greatly increase his power” (Howorth 1876: 523).

One of the few writings about Deed Mongol history published in English is the Italian scholar Luciano Petech's article *Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century* (1988) based on his book *China and Tibet in the early 18th century* (1950). Although Petech refers to this as Tibetan history, there is a lot in this volume about the Mongols in K k Nuur, for during the period he writes about Tibet was ruled by the Deed Mongols, . Moreover, later publications of Mongolian history mention the Hoshuuds. For example, Junko Miyawaki, a Japanese scholar of foreign studies, published an article in *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (1999) edited by Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan, she discusses the Oyirad Khanship [Oirat Khaanship] and claims that G uishi Khan was the first Oyirad (Western Mongols included Hoshuuds) Khan [Oirat Khaan] (Miyawaki 1999: 324), since the Oirads never had an empire but Hoshuuds did in Tibet and in K k Nuur.

Apart from historical documents there are not many ethnographical records, notes of travellers and missionaries etc. I have found one source, a Japanese agent, Hisao Kimura⁹ who in his early twenties was detained in the West of K k Nuur among the Deed Mongols for about fifteen months in 1944 and 1945. Previously he had lived in Inner Mongolia for three years and studied Mongolian thus he was not happy about the Japanese conquest of Inner Mongolia and tried to avoid military conscription. He had a deep desire to see the west, Tibet and Xinjiang and received permission from the Japanese authorities to travel to Tibet as a pilgrim. He pretended to be a Mongol monk travelling with his sister and her husband but in K k Nuur he was discovered and arrested. He was released under the custody of the Babu Noyon the governor of the Khukhut Banner [K k t Khoshuu] and lived in Z uun Hoshuu in the area where I stayed. He describes the political situation of the time; the attack of Kazak bandits, the annual caravan and pilgrims to Lhasa which pass through the area, Tibetan and Mongolian medicine, life of the Deed Mongol Hoshuu governors, sexual relationships, and a little about everyday life (Kimura and Berry 1990).

U.E. Bulag has made a series of contributions to the anthropological study of the Mongols. His last monograph *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity* (2002), focuses in particular on the Mongols in China and the book has

⁹ He told his story to Scott Berry, an American writer whose home is in London, and they decided to publish it.

chapter about the Deed Mongols in K k Nuur. Chapter two is about how national unity came to be ritualised through the sacrifice to Lake K k Nuur. Bulag claims that the sacrifice to the lake was undertaken with the political purpose of uniting nations in the area, during different periods of domination by the Mongols, Manchus, Muslims and Chinese.

One of the few recent and significant attempts to produce a study of the Qinghai Tibetans and Mongols has been conducted by Hildegard Diemberger. An issue of the journal *Inner Asia*¹⁰, edited by H. Diemberger (2002), includes her introduction and seven articles, specifically, about the Henan Deed Mongols and Tibetans in K k Nuur. The articles focus on various aspects of history, film, literature, religion and ritual etc., and mostly are written by Tibetan and Mongolian scholars. The Inner Mongolian scholar Shinjilt, based at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, published a monograph in Japanese about the Deed Mongols in Henan: *The Grammar of Ethnic Narrations: An ethnography of daily life, pasture fights, and language education among the Mongols of Qinghai Province, China* (2003). Based on this monograph he published an article in English entitled *The Ethnic Reality in 'Homemade Narration'* (2004), where he presented the different criteria for being a *Soggo* (or *Sog-po* meaning a Mongol in Tibetan), in the eyes of the local and other Tibetans, Mongols and Chinese. He has 'identified two features of the ethnic identity of the people of *Henanmengqi* [Mongols South of the Yellow River] with regard to the category of *Soggo* and that of some other groups. One is the "possession of the category" – people change their own group identity to *Soggo*. The other is "transferring of the category" – the people hand over *Soggo* to somebody else who considers himself to be real *Soggo*. The characteristics of the identity were manifest in social practices such as 'pasture fights' or "the Mongolian Language education campaign" (Shinjilt 2004: 35-36). The use of the term *Sog-po* or *Soggo* by Deed Mongols in Haixi and the surrounding areas is not very common but people all know that it means a Mongol in Tibetan. However, there are different levels regarding who is more Mongol and who is less a Mongol and more a Tibetan.

Yi Wang, Ph.D candidate at the University of Chicago writes a book review for Shinjilt's monograph. He addresses Shinjilt's critique of the state-oriented theory of *Zhonghua minzu de duoyuan yiti geju* (plurality and unity in the configuration of the Chinese nation), proposed in 1988 by the prominent social anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong

¹⁰ Journal of the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit, University of Cambridge.

(1910-) [in Chapter Three I discuss the similarity between original Mongol idea of unity and the Chinese communist view of unity]. Arguably a resuscitation of the 1930s' discourse proposed by nationalist scholars such as Gu Jiegang (1893-1981), it represented a paradigmatic change from the discourse of a unitary 'Chinese state' consisting of multiple nationalities in the 1950s to that of a singular, substantial 'Chinese nation' comprising plural ethnic groups in the 1990s, thereby justifying ethnic assimilation and national integration (Wang 2005: 134). In brief Shinjilt criticises the Chinese authoritative action to transform nations into ethnic groups.

The *Encyclopaedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (2004) by Christopher P. Atwood includes general information in various sections about the Deed Mongols and the Hoshuuds. He gives a good overview of the history, geography and population of the Deed Mongols in Haixi, Henan and Subei.

In Mongolian there is a considerably larger number of studies concerning the Deed Mongols published in Inner Mongolia using the classical Mongolian vertical script. These are usually about the history, traditional customs, folklore and literature, but they are not well distributed outside Kök Nuur. Since there are no central or local bookshops it was difficult to find them. I found most of them from local intellectuals and households in Haixi and in Xining.

There are two recent books about Deed Mongol history, one of which is written by Inner Mongolian scholar B. Oyunbilig, *History of the Hoshuud Mongols* (Khoshuud Tobchiyan)¹¹ 1990. The other history, *Short History of the Mongols in Kök Nuur*, is a collaborative work by local Mongolian and Chinese historians, and first was published in Chinese in 1993, then translated into Mongolian for the 1996 publication. The main editors are Mi Yi Hi and Bürenbayar. Despite its title as a *Short History*, the book presents a very detailed, complete and original history of the area and people, from the Tsiyang habitation of the area before thirteenth century up to modern times. It is not only a history, but also provides religious, political, and ethnological materials about things like the lifestyle, food products, clothes and herding in the region. In particular, a section about the political aspects of the sacrifice to the lake Kök Nuur provides important material for the analysis of multi-national conflicts in the area.

¹¹ I have not yet found this book. The author also published an article in English based on his book, which will be discussed later.

On ethnology and cultural studies, Sarangerel,¹² a native Deed Mongolian, has made a great contribution. She has written two monographs, about Deed Mongolian culture. The first of these, *Customs of the Deed Mongols* (1992), presents: the historical background, politics, establishment and changes of administrative units, law and order, kinship, family and marriage, Buddhism, Islam, shamanism and local religious practices, economy, herding, raw-material production, agriculture, food consumption, clothes, education and many other traditional customs and rituals. Her second book with Konagaya Yuki, *Interpretation of the Deed Mongol Culture: On the example of the 81st birthday celebration for elders* (2002), is about the annual 'celebration of elders' and its relation to ancestral worship. In common with other Mongolian studies on rituals they focus on this particular ritual and questions of how and what they perform, but not much on the conception of respect and the analysis of interpersonal relationships.

Finally, all eight banners of the Haixi sub-province in Qinghai province published their own 'Hoshuu Encyclopaedias' (*Hoshuuny Oilbor*) in Mongolian. All of them have similar contents covering history, politics, religion, economics, kinship, education, language, medicine, herding, statistical numbers and lists of names of their members. The volumes will be relevant background material for general information about each banner. There are also numbers of articles published in local and Inner Mongolian journals.

Acceptance of the Deed Mongols and to what extent I am a native anthropologist?

Sometimes the term native anthropologist is too simple. This involves the question of what kind of anthropologist am I, a Mongolian, among the Deed Mongols in China. There are several reasons to identify myself as a native anthropologist and also several reasons not to. Firstly, I am a native anthropologist because we share the same language, even though our dialects are not exactly the same and there were times when we could not understand each other. After several months with the family Namjil said that he could understand me much better, but there were still some times that I could not understand them when they talked to each other. Secondly, we shared a very similar culture. These two reasons could easily make me a native anthropologist among the Deed Mongols. However, there are in other ways I am not, I did not grow up there, and even for most of

¹² She is a professor at the Beijing University of Nationalities.

the Deed Mongols I was the first outsider to visit them since they settled there about 350 years ago, apart from few monks who escaped from the communists' genocide in Mongolia in the late 1930s and settled there. They know about Mongolia, but there is not much information and only a few Deed Mongols (about 20 by 2003) have actually been to Mongolia. On the other hand most of the people in Mongolia do not know about the Deed Mongols, some people know that there were some Mongols in K ok Nuur, but many of them think that they do not exist anymore. This separation and sometimes ignorance that exists between me, Mongolia and the Deed Mongols made me reconsider my position as a native anthropologist. This suggests that I am probably somewhere between being and not being a native anthropologist.

This further related to the Deed Mongols acceptance of me in the community and raises the question of whether they regarded me as same as themselves. The Deed Mongols always considered me as "true and genuine Mongol" (*jinhene mongol*) as opposed to themselves who had partially become Tibetan and Chinese. In this way, according to them, I could never be a Deed Mongol and even after I had been there for about a year they still considered me a 'genuine Mongol'.. They would never want me to become a Deed Mongol, according to them it would be disrespectful if they saw me as a true Deed Mongol, because am seen to be of a better and higher status. As mentioned in Chapter One, it is disrespectful to decline one's status and consider ones' self the same as someone in a lower rank. It was therefore quick and easy for me to be accepted into the community, even from the beginning wherever I went people regarded me as relative who they had not seen for a very long time and who they had been waiting for. However this was a formal and public acceptance, because at the same time they regarded me as a very special respected guest, which was obviously very agreeable but not really helpful for an anthropologist trying to understand the community from the inside. In the guest and host situation everything is in a ritual form, and, as I argue in the discussion of sincerity, it is difficult to see the reality.

The Deed Mongols consideration of me higher as than them was useful for me to understand certain functions of respect, which I call the respect of hierarchy (to be explained in the next section). However the ritual and formality somehow blocks the relationship between the anthropologist and the people. After I had been there for about six months the mother of my family told people that they respected me very much at the beginning but now they joke with me. In this context, when the family was able joke with me, who they see as someone of a higher rank, it meant that the relationship had become

very informal and close and I had become more like an insider (cf. also Pedersen 2002: 152).

There were some problems and difficulties relating to the fact that China is a communist country. After I had lived in Xining for several months I met a European student who was doing fieldwork among the Tibetan nomads and was arrested and forced to leave K k Nuur. She had to find another family in a different province and settled in Sichuan. The reason that she was arrested, according to the Chinese police, was that foreigners are not allowed to live with a rural Tibetan family. I thought this might apply to me as well. She had all the relevant documents and papers but nothing specifically saying that she could stay with the nomad family. She suspected that one of the local people did not like her being there and wanted to get rid of her. Personally, I have never heard of such a document apart from the local government permissions, but perhaps it was different in Mongol and Tibetan regions. For me it was easier. In the completely Mongol community hardly anyone recognised me as an outsider who might need permission and instead I was a respected and honoured guest. I informed the governor and the village leaders of Z  n Hoshuu of my arrival. Many Deed Mongols asked me to go to Delhii Hot, the capital of Haixi Zhou, which is closed to foreigners because of the Chinese military base in the region, though a lot of them did not know that it was closed to foreigners and even when they did learn this they still invited me there as they did not consider me to be a foreigner. However, in reality this is more serious than they think. Just after I arrived in K k Nuur with two of my friends, a photographer from Belgium and her Mongolian assistant, we went to see G mben Monastery, the birthplace of Zonhov (Tsongk'apa) the founder of Gelug-pa Sects. As soon as we got there, we went into a crowd of people, and lots of Chinese guards and police. We did not know that the so-called "fake" Banchin (Panchin) Lama was visiting on that day. Local Tibetans in particular think that he is "fake" and the Chinese arrested the genuine one. My photographer friend and her assistant were arrested and detained for several hours and she had to give up her films.

There were certain topics that I could not discuss with people because of the political restrictions, some of these being the essential subjects of the research such as power, politics and state. Even though I tried not to focus my research on the Deed Mongols political situation and colonialism, my research on the Mongolian state in particular could potentially have been interpreted as anti-Chinese, as I will discuss in

Chapter Four. Usually people are not keen to discuss these topics and all I could do was watch carefully and make notes but certainly not interview people.

Background and précis of arguments

Respect: Meaning and Classification. Respect is such an essential aspect of relationships that it can be found in any interaction between people. In that sense, the term ‘interpersonal’ that I use in this thesis should be understood in its widest sense, such as personification of material, immaterial attributes and non-human beings. Since respect is an essential element in relationships it is important in anthropology to find out more about it. When we talk about respect we might need to reconsider many anthropological theories concerning similar or related topics, such as power, which I discuss in the next part of the introduction.

Almost no anthropological research has been conducted on the notion of respect (*kündetgel*)¹³. However similar notions are underlined in research by anthropologists and social scientists. The only work on respect I have found so far is the study by the sociologist Richard Sennett (2003). He complains of a lack of respect and discusses its importance in western culture. He concludes that treating people with respect cannot occur simply by commanding it should happen. Mutual recognition has to be negotiated; this negotiation engages the complexities of personal character as much as social structure (Sennett 2003: 260). Before Sennett, a similar issue was also addressed by the philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) in his study of multiculturalism and theory of political recognition. He illustrates “the demand for recognition” especially in the context of racism, women in patriarchal societies, colonization and so on. Moreover, he writes about the move in the modern world from social hierarchy and honour to equality and dignity. Dignity is, as he puts it, “now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent ‘dignity of human beings’, or citizen dignity” and “the underlying premise here is that everyone shares in it” (Taylor 1992: 27). Extending the notion of dignity he also mentions respect. He argues that “the politics of equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect” (Taylor 1992: 41). It is clear from this that he had a certain type of respect in mind, which concerns equality but not hierarchy. By contrast, I will focus on people who hold a certain rank according to a socially defined

¹³ Unpublished PhD thesis, Carlos Mondragon, *Las ples, las aelan, las tingting: Living respect and knowledge in the Torres Islands, Vanuatu*, University of Cambridge, 2003.

order and want their status or identity to be recognized correctly in the hierarchical system.

As such, both writers focus on the type of respect that I call the 'respect of common courtesy'. Unlike them, my research focuses mainly on a different type of respect. Rather than discussing the importance of respect in a society, I will try to analyze respect itself. My research does not only focus on the propositions of the possibilities of arousing respect in a community where it is lacking, as studied by Charles Taylor and Richard Sennett, it also explores actual respect in a society with a great deal of existing respect.

In order to create respect, according to Sennett "people would have to practice exchanges of a peculiar kind; they would have to break down in certain ways their own tacit assumptions" (Sennett 2003: 246). He also calls this "tacit knowledge", in opposition to "explicit knowledge". "The tacit realm is formed by habits which, once learned, become unselfconscious; the explicit realm emerges when habit encounters resistance and challenge, and so requires conscious deliberation" (Sennett 2003: 232). This implies that by following a given fixed order and structure, which is "tacit knowledge", people are not able to establish respect. I underline that this is not as simple as it sounds. There is some other "tacit knowledge" which is specifically designed to establish a certain type of respect. For example, 'performative respect' is based on a 'tacit knowledge' and expressed through unselfconscious, rigid, ritualised actions.

There are not many studies looking directly at respect in Mongolia. However, many writings indirectly involve respect and in Mongolia, unlike in the West, these are usually about ritual and hierarchy, but not much about common courtesy. They often focus on the actual performances, customs and rituals but not the respect involved, as I noticed in the review of the literature on Sarangerel's work. No-one posed and answered the question what it is actually to respect and to be respected and how it feels and how it effects relationships etc.

Since there are not many previous definitions and illustrations for such a thing as respect I should clarify what I mean by it. It would be too limiting to attempt a rigid definition of the notion of respect, because it is a social construct that can be different in various cultures. In this thesis, I will use the term respect in its broadest sense, as a socially constructed attitude placing the other person or his/her particular character, achievements, talents and so on at a high level, or simply counting them as important and worthy of recognition.

The Deed Mongol term *kündetgel*¹⁴ (*hiündetgel* in Mongolian) and the idea behind the term are quite similar in meaning to the English term “respect”. Both the Mongolian and English terms have two different meanings. The first meaning related to common courtesy and equality. People should treat each other in the same way without regard to origin, position, race, education, religion and so on. This is about not denigrating people and treating them with common courtesy. It follows the notion that everyone is equal as a human being and deserves humane treatment.

As Charles Taylor says, in a democratic, dignified global culture the English term ‘respect’ is most commonly used to refer to the idea of ‘common courtesy’. ‘It is obvious that this concept of dignity is the only one compatible with a democratic society, and that it was inevitable that the old concept of honour was superseded. But this has also meant that the forms of equal recognition have been essential to democratic culture. For instance, that everyone can be called “Mr.”, “Mrs.” or “Miss.”, rather than some people being called “Lord” or “Lady” and others simply by surnames – or, even more demeaning, by their first names – has been thought essential in some democratic societies, such as the United States. More recently, for similar reasons, ‘Mrs.’ and ‘Miss’ have been collapsed into ‘Ms.’” (Taylor 1992: 27).

However, this does not mean that the word ‘respect’ does not have the meaning ‘to respect a superior’. There is another meaning of respect that sees society as unequal and hierarchical. Sometimes people raise others to a level above the common standard. People respect someone who is superior to them, or who they think has ‘something’, like a ‘concentrated quality’ that others do not have. There are many kinds of social construction of superiority or the ‘something’. It can be anything, material or immaterial, such as: money, position, education, talent, experience, age, gender and so on. Thus, the relationship is between superior and inferior, and so concerns hierarchy and inequality.

Probably the meaning of hierarchy is subordinate in the imagination of the word ‘respect’ to its meaning of dignity. Unlike the use of the English term ‘respect’, the Mongolian term *kündleh*, for instance in the Deed Mongol community, more importantly signifies ‘to respect a superior’, while the meaning ‘common courtesy’ is subordinate. There are also cases of respect that combine both of the meanings; for example, one can respect another as superior but still think that the superior should receive no special treatment but common courtesy.

¹⁴ The term is a noun. Its verb is *kündetgeh* or *kündleh*.




Figure 5 Direction of action in 'respect of common courtesy'

Both respect of common courtesy and hierarchy have the meaning of putting someone or something in a 'higher rank'. Here, 'high rank' should be understood in two different contexts. In the case of 'common courtesy', to put someone in a 'higher rank' means bringing him from the 'lower rank' to the 'rank of common courtesy'. People perform this kind of respect in order not to 'put down' (*dord üzeh* and *doromjloh*) or humiliate each other. However, in the case of the respect of hierarchy, the respected person is considered higher than the 'rank of common courtesy'. In addition to the action to put someone up, the respect of common courtesy also has the meaning of pulling down someone from a higher rank to being an equal (for equality and inequality see Chapter Two) (see Figure 5) of 'common courtesy rank'. In this sense, the respect of common courtesy contradicts the respect of hierarchy because the respect of hierarchy does not mix ranks, it regards them as unequal and places them on the different levels (Figure 6). By decreasing one's rank or simply mixing ranks and not recognizing any fixed order the respect of common courtesy can be seen as disrespect for people who have a respect of hierarchy dominant in their culture (cf. also Chapter One). On the contrary, any attempt to put other people in a higher rank in the discourse of the respect of hierarchy can also be seen as disrespect for people in a community who see the respect of common courtesy as essential.




Figure 6 Direction of action in 'respect of hierarchy'

The above answers my question about the sense in which people respect each other. What is the rationale of respect? The 'rationale of respect' is one of the three main subjects of my research on respect. Before moving on to the second subject I need to describe the features of the Deed Mongol hierarchy. Following, Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer (1998: 608) I will use the most elementary definition for hierarchy as 'a system of individuals, social classes or groups ranked from high to low in status'. I cannot follow more detailed definitions such as Louis Dumont's (1980) famous theory about hierarchy: that it is a structure whereby the ranked parts are related to an idea (the values) pertaining to the whole. In India purity/pollution is the idea that applies to the whole caste system. The Deed Mongols' hierarchy relates neither to a 'whole' nor is it judged by purity and impurity, they have their own mechanisms of hierarchy. Unlike in India, there is no single method, instead it has two main methods: firstly, gender – men then women, secondly, age – senior and junior, which I will discuss in Chapter One. There are also secondary important methods such as (3rd) religious learning and (4th) political position etc.

The second subject concerns the 'expression of respect'. In the expression of respect, sometimes following social regulations and performing repeated, ritualised actions is more important than expressing personal intentions. This I will call 'performative respect'. There are also cases where people can express their personal intentions of respecting, which I will call 'non-performative respect'. Following the same

path I will deal with the third subject which is the about the 'sincerity of respect'. Here, I will classify respect into sincere and insincere, and explain when and why it is sincere or insincere (Figure 7).




Figure 7 Classification of respect

The expression of respect concerns people's acts of respect in communications. There are several differences between the performative and non-performative expression of respect; however sometimes the border between the two is not very clear. In the following I will illustrate to what extent they are separable or inseparable. In 'performative respect' the most important thing is to follow, repeat and complete customs, rules and ritual acts. The rigid customs¹⁵ and rituals that must be completed do not permit the performers to reveal their innermost feelings and opinions. For example, in the Mongol community when one offers something to a respected person, especially ritually, it must be offered with both hands or with the right hand with the elbow supported by the left hand. It is compulsory to perform an action that shows the performance of respect, but this is not necessarily a

¹⁵ Rigid is the quality that Deed Mongols perceive when they describe customs. This is how they think of customs, though in reality people do change ritual customs.

sincere respect. The opposite of this is 'non-performative respect'¹⁶ where the respect expressed is more important than the performance of it. It is impulsive and does not have to follow rules or complete rigid customs and therefore people can express their true feelings. This can be expressed through simple acts and behaviour in communication, by telling the other person that he/she is respected, helping or attempting to help, allowing the person to speak first, listening carefully to the respected person, not laughing or speaking loudly or in a high tone and so on. These can be the same acts of 'performative respect'; however the difference is that 'performative respect' is compulsory. Another difference between the two expressions of respect is the intention to respect. In the 'non-performative respect' the performer expresses the intention to respect. Contrary to this, in 'performative respect' performers do not necessarily express their personal intention to respect and they might not intentionally respect the person; however, they should still perform respect. In that sense he/she might only be performing but not actually respecting. Even if they do have the intention to respect, it is not clearly revealed and is hidden behind the compulsory performance, which is considered more important. However, I should underline that I am not making the bold conclusion that all 'non-performative respect' is intentional and all 'performative respect' is non-intentional.

Intentional 'performative respect' can be another special type of respect, which is a combination of the two respects, performative plus non-performative. It is possible for someone to respect the other intentionally and performatively at the same time. I will call this type "additional respect" in Chapter One and provide examples.

Furthermore, the intention to respect brings out the third aspect of respect, which is the question of sincerity, and addresses the question of whether one truly respects the other. The intention to respect should not be confused with sincerity in respect, because the intention to respect does not necessarily have to be sincere. Obviously, respect can be either sincere or insincere. Sincerity is an issue independent of respect, which is a personal feeling. The sincerity of a person's respect does not necessarily have to be absolutely apparent in the expressions of respect. Therefore, in the actual relationship it is difficult to know whether any attitude of respect is sincere or not. In Chapter Two I argue

¹⁶ One might argue that there is no action that is 'non-performative'. I agree with the idea that every action can be defined as a performance to one extent or another. My use of the term 'non-performative' does not mean that it is not performance instead I mean there is less importance and concentration on the performance which is a non-ritualised and intentional action as opposed to what I called the performative expression of respect.

that respect can be sincere in cases where there is no oppression or coercion and vice versa. Moreover, I argue that sincere respect produces power.

Power: Meaning and Classification. One can find related issues and theoretical literature on respect if it is seen in a broader sense as implied in social relationships. If I rephrase respect as a social relationship, one of the closely connected targets of my research necessarily will be power. Numerous studies have been done on power, not the least of which has been Michel Foucault's work. However, a principal theoretical concern of the proposed project is to approach power from a very different angle, which opposes that of Foucault and many other writers. The project aims to show that the concept of respect provides us with a completely different angle from which to see power, one that does not focus on resistance but the acknowledgement of respect.

At the initial stage, power is best understood in terms of how it is manifested as a relationship or discourse, as Foucault puts it, which I will acknowledge. Sociologist John Scott (1994), following Steven Lukes, argues that at the most fundamental level "power must be seen as involving the production of causal effects: 'The absolute basic common core of, or primitive notion lying behind, all the talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects B'" (Scott 1994: General Commentary). I adopt this notion of power and I discuss Foucault's (Smart 1985: 79 and Foucault 1980: 98) idea that power is not a commodity and cannot be possessed by anyone. It is true that power is a very abstract and broad notion that cannot be fully possessed by one person. However, in Chapter Two I argue that people indirectly possess power. I claim that power has different ways of revealing itself and it has various embodiments which can be possessed, for example, holding an important position, being: an elder, a male, wealthy, educated, aware of important information etc. that can be used to affect someone else. In this way, people can indirectly possess aspects of power by possessing its embodiments.

The majority of works on power though, turn to a discussion of class (through Marx), domination (via Weber), and discipline (following Foucault), hegemony (Gramsci), "symbolic power" (Bourdieu), sovereignty (Agamben), relating these with repression, coercion, opposition, resistance and struggle. For example M. Weber writes that "domination in the quite general sense of power, i.e., of the possibility of imposing one's own will upon the behaviour of other persons" (Weber 1986: 29). Eric R. Wolf writes: "the enactment of power always creates friction – disgruntlement, foot-dragging, escapism, sabotage, protest or outright resistance", a panoply of responses well

documented with Malaysian materials by James Scott (1985) in *Weapons of the Weak* (Wolf 1990: 590). Much of the literature, then, suggests that the opposition of agents is essential to power, where one coerces and represses and the other responds to this with resistance and the dialogical relationship ends with a fight. For example, almost all Foucault's writings bring up opposition, labelling it with terms like "discipline and punishment" (1977), "local knowledge and global (scientific) knowledge" (1980), "society and government" (1991). The idea that opposition is intrinsic to power is not misleading, even if somewhat platitudinous, and it is the reason why a study of respect is necessary.

However, there are few anthropologists and political scientist who propose the idea that power should not always be analysed in terms of resistant nature and suggest similar ideas to mine. For example, Hannah Arendt argues "power and violence are the opposite; where the one rules absolutely, the other one is absent" (Arendt 1986: 71). This has two different explanations, one is that people are too scared to resist so that they just obey even though they tacitly resist, second, people might respect and support the power and therefore no violence is necessary. I will present more writers who propose ideas similar to 'power without resistance'.

Unlike in the West, ideas about 'non-resistant nature' are very common in the Mongol culture. A Mongolian political scientist N. Lündendorj writes that, "the nature of arguing, competing and resisting is essential in the rationale of the Western culture. This feature becomes the main regulation of the technique to organize social life. Therefore, the discussions of class conflict, world wars, protests for human rights, and so on, began in the West not in the East. In this way liberalism and Marxism were both created and developed first in the West" (Lündendorj 2002: 14). It may be too extreme to make such distinction between the West and East (c. f. Said 1978 for orientalism and Carrier 1995 for occidentalism). I think, the single statement is not persuasive and it demands more research. However, it is true within the scope of my research on respect. Similarly, Ts. Erdemt, another Mongolian philosopher and political scientist, points out that "power can be empowered by following the main stream of the flow of power and gathering it, but not resisting and distracting it" (Erdemt 2002: 34). I suppose this addresses the obedient and deferential nature of the Mongols.

This research is on a completely new topic, namely the coexistence of respect and power without resistance. In the discourse that I propose the powerful one supports and

respects, but does not coerce and oppress, and the powerless, in return, respects and obeys, but does not resist, and the overall conclusion is not a fight but peace and harmony, which I discuss in Chapter Three. I do not argue that a society can be harmonious without any conflicts or fights, and I do not believe that a human society can ever live peacefully with no conflict or opposition at all. Instead, what I focus on is the attempt at an ideal relationship to be based on such a 'formula of respect and power', and I illustrate the extent to which it becomes the reality. Deed Mongol villages have more of this formula of 'respect and power' than 'resistance and power'. In Chapter Two, I will analyse various attempts to illustrate the different types of power, including a type with little or no resistance. I will argue that different types of respect produce power to different extents, while some cases of respect might not produce power at all. The main formula is that one makes the other powerful by respecting him/her/it.

The question involves relating types of power and respect to one another, such as power without resistance, power with resistance, 'power almost without resistance', and sincere respect and insincere respect. In Chapter Two, following discussion of some anthropological theories such as Foucault's 'internal productive power' (Mitchell 1999) and Mitchell's 'self re-producing power' (1990), I claim that there is a third type of power which lies between power with resistance and power without resistance. These are the theories closest to my idea of power without resistance; however, they are different from what I mean by the expression 'power without resistance, but with respect'. Therefore I call it 'power almost without resistance'. The difference is that 'power almost without resistance' is based on a continuation of oppression and coercion, which is normalized in the long run and no longer considered as coercive by the people who are its target. Because people no longer feel the external coercion, they respond to the power not with resistance but without resistance, even maybe with respect (cf. also Chapter Two).

Chapters of the thesis

The main idea of the thesis, the power of respect, which is a type of power without resistance, is dominant and recurs throughout as I try to show that the idea works in the different contexts of social organization. In Chapter One, I try to provide a wide range of basic ethnography for the further analysis of respect in the later chapters. This I hope will give readers a background understanding of how respect works in the Deed Mongol rationality. I have tried to answer the questions of when, where, who respects whom, and

why and how does he/she respect in the Deed Mongol culture. I called these contents the technology of respect. There are at least two agents in the relationship, the positions of: being respected and of respecting and the first half of the Chapter is about the technology of giving respect. There is a social hierarchy where everyone has various fixed ranks and everyone in the society is well aware of who is in which rank and how one has to treat someone in a given rank. This suggests that to respect in the hierarchical rationale simply means to recognise and follow fixed social order. Not following the order creates disorder and this equals disrespect. I illustrate the social order in the case of the arrangement of space inside the *ger* (felt tent) in everyday life and at feasts and ceremonies. The Chapter also explains how this respect is revealed through actual performance, use of language and addressing people. Since this is bound into the rigid social structure, people usually follow the pre-defined and pre-organized routines non-intentionally. Conversely, the other half of the chapter addresses issues of intentional, strategic manners adopted by people in order to be respected. In addition to socially defined positions acquiring respect through age and gender, personal manners are also a crucial criterion for attaining respect, especially in the sincerity of respect. I have called this the technology of being respected. I list the criteria of being respected in the Deed Mongol community and discuss issues of reputation, false modesty and self-respect. I argue that in the Deed Mongol rationale of hierarchical respect, such a thing as 'self-respect' or self-esteem, does not exist. Because self-esteem could easily imply putting oneself higher than the other people in the interaction, which is considered to be very bad manners and fails to arouse respect from others.

In the other three chapters of the thesis I try to show how respect produces power, or simply how one makes another person powerful by respecting him/her, in different contexts, such as leadership, collaboration and state. Chapter Two clarifies the differences of the two mechanisms of power in the comparison of local and Chinese leaderships. I argue that the local leadership and power emerges from respect and therefore it does not arouse resistance. In the local election for village leadership the villagers vote for the person they respect the most. In this case the power is not in the position but the reputation and respect that the leader has accumulated before the election. Since this type of power is gained through respect it is detached from resistance. But in the higher administrative units the leadership is a decision taken by the ruling authority. It does not regard people's opinions and this is oppressive and gives rise to different methods of resistance. The difference between the two types of power is that the former one is a

process of constituting a power, while the latter one is already a constituted power and does not depend on the people under its domination. In addition to this, anthropologists have suggested similar ideas about a certain type of power that I call 'power almost without resistance' which I discussed in the previous section. (c. f. also the previous part Power: Meaning and Classification).

In Chapter Three, I focus on the different types of production of power by respect. Unlike Chapter Two, here I will show that respect does not only make someone powerful, but also can make the whole society powerful. In other words, respect creates a collective and collaborative power (*olny hüich*). This chapter deals with the question of what happens when many kinds of respect and 'power without resistance' interact in the village relations. The issue of respecting each other in the whole village area was one of the main points addressed in the official village meetings that I used as the main ethnography of the chapter. I try to answer the question by analysing the idea of *biilkemdel* 'collaboration'. According to the Deed Mongols, people 'respect elders and love juniors' in the *biilkemdel*. The local term *hairlah* with the literal meaning of 'love' stands for help, support and contribution. In this way people exchange respect with "love" and try to build peaceful and harmonious solidarity in the community. This is the collective goal in the village and everyone agrees with this point. Under this common goal and through the function of respect and 'love' they create a "collective power" (*olny hüich*) based on the collaboration of every individual. This can be summarised by the phrase "two heads are better than one". I used an early philosophers' argument on the creation of a Leviathan. This might seem an unsuitable comparison, because the argument of the leviathan relates to a whole country and nation while my argument on the Deed Mongol's *biilkemdel* concerns a village. However, the arguments are the same in essence and I try therefore to apply it at a micro level.

Chapter Four continues with the same idea, that respect creates power and proves it again in the case of respect for the state. I argue that respect creates an abstract Mongol state in the absence of present institutions and its actual existence. Therefore the Deed Mongols have in mind two states, the Chinese actual state and an abstract Mongol state. In the background to their culture the Deed Mongols share a conception with other Mongols of regarding the state as something that supports and takes care of people, in other words 'love' as mentioned in Chapter Three. The 'love' and protection of the state arouses people's respect for the state. This, to different extents, applies to both the Mongol and Chinese states. Moreover, the conception is combined with the cult of the

state and encourages people to focus on the positive acts of the state more than its negative acts such as oppression and coercion. Together these constitute the conception that the state must be respected. In addition to this, the Deed Mongols' glamorous past and diminishing future empowers and activates their respect for and creation of the abstract Mongol state. Their history of the rise, and the possible 'disappearance of the nation' by losing their language and culture, i.e. becoming Tibetan or Chinese, makes them nostalgic for their period of rule in Tibet and Kōk Nuur. They, as the smallest minority in the area, had to go through fierce battles of different cultures. For however much they lose their Mongolness, they still respect Mongolness. They consider that one of the main reasons for their decline and collapse is the absence of their own actual state. In this way through their nostalgia they bring out the 'abstract Mongol state'.

Technology of Respect

1.1 Introduction

I use the term technology in order to illustrate how mechanisms of respect work. If we see respect as a big machine then it consists of mechanisms that work together. People are the mechanisms of respect. People act together and establish the phenomenon respect. The exploration of the technology of respect will range between questions such as who respects whom, why they respect them and in what way they respect them, and where and what one should do and what behaviour one should follow to be respected. An interpersonal relationship has at least two or more actors or groups of actors, one respects and the other is respected.

Following the same approach, I will focus on two general categories of the technology of respect. One is a technology of respecting, and the other is a technology of being respected. In combination with these two, there are three more categories, performative respect, non-performative respect and a mixture of the two, which I called the 'combination of the performative and non-performative respect' in the Introduction. Performative and non-performative respect requires analysis in relation to the issue of the technologies of respecting and being respected. I start by illustrating the technology of respecting, mostly in the sense of who is supposed to respect whom and how. I will claim that the issue of respect usually applies to performative respect and concerns what people regularly do to show respect. In this mode, to respect is a ritualised, fixed, repeated action where people do not necessarily express their personal opinions, which I call non-intentional. However, I should also underline that when performances of respect are intentional they are enriched with 'additional respect' (see Introduction) or disrespect, over and above the actual following of the rules and customs.

Being respected, on the other hand, usually involves non-performative respect, which I will illustrate in the second half of the chapter. In other words, rules and customs of hierarchical respect apply mostly to the inferior person, while the superiors do not have to do much to respect, but they have much to worry about arousing respect from others. I

will analyse how people should behave and what they should do in order to be respected. In the case of performative respect, a person has to be older and male in order to be respected, which does not involve any challenging personal endeavours but merely the passing of the years; this kind of respect works in one direction only, from inferior to superior. However, the issue of being respected in the sense of non-performative respect is intentional and requires one's personal efforts, and it works in two directions: upwards and downwards.

Within hierarchal relationships people respect others they regard as good, right, important, talented, extraordinary, supreme and powerful, or sometimes simply different. More precisely, people respect others within a hierarchy in comparison to themselves or, in general, to the other people. This partially answers the question of who respects whom, what and why. In other words, a person respects a particular quality that he lacks and is unable to achieve, because it is unreachable, unachievable and inaccessible for himself or for the community. The key point is not only the fact that he does not have this quality or ability that the other has but also that he must regard it as positive, right, important, superior and so on. Therefore we have a combination of two elements, firstly a person recognizing that what he or she lacks should be respected in another person, and secondly that others' attributes should be regarded as positive and desirable qualities. This respected, concentrated quality is socially constructed in a community. Therefore, something respected in one society may not necessarily be respected in another; moreover, it even can be disrespected by other societies. In my case, elders are the most respected people in the Deed Mongol village. Being younger than someone is inevitable and it constitutes lower status in the villager's social construction. I will come back to this later when I discuss S. Yanagisako's idea of the naturalization of power. When people respect someone's concentrated qualities they can also feel jealous. This might affect the spontaneity and sincerity of the respect.

If the one who possesses negative qualities that others lack is in power and holds authority, then people only show performative respect, which can obscure a sincere lack of respect. If the situation is reversed, for instance if one who possesses a positive quality that other people do not possess is the powerful authority then people respect him/her performatively and sincerely.

In Deed Mongol relationships there are two general ways of ranking ones attributes and deficiencies. One is a social definition and the other is a personal definition. There is

a socially defined order and status that people have to follow and obey without regard to their inward opinions. The socially accepted order is through age and gender; males and elders are regarded as higher than females and younger people. Through this arrangement everyone has a certain socially defined status, which every other person must recognise. Apart from this social definition, anyone can personally respect someone else because for a quality which the respecting person does not have, and by thinking of the person as better and higher. All of this together constitutes hierarchical respect, unlike the respect of common courtesy where one thinks that the respected person is equal (see Chapter Three for equality and inequality) and therefore respects him/her.

People who possess positive qualities which are lacking in others also need to behave appropriately and for the benefit of their society in order not to lose reputation and respect. To arouse respect people must respect and “love” (*hairlah*) (“love” in the sense of support and help) other people (cf. also Chapter Three for the idea of respect for the powerful and “love” for the powerless), which is a specifically Mongol notion. This is the junction of the two: to respect and to be respected. Deed Mongols behave carefully and try not to put anyone down and elevate themselves because hierarchically to regard and treat someone as lower than oneself or lower than the person’s socially defined status is disrespectful. If one does not respect, or indeed disrespects someone, then the disrespected person does not reciprocate with respect. In order to avoid disrespecting others and then in turn to be disrespected, Deed Mongols prefer self-abasement and do not express self-importance, which I will discuss in the second half of this chapter.

1.2 Technology of respecting:

Life between the head and the foot governed by the power of *yos*

1.2.1 Order and social construction of the space inside the *ger*

One of the first things immediately noticeable to an outsider about the Deed Mongols is the serious distinction they make between the head (*tolgoi*) and the foot (*köl*). This tradition exists in Mongolia, but it is clearly regarded more seriously in the Deed Mongol village. Even I, as a Mongolian, failed several times to make such a distinction at the beginning of my fieldwork. I have chosen the *ger* felt tent of the nomads to begin my

explanation of respect because the *ger* is an inseparable part of Mongol culture deeply related to their everyday life. In other words, it is an everyday site where nomads perform most of their cultural activities such as respect.

The mother of the family is Altantsetseg who we call Bergen which means the “bride”. She used to make my bed as well as her father in-law’s bed, and her matrimonial bed. When I was first there I did not know where to sleep and which felt mattress (*esgii desvger*) and duvet¹ to use, but soon after I started making my own bed. One night when I was making my bed and she noticed I was putting the duvet on upside down. She then told me that the duvet has a ‘head’ and ‘foot’ (*könjliin köl tolgoi*). This also applies to the mattress. She underlined how important this was and that when someone else would use that sheet and duvet again in the future and they would not appreciate it if I had used it upside down. Indirectly this means no one would want to have my foot on his/her head. A small mark is placed on the sheets and duvet when they are made to enable people to recognise the “head” and the “foot”. Even after this, I failed to recognise the “head” and “foot” on another occasion.

It was one of the hot, dry sunny days that make people want a cold shower. Apparently, there are no bathing facilities in the nomads summer camp; the winter house also lacks such facilities. This is less of a problem in the winter house where there are different rooms, and people wash before going to bed. However, in the summer people usually live in one or two *gers* and there is no privacy for anything like bathing. Even not wearing enough clothes and showing certain parts of the body is considered rude. I was once criticised by members of the family I was staying with for going around without a shirt and having a bare chest. It is thus almost impossible to wash in the presence of others. I have often seen people wash their heads and feet, in other words body parts that can be shown, when there are not too many people present. Following these customs, I was washing myself for the first time. There was a metal basin (washing bowl), called *garyn gadar* ‘hand bowl’, which I used to wash my head, neck, chest and arms. Then I changed the water and started to wash my feet. Just after I finished, the father of my family, whose real name is Bat but we called him Baba, saw me washing and he said to

¹ Women sew all the bedding and the cotton parts of the *ger*. The mattress is made of sheep wool felt, and covered with cotton. Camel wool or sheep wool is also used to make the duvet, which is covered with cotton.

me angrily “*Ta yadag hiin be?*”², “What kind of man are you [to do this]?” I did not know what I had done wrong and asked him what had happened and he said “Where you live do people wash their feet in the hand bowl?” Then I understood that I had washed my feet in the wrong basin and apologised deeply and asked him to show me the bowl for feet. He pointed to a bigger basin, which I recognised it as the one the mother of the family, Bergen, used for washing clothes. He called it *köliin gadar*, the “foot bowl”.

This separation cannot be fully expressed using only one or two pairs of words such as ‘upper’ and ‘lower’. It would be too limited to discuss the notion using only a particular example. I will argue that there is a complex rationality with different versions sharing a general theory. In the following I will use the pair words ‘upper’ (*deer*) and ‘lower’ (*door*) to indicate the shared general theory. Therefore, my use of the word ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ has to be taken with its broadest range of implications. It includes understandings of ancestor and descent, head (*tolgoi*) and foot (*köl*), state and civil society, superior and inferior, elder and junior, man and woman, spirit and human, pure and impure, good and bad, rich and poor, rare (uncommon) and common, valuable and worthless, and so on. This is what the linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980) define as a significant metaphor. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5). More precisely, the Deed Mongol case is what they call the “orientational metaphor”, which is to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow and central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that our bodies are as they are and that they function as they do in our physical environment (1980: 14). In other words, they claim that spatial metaphors (upper/lower and right/left) are often derived from concepts of the body and then extended into wider use in society and politics.

For Mongols everything from concrete to abstract, from living and non-living can be classified as upper or lower, or any degree between the two. In relation to the degree, everything has its suitable place or status. For example, an upper thing must be kept in the upper place, and a lower in the lower place. When things are not in the place where they are meant to be, then it is not right and not in order. Moreover, the right order and right match represents respect and disorder and mismatch is considered as disrespect.

² Even though he felt offended by what I had done, he still called me *ta*, the respectful form of address. I will return to this in the discussion of language.

Therefore, in order not to show disrespect and not to lose respect from others one has to be aware of the order and the match. Mary Douglas ([1966] 2002) analyses a similar ethnographic issue concerning purity and impurity. In order to be pure people must not eat certain species that are considered impure when there are other species that are edible and pure. Developing the idea of holiness as order, not confusion, this list upholds rectitude and straight dealing as holy, and contradiction and double-dealing as against holiness. To be holy is to be whole, to be one; holiness is unity, integrity perfection of the individual and of the other kind. Dietary rules merely develop the metaphor of holiness along the same lines (Douglas [1966] 2002: 55). For example, animals that swarm are contrary to holiness. Since the main animal categories are defined by their typical manner of movement, 'swarming' which is not a mode of propulsion proper to any particular element, cuts across the basic classification. Swarming things are neither fish, nor, flesh nor fowl. [...] There is no order in them (Douglas [1966] 2002: 57). Therefore they are not edible. In other words, systematic order is pure and holy while disorder is impure and dangerous. A similar logic also works in the Deed Mongol customs of respect. As I described, the head is upper and the foot is lower, they can never be exchanged or mixed, as that would be, as Douglas claims, to "cut across the basic classification", in the same way as eels, worms, reptiles and flying insects do.

The easiest way 'to be correct' (in Mongol rationality) and know the order is to regard things as a human body, because Mongols personify everything and regard everything in terms of a human body (cf. also Lacaze 2000: 43-44). It makes better sense for a Mongol to see things in terms of head to foot, as Lakoff and Johnson maintain in their study of metaphor.

...Personification is a general category that covers a wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or ways of looking at a person. What they have in common is that they allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.... [Personification] has an explanatory power of the only sort that makes sense to most people (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 34).

It is fundamentally significant to know which part of the body is respected and which is not according to Mongol thinking. The key formula is the vertical continuum from "head" (*tolgoi*) to "foot" (*höl*). In between the two, the degrees of respect of hierarchy decline

from the crown of the head³ to the foot. There are endless taboos and customs starting from the prohibition of not touching anyone's head, especially never touching the head of a person of higher status (for comparison with other ethnic Mongols cf. also Norbubazar and Enghe⁴ 2000: 189-190). This, moreover, extends from the human body to other aspects of culture. For example, everything related to the head, such as a hat (cf. also Bürinbayar⁵ 2002: 177), head band, glasses and so on are attributes of upper status. Because people put them on their head these things have to be treated as though they are a head. The superiority of the head is not limited to the attributes that belong to the head; it furthermore enlarges its scale and covers aspects of mental work and intelligence. Following this logic, there is a custom of considering books as superior. I presume that this comes from the times when people could read and write (cf. also Humphrey [1974; 1979: 33, Norbubazar and Enghe 2000: 206, 321 and Dugarsürüng 1988: 45) books were rare and counted as something superior. The same sympathy also applies to academic people (*erdemten, nomyn hiin*), teachers, students and anyone who is well educated and intelligent. In that sense Mongols always consider education as the most valuable investment. That is also one of the reasons why only a few young people left in the village are of secondary school and university age. Züün Hoshuu was famous for its number of university students.

Mongolians never put socks, underwear or boots on the head or mix them with any kind of headdress, books and so on. To place lower things on top of upper things is disrespect for the higher object, its owner and all people who share the same notion. In this way, besides respecting or disrespecting each other with a direct relationship, people can also perform it in indirect ways by following or not following the order and custom, and messing with peoples' belongings. Clothes, belongings and any other attributes can

³ The crown of the head (*oroi* or *zulai*) is the untouchable part of a human being. Shamans in Mongolia describe it as the gate of the "soul of the mind" (*oyuny siins*), or of heaven (*tengeriin siins*) some others say, which inhabits the head. This is one of the three souls of a human being, and the other two are the "soul of the bone" (*yasny siins*) and the "soul of the flesh" (*mahny siins*) (cf. also S. Dulam 2000: 110-114 and O. Purev 2002: 136-142). People must wear a hat to show complete respect. Apparently people do not explain why one has to wear a hat and it becomes accepted. According to the shamans, a hat acts as a guard of the "soul of the mind" and thus wearing a hat has the meaning of holding the soul inside the body or the head. Therefore, according to shamanic rationality, without a hat one's soul of the mind might not be in one's body. This rationality further claims that a man without hat might be incomplete, without his "soul of mind", or an "empty body". Then the rationale suggests that an "empty body" cannot express proper respect.

⁴ Academics from Inner Mongolia.

⁵ Originally from Inner Mongolia and settled in the Deed Mongol. He is a leading local academic.

be substituted for man in order to show respect or disrespect to others. This is very clear in the order of things inside a Mongol *ger*, a round felt tent⁶.

The same tension applies also to history, ancestors and elders (cf. also Sampildendev⁷ 2002: 57-61). They are the origin of the present and in terms of time they are prior to descendents as parents are prior to children. This extends to a wider arena of tradition (*ulamjlal*) and custom (*yos*⁸). Traditions and customs are taught by ancestors and people respect them in the same way as they respect ancestors (see Chapter Four for customs of the state). Lars Højer, who did fieldwork in the north of Mongolia and wrote a thesis about communications and relationships (2003: 109), writes that in Mongolia “old people are considered almost ‘incarnations’ of *yos*”. Apparently as in many other cultures, the same tendency applies to social status. In this way educated people are considered as the head of the society while the least educated are the followers of the head, which is the foot. This illustrates the two extreme ends of upper and lower, but it should be underlined that it does not mean that there are no middle statuses.

To follow this order is crucial, first, to respect the *yos* custom, and secondly, to respect people who are governed by it. The *yos* custom is a powerful phenomenon in society, which rules everyone and applies to every single social relationship. This is a unique social construction of power. People perform respect because it is *yos*, which they must follow, and this *yos* decides who is powerful and who is not in the society. It is an overall organizing mechanism that gives meaning to the society’s constructions. This is similar to Eric R. Wolf’s (1990: 586) discussion of one of the four modes of power (I will discuss his other modes of power in the Chapter Two).

But there is still a fourth mode of power, power that not only operates within settings or domains but that also organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves, and that

⁶ In most parts of Mongolia the entrance of the *ger* always faces south. In West Mongolia Oirats put their *gers* facing towards east from where the sun rises. Deed Mongols, who are historically Hoshuud, one of the four tribes of Oirats, also put their *gers* facing east. However, they do not call it east; instead they continue to call it south. The cardinal south for them is west. For them south is west, west is north and north is east. See also S. Dulam (2000: 151-188) for the same kind of claims about the sense of direction of ancient Mongols).

⁷ A Mongolian academician and head of the Institute of Mongolian Philology, Mongolian Academy of Sciences, who studies Mongol folklore and literature.

⁸ *Yos*, meaning rule, custom, habit or etiquette, but maybe better translated as *the proper Mongolian way of doing things*. When the explanation for a rule is unknown, *yos* is simply evoked as the reason. Alternatively, people say that to do this or that is bad (*muu*) or that you may not do so (*bolohgüi*), but this also seems to be implied in the context. *Yos* is deeply ingrained in Mongolian ‘aesthetics’, as well as in notions of purity and (mis)fortune (Højer 2003: 108).

specifies the distribution and direction of energy flows. I think this is the kind of power that Marx addressed in speaking about the power of capital to harness and allocate labor power, and it forms the background of Michel Foucault's notion of power as the ability "to structure the possible field of action of others" (Foucault 1984: 428). Foucault called this "to govern", in the sixteenth-century sense of governance, an exercise of "action upon action" (1984: 427-428). Foucault himself was primarily interested in this as the power to govern consciousness, but I want to use it as power that structures the political economy. I will refer to this kind of power as **structural power** (Wolf 1990: 586-587).

Unlike sovereign power or state power, the power of *yos* does not have any formal institution like government, police, army and so on. This power does not stand on the side of someone or something like the State; instead it only exists in people's minds. Therefore, this power does not oppress people, coerce them and make them follow it. It is a 'social reasoning' constructed over many years. This is similar to Foucault's illustration of power.

...power is not a commodity or a possession of an individual, as a group, or a class, rather it circulates through the social body, 'functions in the form of a chain', and is exercised through a net-like organization in which all are caught. From this viewpoint individuals are not agents of power, they neither possess power nor are potentially crushed or alienated by it (Smart 1985: 79, also see Foucault 1980: 98).

This is very clear in the order of things inside a Mongol *ger*, round felt tent⁹.

Apparently Deed Mongols consider their *ger* in the same way they see a human body. This means that a *ger* has a head and a foot, or in general upper and lower spaces. A *ger* has upper and lower parts in both the horizontal and vertical directions. Altogether there are two upper parts with most respect and two lower parts with least respect. I will describe the Deed Mongols organisation of attributes inside the *ger*.¹⁰ In the horizontal

⁹ In most parts of Mongolia the entrance of the *ger* always faces south. In West Mongolia Oirats put their *gers* facing towards the east from where the sun rises. Deed Mongols, who are historically Hoshuud, one of the four tribes of Oirads, also put their *gers* facing east. However, they do not call it east, instead they continue to call it south. The cardinal south for them is west. For them south is west, west is north and north is east (cf. also S. Dulam (2000: 151-188) for the same kind of claims about the sense of direction of ancient Mongols).

¹⁰ See also Caroline Humphrey's (1974) article *Inside a Mongolian Tent*. Using a chart made by a Mongolian ethnographer, G. Tserenxand, she compared the traditional and present-day organisation inside the *ger*. Her description of the organisation is very similar to the Deed Mongolian organisation inside the *ger*.

figure, the upper side of the *ger* is *hoimür* (opposite the door) and the lower is *üüd* (door) with a central space between them. In the vertical direction, the top is the 'crown of the *ger*' (*haraats*, the "roof wheel")¹¹, then the central space, and the lower end is the floor (*gazar*)¹² (Figures 1.1 and 1.2).




Figure 1.1 Construction of the horizontal space of the *ger*

Following this, all head related attributes and other things equal to the head are kept in the *hoimür* area. There is usually a chest with valuables, new and clean dresses, garments, gifts and so on. On the chest there are figures of deities, sacred objects and pictures of Chinggis Khaan, photographs of political leaders, famous people and family

¹¹ Like all trellis tents, it consists essentially of four elements forming a frame which is self supporting, and quite independent of the covering. These are the cylindrical trellis wall with the doorway set into it, the roof wheel [*toono* or *haraats*] at the summit of the dome, and a set of roof struts [*uni*] which span the space between the top of the trellis and slots in the rim of the roof wheel (Andrews 1979: 10).

¹² In a *ger* Deed Mongols do not use a wooden floor or carpet, with the exception of the felt carpets (*esgii devsger*) on the sides where people sleep, where the bed is on the figure. The rest of the floor of the *ger* is just earth and grass.

members. Also prizes, diplomas, newspapers, books and so on. Many families now have TVs, CD and DVD players in this area.




Figure 1.2 Construction of the vertical space of the *ger*

In the vertical direction, the most respected space goes down from the 'crown', and the roof to the top of the walls, which they call 'head of the wall' (*hanyn tolgoi*) (Figure 1.2). As I noticed in the Deed Mongol *gers*, only two things are hung from the 'crown', with the exception of the *chagtaga*¹³. One is the ceremonial silk scarf, *hadag*, which is considered the "highest thing among the goods" (*ediin deed hadag*) and the other is the *malyn im*. These are pieces of the ears of one-year-old sheep and goats that are left over when marking ownership by cutting the animals ears. All the small pieces of ear have to be treated with great respect, in order not to lose the *malyn zaya buyan*, good fortune in animal husbandry, which will be discussed in Chapter Three. Similarly, in some parts of Mongolia the *chagtaga*, is also festooned with tufts of hair or wool. Whenever a Mongol sells one of his animals, he takes a tuft from it, wipes it on the animal's nose¹⁴, and fastens it to the rope so as to preserve the vitality of his herds (Andrews 1979: 19).

¹³ A heavy camel-hair rope hangs from the centre of the ring the *chagtaga*. It is used to steady the ring while it is being erected, to correct any tendency in the roof to distort, and for anchoring to ballast during storms (Andrews 1979: 19).

¹⁴ The meaning of wiping the nose of an animal is part of a shamanic ritual that takes the breath of the animal which is absorbed into the wool. A shaman, Byambadorj in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, has a spirit figure (*ongon*) made of sheep's wool. His uncle, who was also a shaman, told him to take his final breath into the wool and make a spirit figure out of it. There is also a stone called *zadyn chuluu*, which is believed to have magical powers to change the weather. When the power of the stone weakens then people say it has to be held in the final breath of a sheep to enhance its power. People believe that this breath has spiritual power.

Another sign of the respect in which this space is held is the fact that the crown, the roofing, is made of *suhai* (tamarisk), the most respected tree used as a sacred offering to deities (see also Chapter Three). People hang it in the *hoimür* or tuck it in headbands, scarves, ties, hats, newspapers, journals, notebooks, pens, pencils, phone book, beads and other religious attributes on top of the walls (*termein tolgoi* "head of the wall") and roof struts (*uni*).

The middle space both in the horizontal and vertical positions is the junction between the most respected and least respected. The upper part of the central space is the least respected level of the upper space and the amount of respect declines as the level goes downwards and reaches the upper level of the lower space. One can find almost no head related attributes below the middle of the central space. This is where the bed is. The head of the bed is joined to the *hoimür* while the foot of the bed joins the upper part of the lower space, which fits perfectly to the local theory of the head and the foot. On the ground there is usually a thick felt mattress¹⁵ covered with a carpet. On it there are made-up beds put on top of each other. They are folded and at the bottom is the mattress, then the duvet, and on the top the pillow¹⁶. Again this is the standard order. The upper and middle space of the *ger* is decorated with a curtain in front of the walls. The top of the curtain is well made and decorated with patterns, while the lower part is just plain. It is not a coincidence that there is a curtain in the part above the *üüd* (door) area. This is again to signify that the area is more respected than the rest.

Below the bed is the lower space where all foot related things have to be placed, not in the vertically high space of areas such as the top of the walls and between the roof struts, but especially below the vertical middle space. In terms of the vertical position, the lower *üüd* space occupies a higher space (Figure 1.3, area 3.1). For example, there is a towel for feet in the lower part in the lower space (Figure 1.3, area 3.3), while the towel for hands and face is in the upper part of the lower area (Figure 1.3, area 3.3). If we put together both the vertical and horizontal layout, then altogether we have at least nine different spaces with various degrees of respect (see Figure 1.3).

¹⁵ It is very common not to have a bed, especially at the end of autumn. Families do not have much furniture or any other attributes in the *ger*. This is usually because of the amount of moving during the half of the year from June to December. They all have houses in the winter pasture and the heavy furniture and majority of their belongings stay there. They live in the house for about half of the year, from mid December to the end of May.

¹⁶ Altogether it is like a sofa, people always sit on the felt carpet and lean against the folded bed.

entrance (exit), and respect increases the further one gets from the door. All the houses I have been in were organised individually. The organisation of the space inside the rooms was similar inside all *gers*, but the organisation of the rooms in a house was different. For example, the kitchen is always on the left hand side when one enters a *ger*, and the guest area is on the right, but in a house the kitchen can be on any side (see Figure 1.4). Another difference is that there is usually another shed or a smaller house for storage next to the main house.




Figure 1.4 Organisation in the house¹⁷

All this leads me to think that something respected is there on the actual or virtual platform away from the common people and untouchable for most of them. In the example of the space inside the *ger* and the house, the door area is definitely the least respected because everybody passes through it; it is an area accessible to everyone. Compared to this, the *hoimür* is a space not everybody or everything has access to. Similarly, the vertically high space – roof (*haraats*) is not accessible and therefore it is respected, while the floor is the least respected because apparently many people have access to it, but it depends on which part of the floor. If it is the *hoimür* floor then some people will not be on the floor of that part, especially when the space in the *ger* is

¹⁷ This is the organisation of Sreeter's house in Van Hoshuu.

completely occupied during important rituals and feasts. However, if there is only one guest then he or she, regardless of rank, sits in the *hoimür*, because that space is available, and a guest is the most respected person among the household members. On the other hand, in a general sense, the floor as a lower point can be understood as even worse because everything that is abandoned, not accepted, not loved, useless, valueless and powerless falls on the floor of the *ger* or, in a broader sense on the floor of the society. Following this logic, the floor is dirty and impure compared to the roof, which is higher, purer and cleaner. I suppose that this is how the ideas of respect and purity coincide. In the following, I will illustrate how people position themselves in the space inside the *ger*.

1.2.2 Arrangement by concentrated and normal qualities: Sitting order and living inside a *ger*

The order inside a *ger* is not only for furniture and belongings, it also affects how people live in it. When people stand, sit or lie they put their heads towards the head of the *ger*, *hoimür* or roof, and feet towards the door or floor. One cannot point one's feet towards the *hoimür* or towards any other respected parts of the *ger*. Moreover, it is not only about sitting and lying in the right direction. It also affects the position of people inside the *ger* where everyone has their own space and fits into the social order. The effect of these conventions was to establish a hierarchical social order where all those involved had a specific series of duties, loyalties, and responsibilities towards each other; nowhere were these relationships more clearly articulated than in the context of the Mongol *ger* (Sauer 2001: 86). Everyone knows his/her own status, their space inside the *ger*, and moreover this is their same status in the community (cf. also Humphrey 1974). In other words, some people are heads and some are feet.

I participated in several weddings and feasts, and in all of them I had to follow the strict seating order. I could not stay in the same spot for the whole time, because I was also filming and taking photos. Whenever I changed my position to find a better angle and position myself in the lower area people asked me to sit in a higher place. Because the hierarchical order is: old men, young men, old women and finally young women, I

could not just sit wherever I wanted¹⁸. This means that old men are equal to the head and young women equal to the feet, and this order extends to many other social relationships (cf. also Højer 2003: 110 for information about hierarchical order in the north of Mongolia). It is very strict and evident in rituals. Old men and most respected persons sit in the *hoimür* because this is the head of the *ger* (Figure 1.5), and the seating order continues down to young women sitting in the lower space close to the door. In the past, the place where the last woman now sits was the 'lowest' place in the tent and barely counted as being inside it; nothing was put here except perhaps women's boots or dirty underclothes. 'Black people' (i.e. people who had committed a sin, killed an animal or were in some way polluted) sat here; dogs sat here if they were allowed into the tent at all (Humphrey 1974).



Figure 1.5 Elders sitting on the *hoimür* at the wedding in Züün Hohsuu

The main criteria of age and gender are also valid in everyday life, but are not followed as strictly as they are in the rituals. In my family in the field there were five people living in the *ger*. The married couple, Bat (the husband) and Altantsetseg (the

¹⁸ Younger children usually sit with their mothers and stay around the middle and lower parts of the *ger*. Most of the times children play outside and do not have a particular place in the sitting order.

wife), who were in their late thirties, the husband's father, Namjil, who was in his mid seventies, a waged herder (*malchin, hoichin*), a Chinese man in his late thirties, and me (in my mid twenties). The couple had two daughters at school in the Dulaan Xian county town. During the summer, my family like other Deed Mongol families usually had two *gers*, one for the family and the other for guests (*zochnii ger*). When we did not have guests, the couple used to go to sleep in the guest *ger* and rest of us lived in the other, but everything was still shared between the two *gers* and the division only appeared when we went to bed. Apart from this, we all usually lived in one *ger*. The second *ger* is usually used for guests and rituals involving a large number of guests. For us the question of which *ger* to sleep in was not ruled by a strict custom, it was just practical and easier for the couple to sleep there instead of three of us, the old man, the waged herder and myself, moving into the guest *ger* every night. To some extent, this really meant that none of us, the old man Namjil, the waged herder or me, was regarded as a guest. I was always regarded as a guest in rituals and in public, but not in everyday life. The waged herder was never regarded as a guest in the community or as a member of the community but just a waged herder. Because I was with the family all the time I was not like a short-term guest who spent one night or so in the guest *ger*, I was a member of the family who lived in the family *ger*.

When we were all in one *ger*, in the spring, the couple lived on the left side (the east of the *ger*), i.e. to the left of the entrance of the *ger* and rest of us on the right-hand side (the west of the *ger*).¹⁹ This matches Mongolian ethnographer G. Tserenhand's (Humphrey 1974) description from Mongolia where the marital bed is on the left side while children are on the right. I sensed that the left side is for the 'first family members', I mean the couple who actually run the household. The front of the fireplace or stove faces to the left and the kitchen is also on the same side. Apparently the husband usually sits at the top, while the wife is below, closer to the kitchen and the fireplace. This is a combination of practicality and performativity of respect. Respect in this case mostly refers to serving food and drink and to showing hospitality through it. In everyday life, the *hoimiir* and the right side is regarded as the most respected side. It is the way the host family shows respect to others. In the minimal sense of the nuclear family, the nuclear

¹⁹ Most of the feasts and celebrations occur, people visit each other, students come home for vacation, during the summer time. Therefore people need an extra guest *ger*. After that people start preparing for winter and make less feasts and visits; therefore, they do not need an extra *ger* and start moving to the winter house.

family in my case is the husband and wife, but not the rest of us. Therefore, as 'first members' of the family they were obliged to respect the three of us who lived on the right hand side.

It is obvious that the waged herder and I were not part of the nuclear family of the household, but I need to explain why Namjil, the father of the father of the family was not. They call him member, however, in actual life the husband and wife run the household. The old man usually stays behind, giving all the responsibility to his son, Bat (Baba) and his wife. He is officially retired in the household. People now call it Bat's family (Batynh), not Namjil's. However it does not mean that Namjil does not have any effect on the family. The young couple still listen to him and respect his decisions.

On the right side, the order is always from the top, the old man, me and the herder, when we sleep, eat or sit in the *ger*. In terms of how the husband and wife see us, the old man is the most respected person in the family and then me, However, between the old man and me the degree of difference was not very large, because I was counted as a special guest-member, deserving the position of an older person amongst the oldest and the most respected men. I had a few major merits to qualify me for the higher space; first of all they saw me as an intellectual (*erdemten*) from a very good university (Cambridge), and this is equal to the position of head, as I discussed earlier. Second, I was very a special guest-member from Mongolia, and guests are one of the respected groups of people, especially if they are from far away. I will discuss the notion of Mongolness in Chapter Four; however, for most of the Deed Mongols I was the first 'real' (*jinhene*) Mongol they had ever seen. I was one of the very few people from Mongolia who have ever visited the herders since they moved to the region three hundred and fifty years ago. All Deed Mongols have very high esteem for Mongolians from Mongolia. They imagine that true and genuine Mongolness can only be found there, while they complain that they themselves are becoming Tibetan or Chinese. Because of this, their respect for me was sincere and emotional, not just performative. They were always surprised that I was there to study and write about them. All this put me in the upper status.

The next person in the family was the waged herder who used to live next to me. Compared to me, his reason for being in the community was very different. He was there to work and make money. He had the respect of common courtesy, not the respect of

hierarchy. The waged herders are usually very poor Chinese peasants from rural areas, and the Mongol families supply them with everything, such as food, clothes and salary²⁰. They eat the same food and wear the same clothes as the Mongol herders. Sometimes they stay there for ten or more years, but sometimes only for a few months. They are usually Chinese, Tibetan, Hoton and Salar (Muslims) or, rarely, Deed Mongol. Whilst I was there my family did not have a properly settled herder. The family had had one, Ga Yuan, who had lived with them for over ten years, from his mid twenties to mid thirties. But he had started to do other work and was no longer with them, and therefore my family was looking for another waged herder. Sometimes Ga Yuan used to visit my family. He is respected, hard working and he can do everything and has a very good reputation compared to the new herders. In general, waged herders do not have a good reputation in the area; frequently they cause trouble, like stealing, selling animals, running off with young Mongol girls and so on. When I was away in town, my family employed a new waged herder. They moved one of the *gers* to the winter house, and he was obliged to stay alone and take care of the other *ger* and the animals left behind. However, the next day he left and took the new motorcycle with him. He never came back. It is a common thing in the area and is the reason the waged herders usually live in the lower part of the *ger*.

The people in the *ger* that would be more respected than the old man and me are guests. We often had daytime guests and visitors from around the area. When a guest comes to a household, one of the family members goes outside the *ger*, greets the guest, helps him/her off their horse and takes the horse to tie it up with the others. The issue of who should go out and greet the guest depends on who is coming. If the guest is a much respected person such as an old uncle, then it is the husband or a senior person in the *ger* who must go out and greet him. If the visitor is just a next-door neighbour or a young person then the wife of the family or any junior person can go out to bring him in (cf. also Sampildendev 2002: 23-28 and Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 386-387). On the other hand, if it is someone who comes everyday, or maybe several times a day, then the person is not a very respected guest; instead they are almost part-time family members. If it is not occupied by more respected guests, the guest, whoever it is, usually sits in the *hoimiür*. On

²⁰ When waged herders work in the village, they get 10 RMB per day. When they go to the mountain with the herds, which takes three days by horse, they have to stay away from the facilities in the towns and villages for about six months and they receive 25 RMB per day.

an everyday occasion, visitors can sit above the old man and me, even if they are junior. They always ask us to move up more to the *hoimiir*, but we usually resist and ask them to sit above us (*öödöö suu*). I presume that because we are more part of the family we are obliged to respect all guests without regard to their status. My point is that as the distance between people increases so does the respect (performative) they have for each other and so does the formality in the relationship. An old woman told me that she even sits below her very young sons at home in order to respect the custom (see also Chapter Four for the same ethnography). By saying this, she criticised the fact that people usually do not take customs seriously in their everyday life at home. On the other hand, this also means that the formality of respect is taken more seriously between people who do not often communicate with each other.

This is exactly the same situation as the problem of humour in the hierarchy of the Darxads [Darkhads] in the North of Mongolia. Morten Pedersen (2002: 151) who did fieldwork in the Darxad community and explores prominence, argues that the claim that considers humour as strictly “downwards” (a higher status person can joke about a lower) is highly reductionist. He confirms that “upwards” joking is possible in informal situations.

This of course is a highly reductionist explanation, which, among other things, fails take into account the sense of informality and intimacy, which, even in the most patriarchal of Darxad households, permeate the interactions between its members (cf. also Jagchid & Hyer 1979: 135). Indeed the above explanation [“downwards”] in many ways resembles the rigid analysis of African “joking-relationships” for which Radcliffe-Brown was rightly criticised (1953). Despite the customary rules (*yos*) against this (cf. above), one can easily imagine situations where instances of “upwards” joking will give rise to general mirth amongst household members. Indeed, it is my impression that Darxad (male) children are *supposed* to be somewhat naughty lest they will be considered too “soft” (*zöölön*) for their own good. All this being said, the above household analogy is nonetheless useful in the present context, for it points to the fact that internal hierarchies are *emphasized* when Mongolian patriarchal (and monastic) units are, so to speak, putting themselves on external display. So while it is true that the above imaginary son would easily get away with his “subversive” joking in the presence of other household members only, then it is also true that he would *not* be able to do so in the case of outsiders visiting our imaginary household (Pedersen 2002: 151-152).

I suppose this is a matter of distance between people. Distance can be understood in the sense of repetition, availability and accessibility. This also explains why people respect guests from afar more than local guests. In that sense, I can see a rough categorisation of people in the family in terms of the distance between the person and the nuclear family. The husband and wife of my family are the first members, the old man Namjil, father of Baba, is the second member, the waged herder (*malchin* or *hoichin*) and I are the third members and visitors and guests are non-members. Moreover, there are degrees for the non-members, very close neighbours and relatives who come to the family often and they can be regarded as close non-members. Compared to permanent members of the household, they are counted as non-members because they do not live in the same *ger* and they do not see each other as often as we see each other as members of the family. Then there are local guests who are not even close to the family at all. We can see that the distance between the family and the others is getting larger and larger. It is a matter of time and space between people's relationships. In terms of time the most respected person must be someone who people do not often see, for example, me being there as one of the few visitors after three hundred and fifty years. In terms of space, Mongolia is still far away and it is a different country, unlike if I had been from another province in China. But when the time and space gets closer the performative respect and the formality of the relationship breaks down; when I became a family member I received less performative respect and instead I was obliged to respect guests in the same way as my family members respected them.

Moreover, this means that people respect something rare and valuable. The value does not necessarily have to be economic and monetary. For example, for the Mongols historic and traditional things are valuable, such as the national culture (*soyol*)²¹, people always talk about respecting the culture (and complain about the way people are disrespecting it) because it is unique, not common and therefore valuable and with reference to the above discussion this is not something that people throw on the ground.

Rarity can also be understood in terms of repetition in time. Rituals and celebrations that happen only once a year or once in several years are not everyday actions; therefore people respect the chance to celebrate them by serving the most respected meal, the

²¹ The Mongolian word *soyol*, culture, originally denotes only goodness. Bad things are counted as *soyolgüi*, cultureless. For example, in Mongolia a 'culture of criminals' does not make sense, because it is not a culture.

'whole sheep' (*bükel shüüis*), including the sheep's head. The uncooked meat is placed on the table in front of the guests. Two men bow and ask the guests' permission to take the meat away and cook it (cf. also Bürinbayar 2002: 159-160). After the sheep is cut into joints and cooked it has to be reassembled from bottom to top in the order of the biological body of the living sheep (the legs are at the bottom and the head is on top) (see Figure 1.6). The arrangement again shows the order of head and foot. The sheep's head has to be offered to the eldest and most respected man in the ritual before serving the meal (for more information about the head cf. also B. Dulam 1999). The oldest person puts the sheep's head in front of the pictures and figures of deities. If there is no shrine then he puts it on the chest on the *hoimür*. After the feast the family eats it.



Figure 1.6 Cooked whole sheep

In general, during celebrations people perform respect to each other by doing things that they do not do everyday and wearing special clothes that they keep in the chest on the *hoimür* of the *ger*. Here there are two distinct respects, one is respect towards the celebration and the action and the other is a performative respect for people. A celebration

forms a complex of rarity in terms of time (repetition), guests, food, clothing, action, and even language, which I will discuss in the next section (for language cf. also Jagvaral²² 1976).

In conclusion, a concentrated quality is a dimension for evaluating respect. However, it does not mean that everything that has a concentrated quality is respected. More precisely, everything considered by the social mind as positive and upper is respected but everything socially defined as negative and lower is considered to be least respected or not worthy of respect. What I mean by negative is what people consider morally wrong, such as stealing, beating, cheating and so on. This is similar to the conclusion I reached at the end of the last section about the space inside the *ger* and respect for the attributes within it. I claimed that something that is respected is there on the actual or virtual platform away from the common and normal quality and untouchable by most of the people. I declare that the concepts of touchable, untouchable, concentrated quality and normal quality constitute a similar logic of respect.

1.2.3 Actual performance of respect

People respect one another in many different ways. One example is the actual performance of respect when people meet. First, it is essential for a younger person to greet the older person first. Erdemt and I planned to go to the countryside to see his family. We first came to the *gachaga* township of the Züün Hoshuu, which is a very small town with four Chinese peasant villages attached to the town. There are only two main streets forming a "T" junction. As soon as we came to the township Erdemt said that he should greet the elders, *nastany amar asuuh* which literally means to 'ask the elder's peace' (cf. also Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 387-388 and for comparison with other Mongol ethnic groups see also Dugarsürüng 1988: 43, Odbagmed 2003: 18-19, 116-157 and Sampildendev 2002: 23-28; Humphrey 1996). Erdemt knew everyone. He started greeting people in the street and shaking hands. He approached the older people first, offered his outstretched right hand to shake hands and said *ta sain bu?* (Are you well?). This is a quite simple greeting in everyday situations. However, when greeting an older person this is not as simple as it is when greeting a younger person. During my fieldwork I met many

²² Mongolian linguist.

people. After a brief meeting and introduction in the street, sometimes I would not remember the person. I could remember their names or faces, but sometimes I would not recognize them at all. On the way to visit Erdemt's family in Xining, we passed through Dulaan Xian, a Chinese town bigger than the Züün Hoshuu town which they call *gachaga*²³, where some Mongols live. There I met Yun Shin (Baatar in Mongolian), who had a degree in History from one of the Universities in Inner Mongolia. He was only few years older than I was. I had not seen him since I was briefly introduced. Nearly a year later we met again in the centre of the Züün Hoshuu *gachaga*. This time I failed to greet him because I did not see him. Then on the same evening, we met again in the local Mongol restaurant.²⁴ For a second time I failed to recognise him. He was angry with me but I did not understand why. Finally, he asked me whether I remembered him. I apologised and said I did not. He complained that I did not greet him or even remember him. He was deeply offended and he would not apologise to me. Even though it seems very simple and easy, recognising someone and greeting him/her first is a very important part of showing respect.

Greeting becomes more complex in other contexts. When I was in the countryside I went to visit a local bonesetter, Tayi, who is married to Namjil's younger sister. They live near our pasture, about an hour away by horse. When I approached their place a younger woman came out first and saw me, then, the old man Tayi with his wife, came out in front of the *ger*. When I arrived, the younger woman approached and greeted me and took my horse. Then I greeted the elders and they invited me to come to the summer house, not the *ger*. They use the *ger* as a kitchen and the house was for visitors. This is also a particular way of performing respect. I had already been told about this kind of welcome by Tserenbal and Oyuntsetseg in Xining, who are lecturers at the University of Qinghai Nationalities (cf. also N. Zögelei and Bayan²⁵ 1997: 386-387).

²³ The term means a village. However, Deed Mongols use this term for the central town of a small administrative unit called *xiang* in Chinese.

²⁴ This was opened just before I first came to Züün Hoshuu in 2003. It is one of the few businesses run by local Mongols. Everyone who passes through the township goes to the restaurant.

²⁵ He is an intellectual from Züün Hoshuu in his 50s. He had been a Hoshuu leader in the past and is the main editor of a book about the Züün Hoshuu. The book contains much information about the Hoshuu, such as history, administrative structure, geography, landscape, wild animals, religion, economy, kinship, politics and so on.

On the first day of the traditional New Year called *tsagaan* (c. f. also Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 375-376 and Bürinbayar 2002: 172-173), meaning ‘white’²⁶ (for the symbolism of colour cf. also S. Dulam²⁷ 2000: 5-10, 21-28), they perform a special greeting *amarlah*. Throughout the whole day people visit elders to greet them. When the sun rises, people start greeting the family, everyone wears new or clean clothes, buttoned up properly and they also wear a hat. First, everyone greets the oldest male and then the next oldest and continues with the order of age and gender. The younger person genuflects and touches right side of their forehead with their right hand thumb and then with both hands offers a white ceremonial silk scarf *hadag* to the elder (cf. also Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 387). The *hadag* is folded lengthwise with the open side facing the recipient. The elder touches the right side of his/her forehead with right hand thumb, puts his *hadag* on the younger person’s hands, and takes the young person’s *hadag*, turns the open side towards to the younger person and holds it with both hands. The younger recipient takes the elder’s *hadag* that had been put on his/her hands and also turns the open side of the *hadag* towards the elder and offers it again to the elder. The elder does the same, puts his *hadag* on his/her arms and takes his/her *hadag*. As such, the *hadag* comes back to the owner. They call it the *hadag soliltsoh* exchange *hadag*. The *hadag* is exchanged twice in this way. In the first exchange the younger says *amur*, meaning “peace”, and the elder responds *mendö*, meaning “healthy”; in the second exchange the younger says *mendö* and the elder responds *amur*. Finally, they shake hands and the younger ask the elder *saihan tsagaalj baina uu?*, which literally means “Are you whitening nicely?” or simply “Are you having a good New Year?” The elder answers *Saihan tsagaalj baina, saihan tsagaalj baina uu?* meaning “Having a good New Year” and asks back “Are you having a good New Year?” They also say *Tsag sain, tsagaan sain?*, which means “Time good and white good?” On the first day they visit all the elder relatives to greet them in the same way. When they visit the elders, the younger families invite them to their places for a New Year feast (*tsailah*). For about ten days people visit

²⁶ On the last day of the year people must finish cleaning everything, cleaning their houses, motorbikes, cars, clothes and themselves. This is in order to clean the dirt and misfortunes of the old year away and prepare for the New Year. In the evening they cook lots of dumplings and eat as much as they can to fill the space emptied by removing the old year’s dirt and misfortunes. They call this day *bitüün*, which means ‘filling’; they fill themselves with food. On the next morning people are supposed to be brand new and clean without dirt and misfortunes. People are advised not to argue, to talk about only good things and be optimistic, in order to symbolically establish a good ‘white’ year. Doctors put medicine and equipment in their bag or box and do not take them out (cf. also S. Dulam 1992).

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each other (cf. also Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 387-388, and Dulam 1992, Sampildendev 2002: 159-175 and Højer 2003: 103-106 for the celebration of *Tsagaan Sar* in Mongolia²⁸).

Additional acts of respect are performed during all the feasts. There are general performances of respect repeated at different feasts. When people come into a feast they sometimes genuflect in front of everyone and stretch their arms wide with the palms facing upwards, and greet everyone. Some people start shaking hands starting from the eldest and sit when they come to the appropriate place according to their age and gender. Then the rest of the people younger come to perform their greeting.

At the beginning of the feast everyone receives shares of the first serving of food and drink. The top and first part of something is called *deej*, and *deejliüüle* is the act of offering it. A few symbolic foods and drinks are the *deej* that represent all other food and drink. They are *gyalaa*, small pieces of dried *aarts* (the residue left after straining the whey from (cheese) (yoghurt)), *arhi* (vodka) and *shuumar*, the figure of a mythic mountain made of barley-flour (*bambaa*), with *gyalaa* underneath it representing the mythic ocean, and butter on top (see Figure 3.9). The youngest person in the family, usually the teenage children and if there are no children the wife of the family, or if the wife is elderly then one of the closest young relatives offer the *deej*. The person offering the *deej* must be dressed properly, all buttoned up, sleeves cannot be rolled up²⁹ and he/she must wear a hat³⁰. The receiver should also be dressed the same way, but this

²⁸ When visiting a family, each visitor starts out by greeting each of the persons present who are older than him or herself and whom the visitor has not already met during *Tsagaan Sar* [literally 'White Month', equals to *Tsagaan* in the Deed Mongol]. If there is an old person present, the visitor begins by greeting him or her and then works his/her way down the hierarchy, beginning with the father of the household. The greeting is performed by holding out one's forearms and hands, palms facing upwards, and placing them underneath the forearms of the hierarchical superior while saying: 'How are you?' (*amar baina uu?*, literally 'Are you peaceful?'). The superior will place his forearms, palms facing downwards, on the top of the greeter's forearms while answering 'Greetings! How are you?' (*mendee, amar baina uu?*, literally 'Greetings! Are you peaceful?'). If the relationship is intimate (in formal terms) and the age difference is substantial, the older person might gently hold the head of the younger one and 'sniff' him or her on each cheek. A ceremonial scarf (*hadag*) can be presented to the one greeted as a sign of respect and this will always be done when greeting elderly relatives. After greeting people, you take your place in the home of the host family and the younger ones present – possibly the children of the host – will then come to greet you. Men will always put on their hat when being greeted (Højer 2003: 105-106).

²⁹ People roll up their sleeves when they kill an animal, to fight and so on; therefore they consider it inappropriate when performing the customs of respect.

³⁰ To wear a hat to show respect is a popular custom among many Mongol communities. People usually do not explain why. In shamanic communities in Mongolia, people believe that the crown of the head is the gate of the soul/mind. Following the same logic, a hat is considered a guardian or keeper (*manaach*) of the soul. Extending this idea, when one has a hat then it is a sign that his soul is in his body, and not

applies more seriously to the person making the offering. He/she genuflects and offers the *deej* with both hands. The receiver supports the offering by holding the bottom of the *deej* with his/her left hand, touches it with the fourth finger of the right hand and offers it to his superiors by sprinkling it around. This is repeated three times and the first *deej* is offered for the “father heaven” (*etseg tenger*), and the second for the “mother earth” (*ek gazar*) and the third for the person himself by touching (*öörin biye*) his/her heart with the finger. Finally, the receiver touches his/her forehead with his/her right hand thumb and nods, and this means “well done and thank you”. The person making the offering does the same and genuflects. Everyone does the same for *gyalaa*, *arhi* and *shuumar*. Unlike other feasts, only on the first day of the New Year do people share the *deej* of the first tea. Before they drink the tea people offer their tea to everyone. People offer the *deej* from other’s tea to heaven, earth and himself/herself. They call it exchanging merit and fortune (*buyan hishig soliltsoh*). Some say that they are not supposed to do this, instead just taste the tea and give it back. Nowadays people no longer put their fingers into other peoples’ tea. They simplified the custom and usually touch the outside of the cup with a finger.

When they drink vodka quite often people offer their drink’s *deej* to others. For example, the receiver offers his *deej* to the person who offered. In particular, if the person offering drinks for everyone at the feast is older than the receiver usually offers his *deej* to the person offering. This is also the same for deities and spirits. People often offer the first part of their food, drink, goods, money and herds to the deities. The idea is to give away the first part of their belongings to others whom they respect.

1.2.4 Respect through language and addressing people³¹

The Mongolian language is also structured with a head and a foot and has degrees of respect. The degrees are: 1) respect; 2) neither respect nor disrespect but the use of common courtesy; and 3) disrespect. For example, the word *id* ‘eat’ has three versions,

wearing a hat means the opposite, that the person’s soul might not be in his body. Not wearing a hat with an empty body cannot be seen as respectful (cf. also B. Dulam 2000).

³¹ A Mongolian linguist, R. Jagvaral (2006), wrote a book about respect in the Mongolian language. He counted 2000 words with the meaning ‘respect’, about 1250 of which are nouns and 750 of which are verbs (1976: 27).

zooglo for respect, *id* for the normal degree and *gudar* for disrespect³². As such, in the Mongolian language many words have two or three versions denoting different degrees of respect. In feasts and rituals the host family organizing the event always use the respectful form of language for guests. However, in everyday life people do not often use the respectful language.

In the Mongolian language there are two forms of the second person singular personal pronoun, *ta* and *chi* (cf. also Choidandar³³ 2004: 28-36). *Ta* is used to show respect and *chi* is used on normal occasions between people of the same status or people of a high status use it for people on a lower level. Lower people can also use *chi* for higher people to show disrespect. Older people sometimes say *ta* when addressing a younger person to show intentional respect, which I will call 'additional respect' in the following section. It is additional because there is a standard respect that should be performed to anyone; if one exceeds the standard and uses even more performances of respect then it is additional. For example, many people older than me called me *ta*. In addition, senior people can call a junior *ta* ironically and this is a way of showing disrespect to the junior. Normally young people say *ta* for elders and in return the senior person maintains a normal relationship towards the junior by using *chi*. A normal relationship here means neither constructing an upper sphere treatment nor a disrespectful treatment.

People do not say the names of respected people (*ner tseerleh yos*) (for comparison with other Mongols cf. also Jagvaral 1976: 78-82 and Dugarsürüng 1988: 44; Humphrey 2006). Particularly, younger people do not say elder's names. People instead use 'honourable forms of address' (*avgailah*), kinship terms, or the names of children. Amongst the Deed Mongols people often use *nastan* and *kögshin*, both meaning old and elder, or *eej* for an old woman, which literally means "grandmother" in Deed Mongol and "mother" in Mongolian. For example, people call Baba's father, Namjil, *kögshin shüji* which means "old party leader", addressing the fact that he was the village party leader for many years. Deed Mongols use children's names and add "father" (Mon. *aav* and Tib. *aba*) and 'mother' (Mon. *ek* and Tib. *ama*) to refer to elders. For example, in my family the husband of the family calls his wife "Manda's mother" (Mandaagiin *ek*), and the wife

³² There are many other ways of showing respect through language, for example, by adding suffixes. *Suu* means sit and *suu-gtun* is the version used for respect (cf. also Jagvaral 1976).

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calls her husband "Manda's father" (Dumagiin *aav*), Manda being their daughter (c. f. also Zögelei and Bayan 1997: 377-378, Bürinbayar 2002: 174-175 and Choidandar 2003: 37-47).

Among the Deed Mongols, not saying respected people's names is taken very seriously. Once I had the opportunity to meet a middle-aged man, Buyan, who is the vice-governor of the Nomhon Xiang, the neighbouring county of the Züün Hoshuu where I lived. After talking to him for a while, I was quite happy to find out that he was the son of Namjil's younger sister. His parents are our neighbours in the village and I know his family very well, including many of his other brothers. Then I used his father's name, Tayi, to show him that I knew his family very well, even their names. Unfortunately, my attempt was misguided. He was deeply offended by the fact that I had spoken his father's name. He replied to me "Are you equal to my father?" He was offended because I did not show respect to his father. In the past it used to be an even more serious offence. Naji (Nasan-Ochir), a secondary school teacher in Dulaan Xian, told me that one of the last nobles of the Baruun Hoshuu had a name starting with *Da-* (he could not remember the last part of the name). People of the banner (*hoshuu*) respected him very much and even did not use words starting with *da-* such as *davs* (salt), *dal* (scapula) and so on. For *davs* (salt) people used to say *shüüü*, which Naji thinks means 'filter' and might have come from the act of extracting salt. For *dal*, scapula people used to say a "flat bone".

The same taboo applies to mountains, spirits, deities, ancestors, khaans, lamas and so on. The people of Züün Hoshuu worship the mountain, which they call San Ovoo (Appendix: C). Apparently this is the honourable way of addressing the mountain spirit called Renzen Tsoj. It is also the same for Gūsh Khaan, the ancestor of the Deed Mongols; his real name is Törbaih and Gūsh is a title given to him by the fifth Dalai Lama. The same attitude also applies to the name of Chinggis Khaan, which is also his title, and his real name is Temüjin. C. Humphrey (1993) presents an explanation for this.

All Mongols avoid casual references to the names of dead people, predatory animals and certain mountains, rivers and springs, which are considered to be inhabited by spirits, and which in the past have caused various natural catastrophes. It is thought that the casual pronunciation of these names would catch the attention of the spirits with possibly disastrous consequences to the speaker (Humphrey 1993: 96).

This is a common interpretation that especially applies to spirits (cf. also Højer 2003: 96-97 for similar cases in Mongolia). However, this also can be interpreted from the angle of

respect. It is clearer in the example of the relationship with the living rather than with spirits and dead people's souls.

When addressing someone it is awkward not to use the name that was specifically given to them. People usually do not explain why they do not say people's names. They only say that they show respect to the person or thing. I presume that it is because they consider the name the respectful property of a man, like his head about which I will provide information later in the chapter. People do not touch each other's heads, only a superior being such as a deity, or a person such as a significant lama touch people's heads to give blessings, or parents and elders can touch children's heads. In the same way, a name is something that can be spoken only by superiors, not inferiors. According to Mongol rationality, a name is not something that can be repeated by anyone who is of a lower status than the name holder. For example, older people can say my name because they are more respected than I am, but younger people cannot say my name because they are not as respected as I am. It is another version of the same theory that all respected things must be in the same sphere, for example, a name is a respected thing and so only respected people or people of equal status can pronounce it. What happened to Naji supports this idea. Once he accidentally said an elder's real name in front of him. He thought that the elder's name, which he knew, was his 'honourable form of address'. However, it was the elder's real name and made him very angry. The elder told him that it was only a name for his (the elder's) parents or other higher people to use. Here, the elder clearly says that a given name is the one that only respected people can use, not the least respected.

This brings me to the importance of power in presence. L. Højer's (2003) claim supports my idea that this kind of performance of respect makes the receiver powerful, which I will focus on in Chapter Two.

Moreover, euphemisms themselves empower what is tabooed, because the suppression itself creates the power it seeks to suppress (by saying *hairhan* [for a sacred mountain] a revered power 'behind' is implied). In much the same way, one could argue that it is predictable authority and certainty of ritualized hierarchy and formalized speaking... (Højer 2003: 97).

1.2.5 Respecting or disrespecting: intention, ritualization, performance and order

All the above ethnography was presented to explain what it is to respect or disrespect within the Deed Mongol social organisation. Respect and disrespect is an issue resulting from the interaction of the fixed order and process of ordering. There are two distinct issues of order and social class. One is the order of people, which is fixed in the community through the arrangement of age and gender. People must follow an order that does not depend on anyone's decision to be in a certain rank. It is widely accepted by all the members of the community and people always follow the order. Everyone is well aware of who is in which rank. The second issue of order is the actual ordering, the process of a relationship that puts someone into a rank. I presume that there are two different ordering processes. In one of them the performer does not necessarily show personal intention (further I will call this non-intentional performative respect), but follows the custom by matching the relationship to the social rank of the person. For instance, juniors address elders as *ta* ('you' for seniors and superiors) to show respect but maybe the performer does not sincerely respect the elder. L. Højer illustrates similar customs in the north of Mongolia.

Individuals are neither totally part of the system, nor is the system total. Only parts of selves are connected within the system, exemplified by the fact that a young teacher from the school came to visit his elder colleague during Tsagaan Sar [Tsagaan in Deed Mongol], even though the young teacher at other points expressed a strong dislike of the other colleague (Højer 2003: 111).

In this way, when people consider the performance of respect as more important they simply follow the customs and put the person into the right social rank. Everyone in a lower status must show respect for a higher person. For example, a head is supposed to have things that equal a head, as well as to receive high treatment from other lower people. As I discussed, Deed Mongols even have a head on a duvet, which must be upwards when one sleeps in it. In this way the head of the person matches with the head of the duvet while his foot matches with the foot of the duvet. Therefore a senior person who is regarded as the head of a community or household deserves the standard treatment for a head, such as sitting or being in the upper part of the *ger*, having food and drink offered first, having the right of speech and advice first, and receiving a different form of language that shows respect, all as I discussed in the previous sections. In other words, the head and other things equal to it such as people, attributes, space, language and

manners are in the same cycle, are links in the same chain. They work as things with a shared essence of the 'head' ” and 'upper', and using all these criteria people construct a technique of respect.

We can draw a comparison between this and Bourdieu's practices, structured structures and *habitus*. *Habitus*, for Bourdieu, is a 'product of the past experience and objective regularities', and has 'an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions' (Bourdieu 1990: 55).

The conditions associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce *habitus*, systems of durable, transposable, dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu 1990: 53).

The origin of the *habitus* is in the past, and can be either repressive or non-repressive (Bourdieu did not specify whether or not it is repressive). Customs of respect or, in other words, non-intentional 'performative respect' thus can be a particular form of *habitus*, and in that sense, to some extent, the power of respect is a power of *habitus*. Contrary to this general assertion, I cannot maintain that all forms of respect are *habitus*, for there are forms and elements of immediate respect or intentional 'non-performative respect' which are not produced by previous regularities or, more precisely, not a *habitus*.

The order is highly ritualized and does not necessarily show the performer's intention. In other words, it is a performative respect that people must enact regardless of their opinions. Here, the issue of performing is more important than the issue of sincerely respecting. It is not only the order that is ritualized and non-intentional but also the process of ordering, or in other words, types of relationships and treatments for higher and lower ranks of people are fixed as well as the order. Lower people perform these standard treatments in the interaction with the higher and vice versa. L. Højer (2003) calls the same formality in the relationship "safe communications". People are caught up in a mode of being that favours recognition and predictability and thereby secures continuity between past and present. It is a safe universe where a self is defined in a non-negotiable

system where nothing is at stake for the irreducible individual (Højer 2003: 109). A ritual theory presented by C. Humphrey and J. Laidlaw (1994) is helpful in analysing this formality. They argue that “ritualization severs the link, present in everyday activity, between the ‘intentional meaning’ of the agent and the identity of the act which he or she performs” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 2).

Ritualized acts in liturgical traditions are socially prescribed and present themselves to individual actors as ‘given’ and external to themselves. Because ritualized acts are stipulated in this way, a new situation arises: instead of, as is normally the case in everyday life, a person’s act being given meaning by his or her intentions, with ritual action the act itself appears as already formed, almost like an object, something from which the actor might ‘receive’. In this transformed situation the intentions and thoughts of the actor make no difference to *identity* of the act performed. You have still done it, whatever you were dreaming of. Furthermore, a wide variety of actions may ‘count as’ the ritual act. This situation is neither an accident nor is it a matter of absentminded habit. It results from a positive act of acquiescence in a socially stipulated order (the ritual commitment) (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 5).

Unlike this, respect is not an example of liturgical tradition based on written sources. Instead it is an example of the “performative ritual” as Humphrey and Laidlaw call it. Following Humphrey and Laidlaw, about *degrees of ritualization* I argue that there are different degrees of ritualization where the highest degree is non-intentional but it becomes more intentional as the degree gets lower. For example, public rituals are more ritualized and therefore more non-intentional while ritual performances in everyday life are more intentional, because the conditions in the formal rituals are more serious, strict and stipulated than in informal situations of rituals (cf. B. Dulam 2002: 212-223 for more information about intention in rituals). Rituals of respect can also be non-intentional and intentional in different contexts. A highly ritualized respect has to be performed in certain situations that are also highly ritualized. This is a match of ordering with the stipulated order. However, the idea of non-intentional respect is not the only way of analysing this. Højer (2003: 119) correctly argues “formality does indeed elicit ‘emotions’ of respect, but...the emotion inheres in the specific act of formality”. In the following I will focus on the same highly ritualized performance of respect, which can be acted out in a situation where it is not supposed to be performed. Then it is no longer stipulated, it is new information and not usually expected. This could either be a mistake by the performer or, as I will argue in the following, an expression of intentional sincere respect.

The second type of ordering uses the same performance as the first type. The difference is that in the second case the necessity of the two is just the opposite. In the second type, people reveal personal intentions by using the same performances in non-appropriate situations. As discussed above, the fixed condition is the treatment for the head and senior person that must be applied, but in the non-fixed condition, the treatment usually used for the head person can be used for a person in a lower rank. This is 'additional respect', as distinct from the respected person's actual rank. People know that it is 'additional respect'. For example, in the Deed Mongol community I was respected in the same way as the most respected elders and leaders and addressed as *ta* by older people as I earlier mentioned. They often asked me to sit among the elders or village leaders and so on. According to my age, I was not supposed to be in the high rank with the elders, however people treated me in the manner reserved for high ranks and placed me higher than my actual rank. I was publicly accepted and no one would disagree (as far as I know) with the fact that I was treated in the same way as older people. This was intentional, but it does not mean that it was sincere respect because people can perform additional respect in order to satisfy a certain need or to plead with someone even though they do not sincerely respect the person. It is very difficult to ascertain the degree of sincerity in performative respect.

Unlike the first process of ordering, this second intentional performative respect does not match the treatment with the person's rank. It does not follow the fixed order of people, but it makes a new order and rank for the person. In other words, it is independent of the socially recognized popular structure of order, while the non-intentional process of ordering is dependent on it. Putting someone or something in a rank that is different to their recognized status further brings up the issue of disorder. More precisely, the non-intentional performative respect repeats the order and confirms it, while the intentional performative respect breaks the social order and establishes disorder, which is a new order. To sum up, to match the process of ordering with the order always results in respect in the performative way, while mismatching the order (disorder) by giving more respect or disrespecting is intentional and non-performative, and maybe sincere. Disorder, or more precisely the mismatch of the ordering with the person's fixed social rank, also reveals either additional respect or disrespect. In other words, disorder can go in two different directions with opposite results. One is to enhance someone's social rank and the other is to diminish his/her social rank. When one enhances a person's rank by treating

him/her with a higher respect then it is a great respect, more and additional respect. However, when people diminish one's rank then it is disrespecting. For example, to treat a senior person on the level of a young person is very offensive. Alternatively, as I briefly mentioned, an older person ironically uses the upper treatment for a younger to show disrespect. To put books and hats with underclothes and shoes in the *ger* is a very bad mark of disrespect. Mongolians describe the situation as chaos (*zambaraagiüi*) where it is "difficult to find the head and foot" (*höl tolgoi'n oldohgüi*). For them it means that the head is not in the place of the head and the foot is not where the foot is and therefore it is difficult to know what is what³⁴. As R. Dentan illustrates, this is the same as the understanding of disrespect in the Semai of Malaya.

Disrespect of cosmic order produces cataclysms (disaster): the enraged Lord of Thunder will obliterate your settlement; the cold waters beneath the earth burst out, bearing dragons, wiping out all traces of human life.

Two sorts of disrespect are involved: the first involves mixing particular categories, especially of food, as if the cosmic order that Semai think their language reflects were so fragile that human whimsy could destroy it. The second, more general, violation involves disrespecting that order.³⁵

One might ask why this order is respect while disorder is disrespect. People would respond that it is a natural order (*baigaliin*). Richard Sennett argues that "these ritual performances helped legitimate inequalities of status and wealth, and were distributed for just that reason to many of the Westerners who studied them: status and hierarchy can feel so *natural* to the celebrants of a rite" (2003: 205). It is true that it is a natural and biological order that the head is on top while the foot is on the bottom. However, to adopt the order in the social structure is a cultural phenomenon. Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) correctly define that it is a cultural "naturalizing power" and order.

Within the context of origin stories, people spin meaningful lives. Narratives of origin incorporate classificatory schemes that describe the order of things, as well as the relations between things and between different kinds of people...When the order is disrupted or when people are uprooted from the sites where these stories and identities make sense (such as is occurring with the contemporary movement of

³⁴ When Mongolians come to Britain, they are always shocked to see the British national flag on shoes, socks, pants and so on. For a Mongolian, the national flag is supposed to be equal to the head and supposed to be on top of things representing the status of the nation.

³⁵ Quote from an unpublished paper.

peoples on a world-wide scale), then not only are identities challenged but so too the hegemonic order (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995: 2).

Deed Mongols do not talk of the narratives of origin. It does not mean that they do not have them at all. I mean that narrative stories are not very influential in the everyday practice of social life. Apparently, narratives of origin are not the only source for people to naturalize their relationship. As discussed earlier, among the Deed Mongols it is very common to personify social structure with regard to the biological human body (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For people, this must be the correct structure because it is natural. In this way they describe disorder as “making the head foot and foot head” (*tolgoigooroo köl kii, kölööröö tolgoi kiih*).

Charles Taylor (1992) calls this misrecognition. He analysed recognition in two different contexts; one is pre-modern, unequal and hierarchical while the other is modern, egalitarian dignity (Taylor 1992: 27). Moreover, he defines the former as “socially derived identity”, while the later is “inwardly derived personal identity” (1992: 34). By analyzing the two, he claims that in pre-modern times recognition was never a problem.

But in the earlier age recognition never aroused a problem. General recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took for granted. Yet inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn't enjoy this recognition *a priori*. It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can fail. What has come about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail. That is why the need is now acknowledged for the first time. In pre-modern times, people did not speak of “identity” and “recognition” – not because people didn't have (what we call) identities, or because they didn't depend on recognition, but rather because these were then too unproblematic to be thematized as such (Taylor 1992: 34-35).

Taylor's “socially derived identity”, based on social categories that everyone took for granted, is similar to the Deed Mongol's organisation of social order through gender and age. People's order of gender and age is a type of “socially derived identity”. (This contradicts the “personal identity” which I discuss under non-performative respect. Later I will point out that non-performative respect tends to respect personal identities). My main disagreement with Taylor concerns his idea that in pre-modern times recognition, or in my use hierarchical respect, was never a problem, because according to him, identity,

or social order in my discussion, was socially derived. It is true that in the Deed Mongol area people perform relationships according to the fixed social order or “socially derived identity” as discussed earlier. Nevertheless, it does not mean that “socially granted identity” or people’s rank defined by the fixed social order never presents problems as Taylor claims. Perhaps it does not “inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self hatred” (Taylor 1992: 26) as it does in the misrecognition of “personal identity”. However, it is equally important to recognize one’s ‘social identity’ or, in other words, rank in the social order, as well as the “inward identity”. People do not always follow the socially defined order and recognize people’s social identity and rank. This arouses a problem of disorder, disrespect and misrecognition.

Moreover, misrecognition and disrespect merit further analytical discussion. Among the Deed Mongols, there are two major forms of disrespect following the main two streams of respect; respect of hierarchy and respect of common courtesy. One is disrespect of hierarchy which is about B’s (powerless, inferior, junior) misconduct towards A (powerful, superior, senior), and the other is the disrespect of common courtesy which is about A’s mistreatment of B (cf. also the introduction of the thesis).

I can draw the conclusion that order is non-intentional performative respect, while disorder is first disrespect, and secondly additional respect in the ironical situation of disrespect, and they are both intentional. Even though this classification is common in most of the cases, I do not argue that disrespect and additional respect are always intentional. I suppose that people also unintentionally perform disrespect or additional respect. At least outsiders in a new community unintentionally show many forms of disrespect. This is because of a lack of knowledge and experience about the order of the society. Alternatively, people accidentally perform disrespect, as Naji did before. The same un-intention also applies to additional respect.




Figure 1.7 Types of performative respect

To sum up, there are several different incidents of performative respect, such as the ones with intention and without intention. Moreover, the one where intention is not important has at least two types between the most respect and least respect. These are normalized actions that always happen and are repeated. In that sense these types of respect can be called 'normal respect'. Unlike these, there are also abnormal forms of respect; ones where the intention is most important and which involve non-standard ordering. These are incidents of 'additional respect' or 'disrespect'. They are abnormal because they are usually not what people expect and not what they see all the time. They occur on rare occasions. In a normal case people understand that it is respect, but in an abnormal case it is clearer that what is happening is additional respect or disrespect. Abnormal, intentional respect is where performative respect meets with non-performative respect, because additional respect and disrespect is an expression of a sincere feeling and opinion of a person (see Figure 1.7). All this is about respect on different levels, but there are also completely normal situations that have nothing to do with either respect or disrespect in terms of hierarchy. For instance, the relationship between people of the same age and gender, the treatment of a junior by a senior, or many other everyday relationships do not arouse any type of respect or disrespect. In terms of the norm, we have three different degrees: (1) a 'normal relationship' with neither hierarchical respect nor disrespect; (2) 'normal respect' that is most respect and least respect, usually non-intentional and performed through the arrangement of the order; and (3) 'abnormal respect', that is intentional additional respect or disrespect. The normal relationship, in the sense being neither respect of hierarchy nor disrespect of hierarchy, is, it seems to me, the respect of common courtesy. What is the difference between the normal relationship and the respect of common courtesy? I would also like to raise the question of whether there is any relationship that does not involve hierarchical respect, the respect of common courtesy or disrespect. Is there such a thing as a normal relationship that has nothing to do with any kind of respect or disrespect? Even though my research convinces me that there is no such relationship that is not about respect, I should leave the answer open for further research.

1.3. Technology of being respected:

Accumulating respect and gaining power

1.3.1 Criteria of being respected

One of my main questions was who is the most respected person (*hamgiin kündtei kiin*) in the village and why. People gave me only two answers, one was the elder and other was the political leader (cf. Chapter Two for more information about the political leader). However, I should admit that not all elders or leaders are respected. For example, in Kurimt village in Banchin (Panchin) Shan Hoshuu, many people do not like the leaders, especially the old ones, which is just the opposite of the situation in my village. When I stayed in Kurimt people (who wish to remain anonymous) told me that the former village leader took the best and biggest pasture during the privatisation of the pastures (they are still state property but herders have sole use of them for a certain period of time). In addition, they also do not like the Hoshuu (Chi. *xiang*) leader. The leader of Banchin Shan Hoshuu was a man in his forties, director of the elementary school, who came from Inner Mongolia. People liked him when he was the teacher and were happy when he became the Hoshuu leader. However, people complained to me that he has now become rich, drives an expensive jeep and has brought his poor relatives from Inner Mongolia. He does not do much to support the herders' lives, and they suspect that he is embezzling money.

Apart from this sort of exceptional case, the elders and leaders (I will discuss leadership in the next chapter) are the most respected people in the Deed Mongol villages. "Leaders" here apply to the village leader (*tosgon darga*) and the village party leader (*tosgony namyn üüriin darga* or people use the Chinese term *shüji*). Some would say elders are the most respected, while some others say that it is leaders who are the most respected. That makes sense because in the performative respect people usually respect the elders most while in the non-performative respect people usually respect the leaders most. People must respect the elders because it is a custom (*yos*), and they also respect leaders - this is evident from the fact that they elect them (election is an expression of the

non-performative respect, see Chapter Two). Erdemt³⁶, a friend of mine, the youngest brother of Baba, told me that not all the elders are equally respected. He meant equally respected in terms of sincerity. They are more or less respected according to their personal behaviour, knowledge (*medleg*) and talent (*chadvar*). For example, in a combination of the above two, an elder who was a leader in the past is usually the most respected person. Namjil is a person in such a position. People respect him, because firstly, he is one of the few old people in the village; and secondly, he was the village party leader for many years. In this sense not all the elders are equally respected, but elders who were leaders receive additional respect. This is because people respect them with two different respects, performative and non-performative, while some other elders are only respected with performative respect. However, my main concern in this part of the chapter is non-performative respect and the effort to be respected.

Richard Sennett (2003) brings up three ways that people earn or fail to arouse respect.

Society shapes characters in three ways so that people earn, or fail to arouse, respect.

The first way occurs through self-development, particularly through developing abilities and skills...Self-development becomes a source of social esteem just because society itself condemns waste, putting a premium on efficient use of resources in personal experience as much as in the economy.

The second way lies in care of the self...Care of oneself can mean additionally not becoming a burden upon others, so that the needy adult incurs shame, the self sufficient person earns respect.

The third way to earn respect is to give back to others. This is perhaps the most universal, timeless, and deepest source of esteem for one's character...Nor is self-sufficiency ultimately of no great consequences to other people, since he has no mutual connection, no necessary need of them. Exchange is the social principle which animates the character of someone who gives back to a community (Sennett 2003: 63-64).

I will illustrate the third way in Chapter Three, under the discussion of exchange of respect and "love". Deed Mongols describe the first and second ways in detail, and they also have many more characteristics and incidents that they consider as not worthy of

³⁶ He is a student at the University of Qinghai Nationalities in Xining, the capital of the Qinghai Sheng.

respect. For this case, Sennett's category is too general and reductionist. People from different cultures can regard many more characteristics as not worthy of respect.

First, a *kündtei kün* (respected person) cannot have any of the characteristics of a *kiindgüi kün* (not respected person). As I was told, these are the following non-respected characteristics: a person cannot be respected if he or she lies (*hudal keldeg*), says boastful things which are not true and which are not fulfilled in real life (*bardam heldeg*), steals (*hulgai kiideg*), does not work hard (*argach* means lazy), drinks too much and visits people (*arhi uuj ail kesdeg*)³⁷, quarrels and is argumentative (*keriülch*), and goes along with people (*taardaggüi*), does not follow and obey customs (*yosoo baridaggüi*). In addition to this, people who are married to Muslims, Chinese or Tibetans and so on also lose a lot of respect. Most of the Deed Mongols have had conflict with these nations and they dislike them. Historically they were all enemies (cf. Chapter Four for information about national conflicts). Any of the above groups are not respectable, which does not mean that people disrespect them. People still respect them with common courtesy and with performative respect. For example, if an elder person has any of the above non-respected characteristics then people might not sincerely respect the person but they have to perform respect for him being an elder.

Not everyone without any of the above non-respected characteristics is respected. They are just common people in the village. A sincerely respected person has many more characteristics in addition to the common and normal quality. They have to be *ovor tegsh* with good manners, friendly, nice, honest, behave politely, be an influential speaker (*üg kel saitai*), educated (*erdemtei*) and cultured (*soyoltoi*), knowledgeable in history and traditional customs (*tiiüh, yos zanshil meddeg*), trustworthy (*itgeltei*), capable of various things (*chadvartai*) and so on. People with the above respected characteristics usually become local leaders. In other words, a respected person has an exceptional character, ability or behaviour that not everyone has (cf. also Chapter Two for election and leadership).

This can be further extended by my earlier conclusion about the division between concentrated quality and normal quality. I claimed that something with a concentrated quality and considered as right, good and higher (positive) is respectable while the

³⁷ This also means a philanderer. People do not openly and directly speak about it, instead they just say *arhi uudag ail hesdeg* which means "drinks and visits people".

opposite of it (negative) is not respectable. Morten Pedersen (2002) discusses the same issue among the Darkhads (Darxad) in the north of Mongolia, and calls it prominence. Prominence can be seen as the opposite of normal qualities. In particular, Pederson's use of the "central prominence" of leadership, which applies to three types of people, leaders, elders and businesspersons, meets my discussion of respect for the rare, higher and more important.

The outcome, I suggest, has been made the particular "distribution of leadership" that can be observed in today's Xotgor ([Hotgor]³⁸, where some "leaders" are prominent "only" by virtue of being old males (i.e. "eldest men"); other "leaders" are prominent by virtue of constituting wealthy patrons in a manner which is in essential continuity with pre-revolutionary times (i.e. *bag* leaders [equivalent to village leaders in the Deed Mongol]), and yet other leaders again are prominent "only" by virtue of being rich (i.e. "businesspersons") (Pedersen 2003: 82).

With the exception of the fact that the "*bag* leader" is a wealthy patron, all the three types of people have the same position amongst the Deed Mongols. In the Deed Mongol village leaders are neither wealthy patrons, nor poor. However, it does not mean that all prominent people are respected. Pedersen talks about another class of prominence, which is "marginal prominence". He argues that "the "marginal" is often used to denote people who are more or less stigmatised with the respect of the dominant social hierarchy" (Pedersen 2002: 69). I agree with his idea of "marginal prominence" in the sense of my use of "negative concentrated quality" which people consider as wrong and bad, and which is not something to be respected. He claims that Darxads (Darkhads) consider "specialists" such as shamans, blacksmiths, mid-wives, bonesetters and diviners are in the "marginal" status. The "marginal prominence" of the Xotgor [Hotgor] specialists lies in their capacity for personifying the "black side" of the Darxad [Darkhad] people. All Darxad persons...are understood to contain a "black" aspect, but the Xotgor specialists seem to be the "most black" persons, or, ...specialist persons are *revealing* a "blackness" that is understood to reside within everyone (Pedersen 2002: 86). It is true that many people consider Darxad "specialists" as "black" and therefore "stigmatised", but in many other contexts these "specialists" are not "stigmatised", they are respectable. Caroline

³⁸ The valley inhabited by the Darkhads, in Hövsgöl Province, northern Mongolia.

Humphrey (1996) writes that shamans were much respected among the Daur, in the north east of Inner Mongolia.

An invited shaman was accorded the greatest honour, regardless of age or gender, and not withstanding the fact that he belonged to a junior or poor branch of the clan like Du Yadgan. The shaman was placed in the most respected seat, begged to smoke and drink and given deep bows even by the oldest people (Humphrey 1996: 25).

According to my theory of respect, the “specialists” with concentrated qualities are different to common people with normal qualities. They have abilities that not everyone possesses. Therefore, they are useful and important in the community. In this way, common people normally respect “specialists” because they can do things that common people cannot do. In the Deed Mongol case, “specialists” such as bone-setters and *zochi* lamas who lead funerals, read prayers and heal, are not as greatly respected as leaders and elders in the “central prominence”, but definitely they are additionally respected more than any common person is. In particular, the 75-year-old *zochi* lama, called Gaga by the people (his real name is Yondon), is greatly respected. He lives in Kurimt village in Banchin Shan Hoshuu, which is about four hours drive from where I lived. He told me that, *zochi* is a Mongol term, (*hon* in Tibetan), and some people call him *bööch*, which has the root *böö* meaning a shaman in Mongolian. He is a specialist who cuts dead bodies into pieces, reads prayers and calls ‘birds’ (vultures) and feeds them with the pieces of the dead body. Deed Mongols put dead people on the ground in the cemetery and wild animals and ‘birds’ eat them. However, they believe if the person was sinful no animals would touch the body, and then people bring the *zochi*. He also divines with his beads and sutras, and does various spiritual treatments. He and his eldest son, Damdinja, are the only *zochis* in the whole of Haixi Zhou (Prefecture). Almost everyone knows and respects them. Apart from being old and lamas, they are rare specialists, they can do things that no one else can do and this arouses additional respect for them.

All the above are various aspects and characteristics that people respect or do not consider respectable. When people possess additional respectable characteristics they are respected for them, while a person who has no additional respectable characteristics loses respect from others. In that sense, one can be respected to a certain extent for one’s good deeds, important talents, etc., and not respected for one’s unacceptable behaviour and deeds. What happened to Dinga explains this statement.

I saw Dinga several times at the *gachaga*, the central town of Züün Hoshuu. Dinga is his honourable name used by other people when addressing him; however, people call him Sohor Dinga meaning “Blind Dinga”. He is old with dark skin and strange looking eyes. People say he accidentally damaged his eyes but he is not completely blind. He is homeless and has no family and just wanders around everywhere. Local people let him stay in their homes and feed him. People say that he is not ordinary; he can see and talk to spirits and ghosts. For many years people regarded him as crazy and some people still do think this. For these reasons he has never had a good reputation. He is disrespected because, according to most people, he is homeless, crazy and a specialist with a negative concentrated quality like the shamans marginalized among the Darxads because of their ‘blackness’. Some people respect him because they say that he can also perform healing to help people. One day I saw Dinga in the *gachaga*, he was holding a stick and could barely walk. I was told that several days previously he had been seriously beaten by two young people and stayed in bed for several days and then went to the hospital. His ribs were broken, his legs were swollen and he had bruises on his face. Like everyone else, I was shocked to hear about what had happened. Young people do fight in the area but they never beat an old man. Dinga might not be respectable but he is an old man and should receive at least some performative respect. He was staying in a family where two of the young members of the family got drunk, misbehaved and argued with their elders. All Dinga did was to tell them not to talk like that to their elders. The next thing that happened was that he was seriously beaten and was unable to get up. Even though he has a bad reputation, after the fight everyone was on Dinga’s side and said that those young people must be arrested and punished for their brutal act.

1.3.2 Name, reputation and accumulating respect

There are many ethical teachings among the Mongols aimed at keeping one’s name clear (*ner tsever*) or, in other words, to build a good reputation. This is very common in the community and the issue of one’s name comes up in almost all kinds of relationships and communications. I will analyse several terms that Deed Mongols always use when they talk about name, reputation and respect.

Name is taken even more seriously in the small communities in the case of face-to-face relationships and the term *ner nüürtei* or *ner nüüргүй* (to have a good reputation with

a nice familiar face or to have a bad reputation and people do not like to see his face) means “name and face”. To have a “good name” (*sain nertei* or *nertei*) or “bad name” (*muu nertei* or *nergüi*) is probably the biggest means of accumulating or not accumulating respect, especially important in non-performative (intentional) respect. The word *ner*, “name” in Mongolian, therefore, always goes with *hüind* (respect), and the combination of *ner hüind* (name respect) means having a good reputation and respect. Many Mongol proverbs and phrases indicate the significance of *ner* (name-reputation), for example, *ner hugarahaar yas hugar* means “better to have a broken bone than having a broken name”; *muu ner husavch arilahgüi sain ner hüisevch oldohgüi* has the meaning of “a bad name is difficult to get rid of, and a good name is difficult to get”; and *hün neree togos ödöö* means “a man takes care of his name and a peacock takes care his feathers”. When I discussed names and reputations with Baba and Bergen they told me that Deed Mongols say that *ner* is more important than wealth. According to them, once one has a good name then he has the power to take care of other needs.

People at least should try not to get a bad reputation. This simply requires people to try not to be bad (not to have the above-mentioned characteristics that people consider not respectable). The kind of reputation a person has is up to them and they have to work for it; as the Deed Mongols say, “parents give the name to call and the person himself builds his name of glory” (*duudah neriig esteg eh olgono duurisah aldaryg ööröö olno*). A good ‘name’ is a practical way of achieving respect and, consequently, power. In many ways, one’s name/reputation is inseparable from respect and power. The phrase *ner nölöötei*, which means “to have a good reputation and therefore be influential”, suggests that, in the Mongol thinking, people with good reputations are powerful.

Names and reputations are also related to the earlier argument about custom and the state (both called *tör*). The combined expression *ner tör* ‘name and custom’ tells us how the two (*ner* and *tör*) are related and what it is to have a good reputation. As I will claim in Chapter Four, the *yos* custom is a rule declared by the state or moral limits constructed by the public over time. Someone with a good reputation is a person who does not break the customs. Therefore, the local logic is that people who follow and obey customs (*yos*) can have a good reputation and vice versa.

A ‘name’ (*ner*) represents its owner and lives among other people (from now on I will use ‘other’ for ‘other people’), rather than in its owner. It is like a photo, for example, my photo is me and my name is like other people keeping my photo. Unlike a photo, a

name is very abstract, and it is similar to a folder/storage with information about the name holder. “Names are thought to present something of the essence of the person, and the pronunciation of the name in a sense brings that person into being even if they are physically absent” (Humphrey 1993: 76). In many ways a ‘name’ is more than its owner because it lives everywhere, even in places where the owner has never been, and lasts long after the death of its holder, and represents the person even in his/her absence. A name (*ner*) contains a lot of information that sometimes even the name holder is not aware of. A name (*ner*) has a different and independent life from its holder, and obviously the two lives are related but not inseparable. Even though that name originates from the holder, the holder cannot wholly control the life of his name. I will call them the ‘name life’ and the ‘name holder life’. People have the names of lots of other people in their mind and put information in the ‘name folder’ (name life). In the absence of the name holder, the name always comes first and is the first thing to be involved in any communications among the other things of a person. When people speak badly of someone then it is his name that is mentioned first and the information will be saved in the ‘name folder’, to which others have access. That is why Mongols have a very high sense of keeping their names pure (*neree hicheeh, neree bodoh*), because the ‘name life’ constitutes the source of respect to the name holder.




Figure 1.8 Circle of reputation and respect

The ‘name life’ and respect are the same in the sense that they live amongst others. They are in a way neighbours, both living in the minds of others. In other words, when people talk about or feel respect or a lack of respect for someone then they access the ‘name life’ or ‘name folder’ of the person in question in their mind and make a decision. I illustrate

this in terms of a relationship and communication between the self and other. In that sense, the other or public on the other side of the 'self', which is a 'home' for 'name life' and 'respect', is a factory which reproduces the 'name life' and 'respect' and gives them life after their creation (see Figure 1.8). The process continues in a cycle and changes the 'name life', the amount of respect, and the interaction between 'self' (the person) and 'other'.

Good reputation and false modesty: *Nerelheh*, *ereeleh* and *zenzeeleh*. False modesty (*nerelheh*, *ereeleh*, *zenzeeleh*) is one of the most popular topics in Deed Mongol everyday life. They do not like anyone who shows false modesty and always encourage people by asking them, especially visitors, not to have false modesty (*eree*, *zenzee*). It is very common in situations such as a visitor coming to a family, and because the visitor does not know the family very well he tries to be polite and not to say anything wrong, or in general tries to be as well behaved as possible. In many cases, by doing that people hide their true feelings and often lie, for example, by saying he is 'comfortable' in his chair even though it is not really 'comfortable' at all. Such pretence and false interaction is unacceptable to the Deed Mongols.

My family members said that they liked one thing about me, which is that, according to them, I have no false modesty. For example, when I was hungry I used to go to the kitchen area and find something to eat or cook for myself. As my family says, someone with false modesty would never act like this. He/she would sit and pretend not to be hungry.

They usually use the word *ereeleh* and *zenzeeleh* for false modesty. *Zenzeeleh* is a Tibetan word, and *ereeleh* is a Mongol word which is also common in Inner Mongolia. However, in Mongolia the word *nerelheh* has the same meaning as the Deed Mongols' *ereeleh*.³⁹ The word *nerelheh* is etymologically interesting, because it has the root *ner* (name). Although the word refers to false modesty, it also keeps the meaning of 'taking care of the name'. *Nerelheh*, I suppose, etymologically means 'try to keep a name good' (*neree hicheeh*, *neree bodoh*). In addition, the action of *nerelheh* or false modesty is actually about 'saving the name' and trying not to have a bad reputation by means of

³⁹ In Mongolia we also have the word *eree* and *ereeleh* but with a different meaning. For example, *ereegüi* which means 'no false modesty' and therefore good in Deed Mongol, means 'disrespectful' in Mongolia, which is just the opposite.

doing or saying something to hide one's truth and reality. It is a certain method of self-control in the sense that it is an example of attempting to build a better reputation. However, it is not exactly the same as *neree hicheeh* and *neree bodoh* as illustrated earlier, because 'to save a good name' is a good thing, but to be pretentious is a bad thing. The reason that it is bad is that to be pretentious is an immoderation of *neree hicheeh* (effort to the name), and becomes bad for the reason that it lies and hides the true reality, which is why it is not the right way to accumulate respect.

1.3.3. Expression of self-respect through self-abasement (*darui kicheengüi*) and self-importance (*bardam deerengüi*)

People prefer 'self-abasement' and dislike 'self-importance'. In Deed Mongol, *darui kicheengüi* is 'modest and diligent', and *bardam deerengüi* is 'complacent and domineering'. A *darui kicheengüi* person is honest and powerful (*chadaltai*), he is realistic and does not lie; for example, he does not say he can do things he cannot and usually has the ability and power to do more than he says. On the contrary, *bardam deerengüi* or *bardam keldeg kün* (literally meaning a person who says boastful things) considers himself powerful, good, wealthy and so on, which is in reality not true. This causes people to have less capacity and less power than they attribute to themselves. People often use proverbs with the meaning that real talent, knowledge and power always run in parallel with very modest and diligent behaviour, while false, unqualified and powerless people are complacent and domineering. For example, *erdemt hün daruu ih mörön dölgöön* (a knowledgeable man is modest and big oceans are peaceful).

I argue that self-abasement is a certain way of accumulating respect and, therefore, of gaining power, while on the other hand self-importance is the opposite and does not accumulate respect and decreases power (cf. also Chapter Two for a discussion of how respect produces power). People appreciate modest and diligent characteristics, and it also surprises people if a person does things that no-one expected of him and which he himself had not said he would do. However, the opposite (for example, when someone says he can do something but cannot do it, or says he is available but is not available or says he is capable but is not capable and so on) disappoints people. When someone could not accomplish what he said or promised, this puts lowers people's impression of him and

turns the person into a liar who says boastful and unrealistic things (*bardam keldeg*). This does not make people respect him; rather he loses a lot of respect.

'Self-abasement' is a process where first self-power is hidden and then revealed, and in contrast, self-importance is just the opposite, it is a process where first someone asserts his power, then, tries to manifest it and fails. By hiding first (not saying that he would do something) and then showing power (to do and achieve unexpected things) one can accumulate people's respect. Even though a boastful manner is a way of showing power that is not preferred in the Deed Mongol community⁴⁰, in many other places it can be a good way of gaining power. Boasting (to say you can do something) and asserting it (to do what one said and promised) is risky, because you can fail and end up not re-manifesting your power. The first stage is a verbal demonstration of power and the second is the real action and achievement to manifest the orally declared power. Compared to this, hiding or not being boastful and then showing power by action loses nothing, at least it does not need an admission of anything. Instead, the person has a chance to achieve or to show more than he claimed. These are different tactics for accumulating or failing to arouse respect.

There is a narrow border between false modesty and self-abasement and they are similar in that they both hide the reality and truth. However, Deed Mongols regard these as completely different and even opposite in that one fails to arouse respect while the other arouses it. However, in the Deed Mongol conception they are two different aspects of one feature. Self-abasement prevents boastfulness and therefore it is good, while false modesty can lead to lying in cases where it is not necessary to lie. In other words false-modesty is an incorrect use of self-abasement, and self-abasement is a proper use of false-modesty.

I suppose that modesty and self-abasement can in many cases imply a respect for other people, because it does not put a person above others but below them. Compared to this, complacency and self-importance places a person high up and this makes others in one way or the other weaker, and lower than the person, which is not respectful in the sense of hierarchy. Respect of hierarchy sees others as higher than the person and this is

⁴⁰ As far as I noticed, self-abasement is also a preferred manner among the Chinese. A Mongolian as well as a Chinese person would not often reply, "Yes, I am" to high complements, for instance, "You are really clever" and so on. Instead they respond "No, I am not", which is in Chinese "Nali, nali".

what is lacking with self-importance. Initially both of them, self-abasement and self-importance, are about the self, however, in their interaction with others they reflect on others and indirectly put others up or down. I do not argue that all cases of self-abasement respect all others while not all cases of self-importance disrespect all others; instead, all I am saying is that in some cases they imply respect or disrespect for some others. For example, one spring day we were shearing sheep (*hoi haichilah*) with everyone else. There was a young Mongol waged herder in his early twenties called Jamts. In general, he had a good reputation and he was a hard working person who could do everything. However, he was a little boastful (*bardam keldeg*). My family had to shear about three hundred sheep. People use big scissors and I found it really difficult work. People usually shear a maximum of fifteen sheep a day. In the morning Jamts said he could do thirty per day. It is true that he is good but no one believed him and people were saying that he was boastful (*bardam kelj baina*). He did a good job but he did not cut thirty. Because of this kind of thing, he finally got the name of “boastful kid” (*bardam keldeg kövüün*). In such a case, self-importance puts oneself higher than the rest, and at the same time it also puts the others lower than oneself. According to my illustration of the hierarchical respect of putting people, especially elders, down is not respectful and is even disrespectful.

According to the Deed Mongol notion, everyone should be self-abasing, even the most respected leaders and elders. It is very common among the leaders, for instance, to say, “I do not know much about this, we should ask the elders” and so on. On the other hand, the elders would say, “I am old, I do not know much. Young leaders are more educated and bright, they should decide” and so on. This means that not showing self-importance can be counted as self-abasement. For example, a higher person sitting in the lower place and not complaining is self-abasement. It does not mean that one must not say anything; one should say the right thing at the right time. As I illustrated before, everyone has a rank in society. Self-abasement is to be aware of and to be in one’s socially defined rank or to put one self in a lower rank. For example, if an elderly person comes into the *ger* which is full of people and sits at the bottom of a row or somewhere lower than he is supposed to sit this is self-abasement.

Moreover, the issue of ‘self-abasement’ and ‘self-importance’ helps me to analyse self-respect in the Deed Mongol culture. The Mongolian term *biye kündleh* or *ööriigöö kündleh*, which means self-respect, is not popular at all because in Mongol thinking showing self-respect is a certain way of showing self-importance and boasting. First, I

will explain what I mean by self-respect and then show why and to what extent it is a type of self-importance. The Mongolian understanding of self-respect is similar to what Richard Sennett (2003: 227) writes about self-respect, which is proven by self-confidence (*öörtöö itgeltei baih*).

The old-fashioned English phrase “solid character” invokes someone who could justly think of himself with respect. The American version is someone who feels secure in himself or herself, the French “comfortable in one’s skin.” All these usages suppose self-confidence...self-confidence can prove an ambiguous foundation for self-respect (Sennett 2003: 227).

I suppose this Western understanding of self-respect is common elsewhere too, such as amongst the Deed Mongols. In addition to this European notion of self-respect in Mongolian, this idea also strongly means to put oneself up. This also proves that Mongol respect is more about inequality rather than being about equality (cf. also Chapter Three for equality). Before going further, I need to clarify two conditions of self-respect. One is to be self-confident and keep it inside the self, and the other is to express one’s self-confidence. In Mongol society the tricky part is to express one’s self-confidence. A strong expression of self-confidence can be understood as being boastful (*bardamnal*). This is the narrow border between self-confidence and self-importance. For example, if one says, “I can do it” then it is an expression of self-confidence. However, if one says, “I can do it, but no one else can do it” this is too strong an expression of self-confidence and many people would count it as self-importance. In this sense, it is more secure to keep self-confidence, and self-respect, inside the self, and the best way to express it is not by words but with achievements. The craftsman – whether musician, cabinetmaker, or indeed executive when focused on the terms of a deal – concentrates on doing the job well, and this provides self-respect (Sennett 2003: 55-56). Expressing self-confidence with words is dangerous as others can easily this it is self-importance. This same tactic is used in self-abasement. According to the logics of self-abasement, instead of boasting with words, it is important to put in as much effort as one can. The same applies to self-confidence, as Sennett (2003: 56) claims that self-respect focuses on the product. All the above means that one can have self-respect based on self-confidence and it should be kept inside or should be revealed carefully in the way of self-abasement, in order not to exceed the limits of self-confidence and cross the border of self-importance. The limits, in other words the narrow border between self-confidence and self-importance, can be measured

in relation to the two major forms of respect. This will also help us to understand what an important thing self-respect is in the Mongol notion.

In the sense of the analysis of hierarchical respect, respecting oneself through self-confidence has the potential meaning of putting oneself higher than others (self-importance) if no one else expresses their ability. Then, it conflicts with the respect of hierarchy for others. As I discussed elsewhere, respect of hierarchy considers the other person higher than himself/herself. Logically, one cannot consider oneself higher than another person at the same time as considering the other person higher than oneself. This means that one does not show enough respect of hierarchy for the other person when one's self-respect, if this self-respect is hierarchical. Therefore, in order to show that one regards other people as more important than oneself, one must keep one's self-respect inside. I suppose this is the reason why the idea of self-respect is not popular in Deed Mongol interpersonal relationships. Instead of expressing self-respect people prefer self-abasement and keep their self-respect inside. I should underline again that this analysis is only if one thinks that an excess of self-respect turns to self-importance. In other words, among the Deed Mongols self-respect cannot work in the same way as the respect of hierarchy, because it would mean to put oneself above the other people, and this is disrespect in the hierarchical system.

On the other hand, self-respect can also be defined as a form of the respect of common courtesy; for instance, to think of oneself as no less than anyone else, and no more than anyone else. This thinking can be expressed without encountering the others. However, it does not mean that a junior person can talk to an elder in the same way as the elder talks to the junior and claim himself to be equal to the elder. Instead what I mean is that one can still respect the other person with hierarchical respect and at the same time express one's confidence and self-respect, for example, by asserting that he is capable of doing things that many others do.

Power of respect

Powerful and powerless leadership

2.1. Introduction: Two powers

It took me a long time to understand the power relations in the Deed Mongol villages, but I can now see why it took me so long. The main reason is that the type of power involving coercion and resistance, common in western societies was not widespread in the villages. This is because of the absence of the notion and the term power, *hüch* in Mongolian. In most Mongol communities the term *hüch*, mainly refers to 'physical power' not political power or power in social relations. When I first came to the village and asked about *hüch* people did not understand me at all. I had to explain what I meant and even then they were not totally clear about it because the concept was unfamiliar but they seemed to understand what I meant. The second reason for the difficulty in locating the power was the lack of disputes and resistance to demonstrate how such power works. The absence of the term or the lack of cases does not mean that this kind of power does not exist at all, but it is not widespread. Power exists in a different way based on respect (In the next chapter I will discuss how the Deed Mongols consider peace and harmony as an important source of a particular type of power: collective power). To understand power in this community one should first understand respect, rather than looking at conflict and resistance. Here one has to be aware of the two kinds of power, one is the power with resistance and the other is power without resistance.

The Deed Mongol community has both of the types of power which I will describe. I will illustrate the two types of power, one concerning the traditional views, elders (*nastan*)¹ and ancestors, focusing on the historical Mongol Khaans, such as Chinggis Khaan and Gūsh Khaan² whom most people respect, while the other can be understood better in relation to the Chinese state and communism, focusing on Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and other Chinese state, government and political leaders such as

¹ The term refers to both male and female elders, but in practice male elders are the most powerful figures in the village, then younger men, elder women and finally the least powerful ones are the younger women.

² Gūsh Khaan is the descendant of Chinggis Khaan's brother Khasar. He was the supreme noble in Tibet and the Kōk Nuur region during the 17th and 18th centuries.

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai³ (see Figure 2.1) whom people usually resisted (cf. also Chapter Four for conflict between nationalities).



2.1 Elders and guests are sitting underneath the portrait of Chinggis Khaan and Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Van Hoshuu

The former, can be perceived as power without resistance but with respect and the latter as power with resistance. Although it seems natural to make such a distinction between the two powers, it does not always make sense, as some Deed Mongols respect the communist leaders and do not think of them as brutal totalitarian rulers. Another crucial characteristic of the two powers is that the power with resistance is external to the Mongol villages whilst power without resistance is internal. Political power with resistance is usually at the higher level of administrative units rather than at the village (*tosgon*) level. The village is the smallest administrative unit with only 30 to 40 households, all Mongols, and the power with resistance is almost absent, but we can find it in the village's relation to the larger administrative units such as Hoshuu and Xian. In the following I will give illustrations about the two powers in the case of leadership.

Obviously, because the village is part of the Chinese governmental power structure, they have the type of power with resistance in the village, which is represented

³ Former Prime Minister of China after 1950.

by the village party leader (*tosgony shüj*) and the leader of the village (*tosgony darga*). Although they are part of the power with resistance and have a duty to the Chinese government they are very much influenced by the traditional power without resistance which works more through respect. I claim that respect eases or even stops oppression, coercion, resistance and fighting. Therefore in the presence of respect in the power relationship, I argue, that there is no resistance. This is counter to the western notion of power illustrated by many social, political scientists and anthropologists, such as M. Foucault, who consider the nature of power as resistant (cf. also the Introduction). However, it is almost impossible to make a clear distinction between the two types of power in the village. There are cases where the two work together. For example, the village party leader (*tosgony shüj*) and leader of the village (*tosgony darga*) represent the state power, which is generally repressive and can be resisted by the villagers, but at the local level they are not repressive and people do not resist them much and instead respect them as they respect elders. Thus, they have the combination of the two powers.

2.2. Power almost without resistance

In the anthropology of power we always write about power with repression and resistance. However there are few discussions in anthropology about the possible forms of power without resistance, but this is what I look at and I will call them 'power almost without resistance' and this is how I differentiate them from my idea of 'power without resistance'. The fundamental processes of the origin of the two powers (without resistance and almost without resistance) are completely different. One is based on respect and the other based on repression and coercion. In order to explain it I will first elaborate on the idea of plurality and types of power.

As I explained in the introduction, numerous works underscore the importance of the classification and plurality of power, and allow us to discuss and present new types of power (cf. also the Introduction). Foucault writes, "Power relations are rooted in the system of social networks. This is not to say, however, that there is a primary and fundamental principle of power which dominates society down to the smallest detail; but, taking this point of departure the possibility of action upon the action of others (which is coextensive with every social relationship), multiple forms of individual disparity, of objectives, of the given application of power over ourselves or others, of, in varying

degrees, partial or universal institutionalisation, of more or less deliberate organization, one can define different forms of power” (1994: 231). We, then, should not understand that there are forms of power only because people make different definitions for power, but that in fact various forms of power exist. For example, E. R. Wolf (1990) has proposed four modes of power, the fourth of which is discussed in Chapter One.

One is power as the attribute of the person, as **potency or capability**, the basic Nietzschean idea of power. ...The second kind of power can be understood as the **ability of an ego** to impose its will on an *alter*, in social action, in interpretational relations. ...This definition calls attention to the instrumentalities of power and is useful for understanding how “operating units” circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings. I call this third kind of power **tactical or organizational power** (Wolf 1990: 586-587).

His classification of power fits in the analysis of my ethnography. Later I will bring in examples for each mode of power.

Discussion of the numerous forms of power enables us to seek various non-western modes of power in different cultures. P. Clastres (1989) maintains that there is no society without political power and “it is not a scientific proposition to determine that some cultures lack political power because they show nothing similar to what is found in our culture. It is instead the sign of a certain conceptual poverty” (1989: 10).

T. Mitchell (1990, 1999) introduces a notion of power similar to that produced by respect, in the sense that it is detached from resistance. In addition to Foucault’s “external power”, T. Mitchell stresses the importance of “self re-producing power” (1990), as Foucault calls it, “internal productive power” (Mitchell 1999).

Disciplinary power has two consequences for understanding the modern state – only the first one of which is analysed by Foucault. In the first place, one moves beyond the image of power as essentially a system of sovereign commands or policies backed by force. ...Power is thought of as an exterior constraint: its source is a sovereign authority above and outside society, and it operates by setting external limits to behaviour, establishing negative prohibitions, and laying down channels of proper. Discipline, by contrast, works not only from the outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not by constraining individuals and their actions but producing them. As Foucault puts it,

as negative exterior power gives way to an internal productive power. Disciplines work locally, entering social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and reassembling them into more productive and powerful combinations. These methods produce the organized power of armies, schools bureaucracies, factories, and other distinctive institutions of the technical age. They also produce, within such institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, receptive, and industrious political subject. Power relations do not simply confront this individual as a set of external orders and prohibitions. His or her very individuality, formed within such institutions, is already the product of those relations (Mitchell 1999: 86-87).

According to T. Mitchell, Foucault does not dismiss the second consequences of modern political techniques, but he does not explain their details either. Moreover, using P. Bourdieu's (1977: 192) idea of "symbolic violence" and A. Gramsci's (Buci-Glucksmann 1980) "non-violent forms of control", T. Mitchell (1990) developed the ideas of "self reproducing power" and "evading hegemony". According to Bourdieu, "symbolic violence" is "the gentle, invisible form of violence" (Mitchell 1990: 551). Similarly, "non-violent forms of control" are those in which "the dominant classes can persuade subordinate classes to adopt their self-serving view of existing social relations, [where] the result will be ideological consensus and harmony" (Mitchell 1990: 554). Both the idea of "symbolic violence" and "non-violent forms of control" contribute to "self reproducing power" which itself an extension of disciplinary power. In the long run, people eventually get used to repressive and coercive exterior power, because its disciplinary potential penetrates people's consciousnesses as "symbolic violence" and "non-violent forms of control" do. After a while, people even tend not to feel the coercion and repression as external forces, because the external is now internal and they are *in* them. This is the elementary form of what I am willing to call the 'power almost without resistance'. It is an initial stage of the normalization of the coercion by repeating it until it develops into the power almost without resistance. Once the exterior force is normalised the reaction against it is no longer resistance. So the absence of resistance can lead to the growth of respect which shows how repression and resistance can eventually turn into respect. But later I will return to this discussion and claim that it is 'power almost without resistance'.

Furthermore, the above discussion relates to M. Foucault's (1977) "procedure" and P. Bourdieu's (1990) *habitus* (cf. also Chapter One for *habitus* and respect). In general, "procedure" and *habitus* are the same in the sense that they are products of the repetition of previous actions or simply the conglomerate past. This is the same as the process of "self reproducing power", and to some extent, to the 'power almost without resistance'. For example, M. de Certeau (1988) gives the following explanation of "procedure".

In fact, disciplinary procedure gradually perfected in the army and in schools quickly won out over the vast and complex judicial apparatus constructed by the Enlightenment. These techniques are refined and extended without recourse to an ideology. Through a secular space of the same type for everyone (schoolboys, soldiers, workers, criminals or the ill), the techniques perfected the visibility and gridwork of this space in order to make of it a tool capable of disciplining under control and "treating" any human group whatever (de Certeau 1988: 46).

As mentioned earlier, T. Mitchell's "self re-producing power" and Foucault's "internal productive power" is similar but not the same as all the forms of the power of respect. The similarities lie in their shared features: the fact that neither is repressive, coercive, oppositional, resistant nor struggling. In this regard, all of the "self re-producing power", "internal productive power" and the 'power of respect' differ from the Foucauldian form of power with resistance. I call these two – Mitchell's "self reproductive power" and Foucault's "internal productive power" the power almost without resistance. This is how I am differentiating the power of respect with no resistance from the "self-reproducing power". This is mainly because "self re-producing power" emerges from, and indeed is, a continuity or product of disciplinary, coercive power. By contrast, "discipline", "procedure", "symbolic violence", and "non-violent control" are not always sources of the power of respect. Unlike the "self-reproducing power", then, the power of respect is not a product or continuation of disciplinary, coercive power. I suspect that there is hidden resistance obscured by the normalization of coercion in the self-reproducing power and disciplinary power. Because it is the normalization of coercion or the internalisation of the external repression through repetition, that is the continuation of the repressive method. Therefore there is a

possibility that the reaction might be resistant. This is basically the reason I call it the power almost without resistance. I will return to this idea at the end of the discussion.

In order to study the power of respect, one has to break down two fundamental aspects of Foucault's theory, an endeavour which will afford alternative ways of approaching the concept of power. First of these theories is that repression and resistance is always essential and intrinsic to power. I argue against this. Both Foucault's 'internal productive power' and Mitchell's 'self re-productive power' are a kind of freedom from repression, coercion, resistance, struggle and all other similar characteristics that political power holds similar to the power of respect. Having said that, I should agree with P. Clastres (1989), who argues we cannot introduce the following division: societies with power and those without power. According to Clastres, non-western societies, which westerners perceive as societies without power, have diverse types of power without coercion and resistance.

We believe that the previously cited examples of Amerindian societies illustrate quite well the impossibility of speaking of societies without political power. This is not the place to define the status of the political in this type of culture. We shall go no further than to reject what ethnocentrists take for granted: that the bounds of power are set by coercion, beyond which and short of which no power would exist. In fact power exists (not only in America but in many other primitive cultures) totally separate from violence and apart from hierarchy (Clastres 1989: 14).

Through this claim, Clastres presents two primary modes of power: "coercive power" and "non-coercive power" which he also calls the "power without power" (Clastres 1989: 5), as in 'powerless power' in the Deed Mongol community. I have taken up his idea of 'power without power' or 'non-coercive power' as one of the main arguments of my project. Following Clastres, I argue against the theories of power that suggest that it is impossible to speak of power when there is neither coercion nor violence. Power can exist without coercion and violence and in this case the form of social interaction attached to power between people will be not resistance but respect.

The second fundamental aspect of Foucault's theory which must be discarded is the fact that he downplays the importance of the intentions of subjects (i.e. people) in power relations, and in so doing disregards both the mundane fact that centrally located powers exists and the intentions of his subjects. He makes too bold claim in three of his

five methodological “precautions”, which clearly intimate that in order to study power, we should not study subjects but focus on power relations as processes between them.

In the first place it seemed important to accept that analysis in question should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their **central locations**, with **general mechanisms** through which they operate, and the continual effects of these. On the contrary, it should be concerned with the power at its **extremities**, in its **ultimate destinations**, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more **regional and local forms** and institutions (Foucault 1980, 96, also see Smart 1985: 78).

Here, in this first “precaution”, Foucault separates 1) “central locations” and “general mechanisms” from 2) “extremities”, “ultimate destinations” and “regional and local forms” of power. Similarly, in his second “precaution” he detaches “effects, object, target” and an “external visage” of power from its “conscious intention” and “internal point”.

A second methodological precaution urged that the analysis should not be concerned itself at the level of conscious intention or decision; that it should not attempt to consider power from its internal point of view... What is needed is study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there – that is to say – where it installs itself and produce its real effects (Foucault 1980, 97, also see Smart 1985: 78).

In his third “precaution”, Foucault again imposes a gap between an individual, a group or a class, and the exercising of power. As quoted in Chapter One he argues that “power is not a commodity or a possession of an individual, as group, or a class, rather it circulates through the social body” and “individuals are not agents of power, they neither possess power nor potential crushed or alienated by it” (Smart 1985: 79, also see Foucault 1980: 98). In Chapter One I talked about how this idea works in the case of certain types of power such as in the power of the *yos* custom. But, Foucault is so concerned with aspects of power that he thinks are crucial that he also almost ignores the importance of the subject, who is the centre of the functioning of power. In the case of internal power, T. Mitchell quips, that “Foucault does not dismiss the importance of this larger kind of

structure; he simply does not believe that the understanding of power should begin there” (1999: 87). In methodological terms, I would prefer not to adopt the Foucauldian division between what should and should not be studied in something as complex as power. Such a division, I feel, would limit and obstruct anyone’s view of the power of respect – the object in question. My suggestion is that Foucault’s precautions are not suited to the analysis of all forms of power. Instead, I propose that in a study of respect, one must focus on subjects, both as people and agents in power relations. Therefore I am going to examine the production and the reproduction of the power as it concerns both parties in the discourse. Foucault analyses the already existing or created powers. I will deal with the creation and origin of power, and give an answer to the question of how power is built up in the first place.

All the above theories – de Certeau’s “procedure”, Mitchell’s “self re-producing power” and Foucault’s “internal productive power” – are the same in the sense of exploring the extension of the A (the powerful agent in the relationship) to B (the powerless agent in the relationship) discourse. I will illustrate it more in the following section. Because they are all initially the continuation of the A to B relationship they are completely different from the B to A relationship which I will discuss later in relation to power without resistance and the power of respect. But here I argue that Mitchell’s “self re-producing power” and Foucault’s “internal productive power” are forms of power almost without resistance. Maybe the two (without resistance and almost without resistance) seem like a type of power without resistance because they do not have explicit and active repression, coercion, and violence, struggle and so on. However, I suppose that all of them (repression, coercion, violence, resistance and struggle) occurred in the in past and the multiple repetition normalized the aggressive condition and diminished the resistance, as with *habitus*, “procedure”, “self discipline”, “symbolic violence” and “non-violent forms of control”. Even though it is normalised obviously their (Mitchell’s “self re-producing power” and Foucault’s “internal productive power”) origin is repression, coercion, violence and struggle, and they (“self re-producing power” and “internal productive power”) are the continuation of repression. At the stage of normalisation the conflict is no longer evident but its roots are in its past of coercion and resistance. This is why I claim that “self re-producing power” and “internal productive power” is not wholly a type of power without resistance. When compared with power without resistance created by respect, the main difference between the ‘power almost without resistance’ and ‘power without resistance’ is that the former has an external resource while the later has

an internal source. When people reinforce the power through the normalization and discipline and so on they continue the exterior pressure. But when people respect the power and reinforce it then the respect is not necessarily caused by exterior repression, instead it is usually an outcome of internal sentiment to sincerely respect the powerful. Anyway the power almost without resistance is similar to my initial idea and it is one step closer to the form of power without resistance that I focus on.

2.2.1. “Constituted power” and “constituting power”:

A towards B and B towards A

It seems that Foucault illustrates power, domination and discipline from one fixed direction without considering that it can work the other way around. If we imagine the state, sovereignty or any ruling and powerful body as A in opposition to its subjects B, the public and civil society, then power is always analyzed through the direction A to B.⁴ That is the direction of Foucault’s analysis, and an enormous amount of other research on politics, power and resistance concerns the domination of B by A. Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power and many other of his studies concern B and the extension of power, but always in cases of A dominating B with different techniques, not necessarily as an external force but by becoming an internal rationality of the society, as discussed previously. Therefore his work looks at different actions of A towards B. When he explains the discourse from B to A, he approaches the action as a continuation of the previous action from A to B. Then, of course, the result is domination and resistance. I mean domination is the action from A to B, and resistance is the action from B to A. When he analyses the action from B to A as a continuity of the previous action of domination from A to B, then he is unable to discover the possible action from B to A which is not resistance but might be respect. Foucault always expects there to be resistance, so he does not consider the analysis of non-resistance and we need another theory to explain this. I focus on relationships in a B to A direction while most theorists focus on them in an A to B direction. In my analysis it is B that respects A (I will come to the discussion of respect at the end of the chapter). Thomas Hobbes (1999) analyzed B to A relationships when he discusses his social contract theory. He describes the unity of people with the sovereign ruler by their common will and how this constructs power,

⁴ Richard Sennett (2003: 253) calls it a top-bottom and bottom-top.

which I will focus on in the next section. What I suggest here is to focus on the B to A relation without considering the effects of prior action of A to B, whereas Foucault focuses on the existing power, not on the creation of power. He does not pay much attention to the question of how the existing power was first created, how the state and sovereign gained power. It is a discussion about the “constituting power” as Bourdieu and Agamben (1998: 39) termed it, in opposition to the “constituted power”. Like Foucault they both perceived the “constituting power” in opposition to the “constituted power” and discussed the relationship between the constituted and constituting powers. Bourdieu’s explanation of the two as follows:

Constituted power exists only *in* the state: Inseparable from a pre-established constitutional order, they need the State frame, whose reality they manifest. Constituting power, on the other hand, is situated outside the State; it owes nothing to the State, it exists without it, it is the spring whose current no use can ever exhaust (Agamben 1998:39).

But my interest is not so much the relation between the two but mainly the techniques of the constituting power, as C. Humphrey (2004) demonstrates the emergence of the “local sovereignty”. She describes how a new power is constituted not with repression and resistance but by people’s own will, in the same way as Hobbes’ commonwealth. After 1990 the public transportation service almost stopped in Ulan-Ude, Russia. Soon after people started buying private micro-buses and cars and used them for public transportation which turned into a very good business. At first private buses followed the old bus routes then they started to introduce new routes.

In Ulan-Ude, unlike certain other cities, this happened so suddenly and on such a scale that the Mayorate (the new town council) was unable to take control and “criminal elements” moved in. They simply claimed a given route as “theirs” and demanded that the drivers on that route pay them to use it. They beat up individuals, threatened others, and set up ambushes in remote areas to attack anyone who resisted. The police were unable to cope. The drivers then got together at a mass meeting and decided that “If the ‘roof’ [*krysha*] exists, then after all it is better for us to have some kind of ‘roof’.” “Roof” was a term widely used throughout Russia for protection in general and mafia personnel in particular (Humphrey 2004:425).

The case in Russia is similar to what Hobbes calls the “commonwealth”. Both create sovereignty through the will to be protected and both show the emergence of power through its constitution. This is the B to A action that constitutes power. As I have mentioned the emergence of power begins from the B, the public or the civil society, and projects to invent the A, the sovereignty, authority or state with power. This is close to my main argument on the production of power through respect. In the process of the constitution of power, because there is no authority or sovereign to repress and dominate there is not much to resist in the framework of the group or commonwealth. At this level the “roof” or the leader can gain lots of power and constitute a power by accumulating support and respect from its members. Once it is constituted then it is up to the “roof” whether he will reproduce respect and power or establish repression and resistance. This is a popular way to attain power in a Mongolian community. However the case of the Ulan-Ude mafia and the Deed Mongol villages are different from one other. In Ulan-Ude power was created at least partly through threats of violence from outside and inside. Drivers needed some kind of order to prevent random violence. But in Deed Mongol villages, in most of the cases of respect and power there is no external initial threat of violence that becomes the reason to build a commonwealth with willingness. Not violence, but respect, comes first and precedes the construction of power in the Deed Mongol villages. The same technique of constructing power through respect works in various cases between individuals, in the household, in the village etc. When everybody uses the technique then it makes the village altogether more peaceful, and reduces resistance and disputes, which I will illustrate in the following chapter. This is what I will call the power without resistance. Respect therefore is a certain technique of gaining power.

2.2.2. “Constituting powers”: Respect and Social Contract

Unlike Foucault, Hobbes (2004 [1651]: 120) discusses the possibilities of constructing the sovereign power or “common power” by unifying individuals and building a commonwealth. Hobbes’s work on the *Leviathan*, I should emphasize, is about the action from B to A. Obviously Hobbes describes a situation without a prior action of domination affecting the later action of B to A. Actually, Hobbes starts from a situation without the A

therefore B has to build one (A), similar to the above case analyzed by Humphrey (2004) in the example of Ulan-Ude, Russia (see also Chapter two). Respect and social contract are similar in the sense of a B to A relationship, or in other words as a technique to unite people and create a powerful “one common social body” (but social contract and respect are not exactly the same. I will come back to the difference later on).

Some philosophers such as Hegel (1999: 70) and Hume (1999: 66-68) argue against social contract theorists such as Hobbes (1999), Locke (1999) and Rousseau (1999). Hume writes about the “irrelevance of consent” arguing against Locke’s “tacit consent” and the arbitrary will of the contractor. He thinks that people or civil society do not establish a contract by arbitrary will but the state forces people to consent to it. Therefore for him talking about consent is irrelevant in the relationship between a state and its subjects. I quote:

Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any presence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people. When an artful bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing, sometimes violence, sometimes false presence, to establish his domination over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partisans. He allows no such open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those, who are the instruments of his usurpation, may wish to his fall; but their ignorance of each other’s intention keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. By arts as these, many governments have been established; this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boast of (Hume 1999: 67).

Apart from his claim about the irrelevance of consent and the coercion of the state, he shares another argument with Hegel, and they both argue against contract theorists. I quote again from Hume (1999: 67); “But where man he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounce and disclaims”. Simply what he means is that individuals do not establish a contract with the state with their arbitrary will, but they are

already born into the relationship. Following Hume, Hegel raises the same claim and calls it “the priority of the state over the individual”.

Thus contract springs from a person’s arbitrary will, an origin which marriage too has in common with contract. But the case is quite different with state; it does not lie with an individual’s arbitrary will to separate himself from the state, because we are already citizens of the state by birth. The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one to be founded. Permission to enter a state or leave it must be given by the state; this then not a matter which depends on an individual’s arbitrary will and therefore the state does not rest on contract, for contract presupposes arbitrariness. It is false to maintain that the foundation of the state is something at the option of all its members. It is a nearer the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for every individual to be a citizen (Hegel 1999: 70).

The main difference between the opposing philosophers is that Hobbes and others are talking about the “constituting power” while Hume and Hegel are talking about the “constituted power”. The case discussed by Hobbes and other contract theorists is about how B – individuals, public civil society, are building A – the state, sovereign, and ruler. Moreover, at the next stage it is a question about the choice of the A constituted by collective will and respect. Once the power is constituted (the A is constructed) it is up to the powerful whether to continue with respect or with repression, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Hume and Hegel suggest that after the construction of the power (A) the powerful or the A usually choose the power of repression over the people.

2.3. Local politics and ‘democracy’ under authoritarianism

In China the social structure consists of the following administrative units. The major divisions are provinces and autonomous regions, I did my fieldwork in Qinghai Shen (Province). Within the province the units are: Haixi Zhou (Prefecture), Dulaan Xian (County), Züün Hoshuu (Chi. Xiang, Township), and the smallest unit where I lived is the Shish Cong (Village) (cf. also the Introduction).

Every administrative unit has two leading positions namely the party leader (*shüj*) and the leader of administrative unit (*darga*). The party leader has the highest rank.⁵ I will illustrate election and leadership in the two lowest administrative units, namely the Hoshuu (Xiang in Chinese) and the village (*cong* in Chinese and *tosgon* or *bargiad*⁶ in Mongolian). The Hoshuu (Chi. Xiang) also represents the rest of the higher administrative units which are authoritarian compared to the village, as explained below. I take the village election and leadership as an example of “constituting power” and the other as an example of “constituted power”.

Beneath all the authoritarian mechanisms lies a democracy at the bottom – in the village. However the larger authoritarian organization somehow controls the village democratic election. In the village, people vote amongst themselves for a leader and the one who receives the highest vote is supposed to win the position. Theoretically this is the process, but the higher authorities have a right to dismiss candidates, and the one with highest votes does not always win. People do not have complete power over the election. As the Shish village leader, Süker, describes everyone above the age eighteen, both male and female, has a right to become a leader. However, the leaders are usually male and in their thirties.⁷ Even though it is legal to put oneself forward in the election no one does so. As I discussed in Chapter one, putting one’s name forward would be an expression of self-importance *bardamnai*, and people consider it not right. Whoever becomes the party leader must be trustworthy, honest, educated, and be able to lead others and to solve the community’s problems. Recently higher administrative units have underlined the importance of the leader’s capability to lead people towards a wealthy life, for example, by helping them to increase their household income. Briefly someone with good reputation (cf. Chapter One for the importance of reputation) becomes a leader. People vote for someone who has a “power as the attribute of the person, as potency or capability” (Wolf 1990: 586). As quoted earlier, this one of the four modes of power that Eric R. Wolf proposes. According to him, “speaking of power in this sense draws attention to the endowment of persons in the play of power, but tells us little about the

⁵ The most powerful figure of the village in terms of the government and the state is the party leader the same as in the whole of China. He is responsible for the people’s education, thinking and view (*üzel uhamdariig hamaardag*), while the village leader deals with *aj ahui* (enterprise, economy and domestic affairs) of the village.

⁶ Etymologically adopted from Russian *brigad* or ‘brigade’ in English.

⁷ But the higher administrative units like a Hoshuu sometimes have a female leader. For example, the Züün Hoshuu, where I lived had a wise party leader who is a middle-aged Mongol woman. Also the wise major of the Golmus City is a lady.

form and direction of that play” (Wolf 1990: 586). It is a certain capability of the person that is not in the actual power relationships of election, but ready for it. In Chapter One I called this “personal potency and capability” ‘concentrated quality’.

At the beginning I did not know that having a good reputation and ‘concentrated quality’ was so influential. When I first arrived in the area I was looking for a family to stay with and asked Erdemt whether he knew of anyone. He said that his eldest brother Bat’s family would be a perfect choice. Erdemt explained to me that his brother Bat (Baba) had a very good reputation (*ner saitai kiin*) among the villagers. Also his father Namjil who worked as a village party leader for almost thirty years lives in the same *ger*. At first, I did not take it seriously and I did not quite understand why Erdemt proposed Bat’s family rather than his other brothers and sisters. Erdemt lives with his sister and her husband. After a while I discovered how important a good reputation is in terms of respect and leadership. I was not surprised that Bat (Baba) was elected as a village party leader after the end of my fieldwork.

The actual election process lasts for about forty days. In the first stage the “Village Committee” (*tosgony zövlöl*), which consists of the party leader, village leader, women’s society leader, village accountant and “cashier” (*zoos hamaaragch*), organizes a village meeting to choose the “first candidates” (*anhny jishigdes*). Every member of the village has a right to put someone’s name forward. From this the committee makes a list of names of candidates. There is no limit to the number of candidates at this stage. At the second stage only those with more than ten votes stay on the list and the candidates are declared. External members from the higher administrative units, Züün Hoshuu (Chi. Xiang) and Dulaan Xian, come to participate at the local election and build the “Election Committee” (*songuuliin duguilan*) which consists of the members of the Village Committee and the external members. They decide on the number of candidates and discuss all those left on the list and choose the “real candidates” (*jinhene jishigdes*). This meeting also decides the number of “real candidates”. The elimination at this level of the election, I believe, limits and controls the democracy, and is a sign of a continued authoritarian presence. Foucault calls it the extremities, ultimate destinations of [state] power which became capillary (1980: 96, see also Smart 1985: 78). The committee usually extracts three or four “real candidates”, from the list and then for ten days the committee collects any opposition to each of them. If there are complaints from more than ten people or ten different households about any one candidate then he/she would be eliminated and replaced by one of the candidates eliminated at the previous stage and the

same ten-day process is repeated and the final candidates go forward to the next stage when the villagers vote by secret ballot for one of the "real candidates". The two candidates with the highest votes go forward to the actual election and on the election date, declared by the Committee, all the villagers vote again for one of the two candidates and the winner is elected. The same process applies for the election of Village Party Leader except that only party members vote.

The Hoshuu government officially announces the new leader of the village to the other villages, and organizes a "meeting of two administrative levels" (*hoyor shanty hural*). The two administrative unit levels are the Hoshuu and the village. The new and old village leaders participate at the meeting where the old leader resigns and the new one is officially instated.

The process of the vote and election is an example of an arena where the "personal potency and capability" of E. R. Wolf, or what I called the 'concentrated quality' is activated and taking a role in the playing out of the discourse of power. This is similar to the second mode of power introduced by E. R. Wolf. As he argues "this draws attention to the sequences of interactions and transactions among people, but does not address the nature of the arena in which the interactions go forward" (Wolf 1990: 586). He calls this type of power "the ability of an *ego* to impose its will on an *alter*". Wolf expected the *ego* to use his potency and capability to impose its will on the other people. He had in mind the A to B relationship of the "constituted power". Whilst I agree that this is one of the possible developments of interaction, in my ethnography the *ego* or the candidate is not imposing his will on the *alter*. Instead the *ego* is receiving support from the *alter*, by doing this he is enhancing and constituting his power. This is another possible development of the interaction that Wolf did not have in mind. The same explanation also helps me to compare and analyse Wolf's third mode of power - "tactical and organizational power", which is about how one actor or "operating unit" effects and controls the actions of others within determinate settings, and constructs part of the environment of the other actor. He argued that the third mode of power is not about the interactions and transactions among people, but it is about the "nature of the arena in which the interactions go forward" (Wolf 1990: 586). In my ethnography the election constitutes a similar situation. The difference is that in my ethnography it is not the leader who is the actor or "operating unit" that exercises controls over energy flows that constitute part of the environment of another actor. But it is the people who respect the

leader, vote for him and constitute part of the environment for the leader. The actors are in the reverse position.

After the election the leader is in post for three to five years. After three years if the leader is good and willing to continue then the villagers keep him as a leader, and even in many cases they continue to re-elect him until he retires at the age of 55. In Arslan village, next to my village, Shish, Tsenden, worked as a village leader for 20 years until he retired and Namjil, grandfather of my family, was a village party leader in Shish from sometime in his 30s until he retired, and the current village leaders have already worked for over ten years. It seems that having the same person as a leader for very long time is not unusual and can be related to the respectful and less-resistant nature of a society. People do not compete to become leader, because the leaders do not have supreme political power over the ordinary people, and they are not of much practical importance. The absence of resistance to a leader can be explained through the people's respect for him; moreover, because people respect him he retains his position for a very long time. People say that they elect as a leader the most respected young man who fulfils the criteria listed in the section on non-performative respect (see Chapter One). Respecting the leader means listening, obeying and following his decisions. To be respected in the village is a way to become leader, so the power is not only something held through a position, it can be gained by people's respect. The most respected person in the village is usually the leader, not because he is a leader but for the reason that he is a good and respected man which is why he gains the position. This means that respect and power precede the position of leader.⁸

Another example that confirms the issue is the continuation of the power of and the respect towards retired leaders (cf. also Chapter One for respect of elder leaders). The ongoing respect for a man, which started before he became a leader, continues after he leaves the position. This implies that the political position is not the reason for his power and respect. As claimed in Chapter One, retired leaders are, as everyone says, the most powerful and respected persons in the village, more than the actual leaders. They have the

⁸ The case matches to the Nambikuara leadership illustrated by Lévi-Strauss (1967: 51). They have a democratic leadership where people choose one from the several people who are respected and have a good reputation in the group, just as in the Deed Mongol community. I quote:

There are, in the initial group, several men acknowledged as leaders (who likely acquired this reputation from their behaviour during the nomadic life) and who make relatively stable nuclei around which the different aggregates center. The importance, as well as the permanence of the aggregate through successive years, depend largely upon the ability of each of these leaders to keep his rank and eventually to improve it. ...Personal prestige and the ability to inspire confidence are the foundations of leadership in Nambikuara society (Levi- Strauss 1967: 51).

combined characteristics of respect, first they are old, and second they were leaders. It is not only symbolic – in decision-making the old leaders also have an important role. After my main question of who is the most respected person in the village, I often asked who should respect who, in a relationship between the two most respected persons, elders and leaders. I heard many times from various people of different age and gender saying that “leaders are young people, they must respect and are supposed to listen to elders”. Some say that in official matters leaders are more powerful but in the matters of tradition and custom elders are powerful and leaders must listen to them. I will give ethnographic examples in the following section on decision-making.

The issue of trust and respect for someone who can be a leader raises the question as to whether villagers really know a person, and really know each other. I would answer that compared to many other communities they do really know each other, particularly because ‘privacy’ is almost absent in nomadic Deed Mongol relationships. When I first came to the village I felt insecure leaving all my belongings in the *ger* with no locks, or even a wooden door. *Gers* in the countryside have old-style felt doors hanging from the roof and they do not lock the *ger* when they go away. I was told that in the past when people went away they used to make some tea and food and leave them on the table for any guests who might turn up. Professor Tserenbal told me that several years ago people even used to go away and leave the *ger* open for a week or more. Also, living in a *ger* there is no time and space for anyone to be alone in private and this somehow applies to the whole society. In the village people live as a big family and in actual fact many of them are related. In addition to this, the communist system bonded them into one big family where everyone shares their life problems. In Chapter Three I will describe a Village Meeting and show how they discuss each and every family’s issues. However, this knowledge and absence of privacy cannot secure real knowledge, trust and respect. There are cases where people respect someone, vote for him and later he turns out not to be a good leader. As I mentioned, in Kurimt village of Banchin Shan Hoshuu, people did not like the former village leader because he took the best pasture during privatisation.

Now the candidate has become a leader, the question is: what happened to the constituting power? Is it still a “constituting power” or has it turned into a “constituted power” since the election? According to the ethnography the process of constituting does not end, because people keep on respecting, supporting and empowering the leader even after the election. However to a certain extent this is also a constituted power at the same time because the leader has become powerful in his interactions with other people. In that

sense this power can be seen as constituted after the people empowered him. In the Deed Mongol case of the power of respect the issue of being constituted and constituting is inseparable. However, they can be separated in other circumstances. For example under authoritarianism people sometimes do not respect and support the leader and therefore do not constitute power for the leader. His power could have been constituted from other sources, for instance from the communist party in China and from nationality, which I will discuss.

Unlike in the village, in the Hoshuu and in the rest of the higher administrative units there are usually two or three names of people proposed by the higher administration and two “village representatives” (*ardyn tölөөлөгч*) from each village who go to the town to vote for one of the two or three candidates. The ‘village representatives’ can be anyone from the village. For the government all the chosen candidates are acceptable, because the higher government specifically selects them in advance, and it makes no difference to them which one succeeds. This is an example of constituted A to B power where Wolf’s second mode of power as an “ability of an *ego* to impose its will on an *alter*”, and his third mode of “tactical and organizational power”.

As I was told by an old village leader, Tseden, elder brother of Bergen, the mother of the family, until recently the Hoshuu leader used to be a local person usually a Mongol, but the Hoshuu party leaders are always Han Chinese people except in the smallest administrative unit – the village. So in the village even the party leaders are Deed Mongols. In last six years villagers of the surrounding area had Hoshuu leaders from outside, either from other Hoshuus or from the Dulaan Xian. As Tseden and many others told me, until around 1990 the Hoshuu leaders used to work very well by going around and visiting the herders and pastures on horseback. Then they got a jeep and stopped visiting the pastures, but at least then knew the leader of the Hoshuu, because he used to be a local person. Then the situation became even worse when they started to choose leaders from different Hoshuu (Chin. Xiang) or from the Dulaan Xian. For these reasons, Tseden told me, made the relationship between the Hoshuu leaders and villagers very distant and only the village leaders knew the Hoshuu leader personally and many of the other people did not even know his name after he had been in the job for three years. This is probably because only a few (10-15 Mongol households – people who work in the school, government, bank and hospital) Mongols live in the *gachaga*, Hoshuu’s central town, and rest of them are herders, isolated from each other by the privatized pastures and scattered throughout the valley. Not recognizing the Hoshuu leader does not affect the

herders' authority, in most of the cases the Hoshuu leader is just an intermediary, passing on the rules and decisions made by the state and the higher authorities. The herders know that resisting the Hoshuu leader does not solve disagreements, unless the leader himself makes an unacceptable decision and then people might resist him, but usually he does not have the power to make the sort of crucial decisions which might upset the herders. If they do not have a TV or radio the herders are often not even aware of the higher leaders of the Chinese State, and they certainly do not know the middle-level leaders of Shen, Zhou and Xian at all. This kind of unawareness shows the isolation of herders from the state. Probably one of the reasons that it took me so long time to find out about the political power is that there is a large gap between the officials in the authoritarian state and the herders in the countryside. It appears that herders do not need to know or even care who the Hoshuu leaders are, what they do and what is going on in the state. This shows how external the power of the Chinese State is.

2.3.1. Conflict and decision-making

Decision-making is one of the cases through which we can analyse power and respect. In this section I will illustrate decision-making in two different spheres, the public and the private. I used to talk about village matters to Ja. Bat, the accountant of the village and Jun Hua, the husband of Namjil's daughter, who were our neighbours. Whenever I asked about current village politics Baba and Bergen used to send me to see Ja. Bat, because, they said that having a position in the village administration he had more up to date information, but they all told me that the leaders and the "Village Committee" (*tosgony zövlöl*) have crucial roles in public decision-making. Among them the village party leader (*shüj*) is in the highest position in accordance to the Chinese governmental structure, as Foucault calls it the "general mechanisms" of power. The party leader is in charge of all the political issues in relation to the party, and in reality there is no problem with which the party, directly or indirectly, does not interfere. The Party in China is the sovereign power and in Foucauldian terms it is a "capillary" in the society. The party leader's duty is to present to villagers all the new policies and rules declared by the party. The village leader is the next highest position and is usually responsible for practical (*aj ahui*) issues and the management of arguments and disputes in the village. However, there is another power significant in decision-making as I mentioned previously. I was

told many times that elders are influential in decision-making in public and private issues though they do not have a political position and power relating to the state and party but they gain power in different ways such as through traditional mechanisms of respect. Particularly, those who used to be leaders have a significant role, and in many cases current leaders take advice from them. According to the Mongol *yos* (rule and custom), young people should listen to and obey what elders say and it is how youngsters, even young leaders, show respect to the elders. This is a *yos* (custom) and has to be performed regardless of position, power, and wealth etc. and it is evident in the example of young leaders taking advice from elders. *Namjil*, in his 70s, is one of the most respected elders in the village is called 'old party leader' (*högshin shüj*) and both of the two village leaders, Tserenküü the party leader and Süker the village leader, when they came to visit our family would discuss village issues with the "old leader". The traditional hierarchy is still dominant in the lowest level of the modern governmental structure – village *tosgon*.

Another question is about agreeing or resisting decisions made by village leaders. Many people told me that they usually follow the decisions made by leaders, firstly because it is compulsory and usually the state is behind the decisions which they cannot resist, secondly because they are following the leader they voted for. The harmonious combination of the two reasons, on the one hand people's respect, internally directed from the villagers to the leaders, and the other the state power which is externally directed from the state to people, makes the community peaceful.

In families, elders (e.g. *Namjil*) and middle-aged men (e.g. *Baba*) are in significant decision-making positions. When family members discuss problems, it seems to me that none of them dominate and it is generally quite harmonious without any strong disagreements. The head of the family usually makes decisions concerning the household and herds and elders often do not take much interest because the head is responsible for these matters. But the traditional respect for the elders does influence some decision-making. For example, *Erdemt* applied to study in Mongolia, and the first person he asked for permission was his father, and his brothers and sisters, who all agreed. He also went to see a lama for divination and the result was positive. This was very persuasive for them, but it took a long time for the family of his girlfriend, *Chin Chin*, to make a final decision. A lama's divination said that it would be good for her to go but equally if she did not go she could find a job here. Her father was worried about her and did not like the idea of her going so far away to Mongolia. I was quite impressed with the obedience of young

people, it was surprising to see how quickly she changed her mind and just because her father had said no it seemed to be agreed that she would not go. I had seen a similar case. A girl named Duma, Erdemt's classmate at the university, also decided not go to Mongolia because her parents would not allow it. However, Chin Chin did eventually go because her father changed his mind after a positive divination from a lama.⁹ It seems that divination is very crucial to decision-making in the private sphere. It is a kind of final confirmation for the decisions people have made, or a way to resolve a difficult dilemma.

At the beginning of this section on power, I acknowledged the lack of resistance, conflict and fights. After careful consideration I started to realize that cases of resistance were rare. However, rarity does not mean there is no repression and resistance, there is always some. When I ask people whether they have arguments and fights in the household and village they always say yes, which is to be expected because there is no such thing as a society without conflicts. However, societies and cultures can be differentiated by the amount of conflict within them and in this case Shish village is definitely one with less conflict.

The most common cases of disputes are to do with pasture, (see also Chapter Four for pasture fights and nationalities' conflicts) which can have several sub-cases involved. It can be between any bodies such as families, villages, Hoshuus and ethnic groups and usually is about someone's animals crossing the boundary and using the other's pasture, or boundaries not being correct. The most serious disputes are usually between the larger administrative units or nationalities (Mongolians, Tibetans, Chinese and Hoton Muslims). When the level of the administrative unit becomes higher then the minority always has to deal with bureaucratic leaders of different nationalities such as the Chinese, Tibetans and Muslims. This reflects my earlier statement that the traditional power with respect is usually in internal relations in the Deed Mongol community, and the new power with resistance is usually external and expressed in its outside relationships with other communities. Alternatively, the conflict could be between members of one household whose parents have passed away without arranging the inheritance (*önch huvaah*) and pasture (*övs belcheer taslah*). In this case the oldest member of the family would be left in charge of dividing the inheritance and if they were unable to agree then they would have to ask the village leader for help and perhaps resort to a legal solution.

⁹ When elders disagree but the divination is positive then the decision usually depends on the situation. Elders would probably follow what the divination says. In the case of the above kind of disagreement between an elder and a divination the decision also depends on what the young person and other members of the household think.

In terms of the number of cases, serious disputes between different ethnic groups or counties are uncommon. For example, in my village the last conflict was about ten years ago, and smaller conflicts within the village happens perhaps once in three years. Since land privatisation and the construction of the fences this kind of conflict has become even more unusual.¹⁰

In cases involving resistance and decision-making it is interesting to look at the solutions to disagreements between leader and villager or between an elder and younger person. A friend of mine, Bayashal,¹¹ in his mid twenties, told me about a quarrel he had with one of his maternal uncles (*nagats*). According to Deed Mongol custom, a maternal uncle (*nagats*)¹² is one of the most respected relatives in the kin group and people do not quarrel with uncles. Bayashal was herding in his summer pasture few years ago. The neighbouring pasture belonged to his uncle who had not moved in yet. One night Bayashal's herds went into the uncle's pasture without him noticing and the next day when his uncle found out he got very angry and started shouting at him. Because his uncle was in his mid sixties and a respected relative, according to the custom Bayashal could not retaliate. However, his uncle did not stop and said very unkind things. Bayashal was quiet and just listened to his uncle, but after a while he became angry too and they had a serious argument. Bayashal knew that it was his responsibility to look after the animals and he had failed, but it was unintentional. He thought that his uncle had over-reacted, and it got worse when his uncle said that he would rather not have a nephew like him and Bayashal replied that he did not want an uncle like him. They did not talk to each other for about a year and Bayashal did not even visit his uncle at the New Year.¹³ His parents tried to make him go but he refused. One day his uncle came to see him, and asked him for a favour. He had lost some of his camels and he had to go and look for them, and he needed someone take care of the rest of animals. They have had a good relationship ever since. This case demonstrates that young people sometimes break the customs if they have problems with elders.

¹⁰ However, in many other parts of China conflict over land and pasture is still a very big problem. Shinjiltu (2003) discusses similar issues among the Deed Mongols in Henan Xian, and Dee Mack Williams (2002) talks about problems in Inner Mongolia.

¹¹ He is a student at the Qinghai Nationalities University in Xining, the capital of the Qinghai province. He is originally from the Züün Hoshuu's Sair village. It is one of the neighbouring villages of Shish village where I stayed for my fieldwork.

¹² Among the relatives the most respected one is the maternal uncle and then paternal uncle. They are not equal.

¹³ According to Mongol customs, in the lunar New Year all the young people should visit to the elders to greet (*zolgho* in Mongolia, *amarlah* in Deed Mongol) them. It is a very serious insult and way of expressing resistance if one does not visit an elder.

The story implies that if someone breaks the customs of respect by having a confrontation then there is no punishment. The elders are powerful and respected but they do nothing against the young or the powerless. Elders, leaders and other respected figures do not repress, coerce or do any violence to the other villagers.

The next story is about a fight between a leader and a villager. Naji (Nasan-Ochir)¹⁴ a teacher in the secondary school told me about a dispute in one of the villages. The Village Party Leader constructed a drainage system for a spring (*arig*) which flowed out onto the surrounding area and flooded a neighbour's pasture. The owner of the pasture, one of the villagers, asked him to pay for the pasture but the leader refused. The villager complained to the administration of the Xian, and won the fight. This confirms the idea that the powerful figures in the village actually are to some extent not powerful at all. These varied cases of disputes and solutions lead on to my next argument about powerless power.

2.3.2. Powerful but not powerful

The two forms of power, which I was looking at became clearer to me, particularly after I had collected various cases of disputes and fights. I argue that the Deed Mongol villages have two specific types of power as I mentioned previously – one is the power without real political power and the other is a power with real political power. In the following section I will explore a new facet of the two types of power. I would like to call one the “powerful power” and the other the “powerless power”. I mean powerful or powerless in terms of the western notion of real political power, which produces force, fear, resistance and conflict. Expanding on my idea of the ‘power with and without resistance’, I argue that the ‘power with resistance’ is the ‘powerful power’ while the ‘power without resistance’ is the ‘powerless power’.

The terms ‘powerless power’ and ‘powerful power’ can also be understood in different ways. For example, someone or something can be powerful in the sense of gaining respect and enhancing their power, whilst not being powerful in terms of the other sources of power such as state power. The former is the case with local leaders and elders in the Deed Mongol villages. While those, such as most of the Hoshuu and other

¹⁴ He is a teacher of Mongolian literature and history in Dulaan County. The story is about Tevk village in Züün Hoshuu.

higher leaders of the government that get power by being under the umbrella of the sovereign power, do not gain their power from people's respect.

As described earlier, 'powerless power' works in the villages and families, in other words in the smallest administrative units of China and the 'powerful power' is more common in the administrative units above village level. Because the villages, probably the rural minority villages, are quite isolated from the real politics and global civilization and have their own unique arrangements and politics based on their traditional experience and knowledge, I argue that men, elders, and leaders of the village who are the powerful figures are the 'powerless power' in terms of the western approach to the notion of power. The local people probably do not think that they actually are powerless. According to many examples of disputes in the village – between people who are not suppose to fight like an elder and younger, leader and commoner, and male and female – the powerful agents such as the elders, leaders, and males do not really hold the power to scare, punish, depress, influence and threaten, but they have a harmonious domination over the common people or the powerless. Even though they are the powerful people, compared to the rest of the powerless people in terms of the amount of respect gained, status in the village, and role in decision-making, they do not exercise western-type of power with repression and resistance. This is evident in the comparison of village leaders and the other leaders in the higher levels. In other words it is a comparison between the two powers. In the cases of Xian (Eng. County) and Xiang (Mon. Hoshuu), the leaders can exercise practical domination and have rights which the village leaders do not have. The village leaders are different from the Xiang, Xian, Zhou and Shen leaders in the following ways:

1. Village level politics and leadership is very democratic. The Chinese government considers the village leaders' position as less important politically while the other leadership positions above village level have real political power and authority.
2. Higher leaders have real power and authority. The obvious difference is that they have cars, offices, employees, and make important agreements, decrees, are responsible for all financial issues like investment, tax, salary and so on. In addition, they receive salaries from the government of at least one thousand, five hundred RMBs¹⁵ per

¹⁵ It is the name of a Chinese monetary unit. According to the 2003 exchange rates, a thousand RMB is around 80 USD.

month. But village leaders have none of the above authorities, and receive about a thousand RMB per year from the villagers.¹⁶

3. In the village there is not much demonstration of power and authority. Unlike the higher administrative units, the villages do not have schools, hospitals, municipal buildings or any other organizations that exist in towns. Herders have their own livestock and pasture that is privatized. There is almost no need for further organization. Therefore, the village leaders are not responsible for large issues and do not do serious work.
4. To be a village leader is not profitable and does not help much to improve one's own life. But to be a leader in the higher administrative unit is very helpful to improve one's life by having a good income and opportunities for advancing to a higher position etc, while the village leaders cannot do this.
5. Because of the above differences, competition for the positions is also very different. There is a competition to get a leading position in the higher administrative units while in the village case there is almost no competition or willingness to become a leader. In fact there are a lot of reasons that it is better not to be a village leader.
6. In the case of higher leaders, because they hold authority and the ability to change people's lives, the people have to show a lot of ritual respect for them regardless of their true feelings. Therefore, in this case respect can be not true respect, whilst in the village people usually show their true feelings, they do not need to flatter the village leader because he does not have the power to change someone's life.

From the above differences between the village leader and the high leader, it is clear that the village leaders are the "powerless powers" and the high leaders are the "powerful powers". Because of this it is very common in the Deed Mongol villages to reject the position, Naji once told me that there is no good reason to become a village leader and it makes better sense not to be a leader. This is similar to what Levi-Strauss (1967: 51) writes about the Nambikuara leadership in South America. Groups of up to twenty people have a leader who has lots of responsibilities like being a very good guide for gathering food etc. and has to be very generous by giving away everything to others. Most importantly as in the Deed Mongol community the chief in Nambikuara has no coercive power. "As a matter of fact, chieftainship does not seem to be coveted by many people,

¹⁶ Divides the salary amount by the number of the households and collects the money from all households once a year.

and the general attitude of the different chiefs I happened to know was less to brag about their importance and authority than to complain of their many duties and heavy responsibilities" (Levi-Strauss 1967: 51). Pierre Clastres (1989) analyses just the same ethnography of chieftainship in South America and defines the leaders as powerless powers, in the same way as I am proposing in this chapter. He states that "for what needs to be understood is the bizarre persistence of a "power" that is practically powerless, of a chieftainship without authority, of a function of operating in void" (Clastres 1989: 21).

However the above case does not imply that the village leaders are not powerful at all. Only compared to the high leaders, and in terms of disputes against them and rights of punishment they have, does it show that they do not hold enough political power. But on the other hand, compared to the common villagers the village leaders are powerful in many ways, in decision making, in ritual, and in general in terms of position in the village and in how people regard them, but not in disputes and conflict. If they are not powerful in the western sense but still powerful, then they must have another special way of enhancing power, which is through respect.

Ethnographies of this chapter and Chapter One both show that the power of respect is a possession or an "attribute of the person" as E. R. Wolf puts it. This contradicts Foucault's third precaution which I quoted earlier. He claims that power is not a "commodity or a possession of an individual, as a group, or a class" and "individuals are not agents of power, [...] they neither possess power nor have their potential crushed or alienated by it" (Smart 1985: 79 and Foucault 1980: 98). This is true to a certain extent especially in the sense of sovereign power. In its widest range power is a very abstract notion exhibited in various ways in various cultures. In its whole range power cannot be reduced to a single attribute, commodity and possession. But, in addition to its abstract aspects power also has numerous ways to reveal itself in social relationships. In other words it has different embodiments. As Foucault writes "[power] invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques and equips itself with instruments" (Foucault 1980, 96). Individuals may not possess power as a whole but, I argue that they possess embodiments of a certain type of power. For example, personal characteristics can be regarded in a particular society as an embodiment of power. In this way everything has the potential to be an embodiment of power and it is the people and culture that construct it. Similarly, Hannah Arendt confirms that "power is not property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that 'he is in power' we actually refer to his being

empowered by a certain numbers of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, 'his power' also vanishes" (Arendt 1986: 64). For example, amongst the Deed Mongols being older than someone, being male or having a good reputation is a social embodiment of power, as discussed in Chapter One. When an individual or a group possesses many different embodiments of power the person or the group is powerful. This is the local theory for winning an election, to be influential and powerful in the village. In this case, what exactly is the power? Is it the characteristics, ability, and capability of an individual, or is it the social construction that decides what the actual embodiments of power and people's respect for them are, or is it the influence of the leader, the powerful person or thing into the society? E. R. Wolf has already answered this question and calls them different modes of power, as discussed before. Then power is not a single entity that can be fully understood with one word "power", rather it is a complex phenomenon. As Foucault explains it, it has a "central location", "general mechanisms", "extremities", "ultimate destinations" and "regional and local forms" (Foucault 1980: 96 & Smart 1985: 78). Apparently Foucault did not think of the power of respect when he wrote it, instead he had the sovereign power and state power in his mind. On such a large scale power is scattered and the constituting modes and embodiments of power are isolated from each other.

Foucault in his first methodological precaution, as mentioned at the beginning of the Chapter, downplays the importance of the study of the "central locations" and "general mechanisms", and underlines the importance of studying the "extremities", "ultimate destinations" and "regional and local forms of power". However this rating of importance is not a good methodology for studying the power of respect. First of all, does the Deed Mongol power relationship have these constituents of power? Where is the "central location", "ultimate destinations" [of power] and so on in the village leadership for instance? All these can also be found in the village. According to Foucault, the village leader in the sense of partially being an official member of the authoritarian administration is part of the "central location" and "general mechanisms" of China's sovereign power. But as shown in the ethnography, partially the leader is also not of the "general mechanisms", he is the "regional and local" and "capillary" forms of the sovereign power. In addition to this the village leader, as I discussed in the introduction of the chapter, is part of the traditional power of respect. Then the question is where are the "central" and "regional" locations of this power. I presume that the individual leader (or

elders) is the “central location” and his influence, people’s respect for him is the “capillary”, “ultimate destinations”, “regional and local forms” of the power of respect. Compared to the sovereign power the discourse of power in the village is on a very small scale. Therefore the aspects of power are not scattered and isolated from each other, they are inseparable.

2.4. Conclusion: Production of power and respect

The question I always pondered was whether power is first or respect is first and which one produces the other. Continuing the discussion from the previous chapter, my claim is that respect produces power and power produces respect as well, in other words, when one respects someone he/she makes that person powerful. On the other hand when someone is powerful he also arouses respect from others. The relation between power and respect is cyclical and in many cases, the two produce one another, and continue like a chain (see Figure 2.2). The chain is a mixture of two types of power (power with and without resistance) and the two types of respect (sincere and insincere respect). The order of the four (the two powers and the two respects) can be random depending on how one behaves, as I describe in the following (see Figure 2.2). We could stake the milder claim namely that in respecting another one enhances his power. Y. Navaro-Yashin (2002) argues that through everyday life people enhance state power – and this is a case of sincere respect producing power (sincere respect - power). The chain continues from the power and the power can be either repressive or respectful, this is up to the powerful one. It means that in the chain of respect the power goes in two different directions one leading to respect and the other to repression and resistance. On the other hand, one respects someone who is powerful in terms of status, knowledge, age, gender, etc. and in this case, it is power that produces respect first, in a form that quite likely is related to repression, coercion and even resistance (repressive power - respect). I should underline here that the repressive power usually tends to produce insincere and performative respect. Then the insincere respect would not produce power and make the powerful more powerful. Instead it produces resistance as a reaction to the repression. In the following, I will try to give more precise illustrations for the above cases of productions of power and respect (see Figure 2.2).

It is an interesting question, which respect makes power and which one does not and how and why. Not all respect produces power but sincere respect especially, produces

real political power and insincere respect does not. I suppose that performative and non-performative respects do not necessarily produce power, because they have the potential to be insincere. The democratic election in the village is a good example of sincere respect producing power that puts someone in a high and powerful position through respect.

In the case of leadership in the administration above village level, as described, power produces respect. More precisely, power with repression produces respect. Because here leaders have the authority and real political power to scare and influence others' lives, make it necessary for people to respect the leader whether the respect is sincere or not, non-performative or performative. In the case of the village leadership there is no necessity and repression to make people show respect to the leader, simply because the leaders do not have the authority in the same way as the high leaders do, to evoke respect. Instead respect is fundamental here, it appears before power and produces power. People respect the village leader and that is why he is elected and becomes the leader. Villagers respect him and he achieves a dominant position over the other villagers, as I mentioned in the section on democracy and authoritarianism. By respecting the village leader the villagers make him superior and powerful, and when they respect him they tend to trust him, obey him and follow his decisions. In that way the respect of villagers towards the leader produces his power, he is powerful to certain extent and it is up to him whether he uses the power to repress or to respect others. In the case of the Deed Mongol villages, particularly Shish Village where I lived, the leader continues his power with respect. Therefore, disputes against the leader are very rare not because he is powerful but because he is respected. Because the leader is not repressive and coercive the people do not have many reasons to resist him. I will come back to this discussion later. The same arrangement also works in the respect for elders and men. Elders and men do not have a power over others and a right to force others; they are same as the village leader. Furthermore, when respect is a source for the production and functioning of power, then repression, resistance and conflict are not in the power relationships anymore, and I state that it is a "power without resistance". If power comes first and produces respect through its repression and imposition then it is what I call the "power with resistance".




Figure 2.2 Cyclical production of respect and power

Collective power

Reciprocity of respect in the peaceful hierarchy

3.1. Two heads are better than one...

3.1.1. Official village meetings

The Village Meeting is the main occasion for herders to share their feelings and for the transmission of information with regard to private life issues, public village issues and the state. The villagers organize three different official meetings towards the end of the year, from September to December. The meetings are: 1) the Village Party Meeting (*tosgony namyn üüriin hural*), 2) the Village Meeting (*tosgony hural*), and 3) the Women's Society Meeting (*emegteichüüdiin holboony hural*). When I was there, they held only two of the meetings, the Party Meeting and the Women's Society Meeting, which I will describe now.

There is a big house in the countryside, in the winter pasture area, where the villagers usually hold political meetings and gatherings to discuss organizational and administrative affairs and so on. People usually gather in the village house in the winter, but if they need to hold meetings during summer they usually gather in the yurt (*ger*) of one of the families. First, I participated in the Women's Society Meeting. Because the meeting was in September they gathered in our neighbour Ja. Bat's *ger*. It had been planned for two weeks earlier, but because there were only eighteen people it had been postponed. There are 42 households in the village, and it is obligatory for the village leader and the village party leader and at least one female representative of each household to participate. If less than 50 percent of these turn up then they do not hold the meeting. This second time, there were twenty-two people. The party leader Tserenküü was away with the herds in the mountain and the village leader Süker was at a funeral, but he joined later. The meeting was due to start at one o'clock in the afternoon, but we had to wait for latecomers and eventually, by half-past-three, there were 22 people and we started the meeting.

Until Süker, the village leader, arrived the host of the family, Ja. Bat, and I were the only men. According to custom all the women asked us to sit in the *hoimiir*. The seating order was not as I had expected for the official meeting, but it was same as for traditional feasts and rituals. As I discussed in Chapter One, men were in the *hoimiir* and then elder women, and finally all the 'five leaders'¹ (*darga nar*) of the Women's Society were sitting at the end of the line near the entrance above the rest of the younger women. As always officials and leaders are all young people (see Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1 Leaders of the village Women's Society sitting at the lower part of the *ger*

Before the meeting started, the women studied the rules and announcements passed down from higher official meetings. As there were no new rules or information to present, one of the officials of the Village Women's Society read and then explained the planned reproduction policy, which many of them already know from instructions of pervious years. Finally after two and half hours, the Women's Society leaders opened the meeting and gave a speech about the last year's decline and improvement on education,

¹ The five officials are: 1) the leader of the Women's Society Gerel who is 47 years old, publicly elected and working in the position for two years after Bergen. She is a younger sister of the village leader Süker. 2) Narantsetseg - 30 years old, the organizer of the society (*zohion aigulalt hamaarah gishüün*), 3) Güüshaan - 36 years old, secretary of the planned reproduction (*tölvölgööt ürjil hariutssan nariin bicheech*), 4) Delger - 39, propaganda officer (*uhaguulah gishüün*) and Ulaantsetseg - 35, harmoniser (*eyeldüülekh gishüün*) who is responsible for mediation in arguments and conflicts.

reproduction, herding, pasture, fencing pastures and so on. She had a note from the meeting of the previous year, so she could compare the changes. She ended her speech by appealing everyone to make more improvements and underlined the importance of collective effort.



Figure 3.2 Board of the ten stars

Then the interesting part started. They began to discuss every family one by one. The discussion on each household proceeded according to the requirements of the “ten stars” (*arvan odon*). They call it “to match the ten stars” (*arvan odon tegshitgeh*). Every household has a red metal board with a list of ten requirements and duties printed on it and have a red star on each of them. It is distributed from the Dulaan Xian government to rate and control households (see Figure 3.2). The board is entitled: “Cultured Household with Ten Stars” (Mon. *arvan odont bolovson örk*, Chi. *shi xing ji wen ming hu*). Households have to achieve all the ten requirements if not the stars have to be removed. The ten requirements are as follows.²

² The translation of the text on the board describes the ten rules in Chinese. My friend translated it for me into Mongolian as expressed in the Deed Mongol dialect. Then I translated it into English.

1. Respect [Love in Chinese version] the party and love the country (*Namaa kiindelj, ulsaa hairlah*)
2. Work hard and attain wealth (*Sharguu ködölmörlöj, chineelegt kürek*)
3. Gain knowledge and culture, and esteem education (*Soyol erdmiig suraltsaj, bolovsrolyg erkemlek*)
4. To be decent and moral (*bolovson yos surtahuuntai baih*)
5. Follow rules and obey law (*Dürmiig barimtalj, huuliig sahih*)
6. National solidarity (*Ündestnii bülkemdel*)
7. Reproduction planning (*Tövlögөөт үржил*)
8. Unity in the family and harmony in the neighbourhood (*Ger бүлdee negdej, hörsh zergeldeeteigee eye evtei baih*)
9. Convey ritual and customs (*Zan zanshlaa ulamjlah*)
10. Consider the hygiene of one's surroundings as important (*Orchin toirny ariun tsevriig erkemlek*)

There was no special order for families to be discussed. However, younger people waited until most of the elders had presented their situations. People voluntarily talked about their private matters openly and asked other people to comment and criticize. Since I do not have space to present all the forty-two households I will give a few examples. Domsh, an old lady in her late fifties (later I found out that she is the elder sister of the village leader Süker), was one of the first people to open a discussion about her family. She started her speech by agreeing with her family's failures: that they never achieved two of the requirements of the board, the first was not being clean and hygienic, and the second was her aggression and quarrels about pasture (whether someone else uses her pasture or she uses someone else's). However, she said, after they had put a fence around her pastures she did not quarrel much anymore, but she still thought her family were not clean enough. Finally she said that "you are all watching my life and know what is wrong and what is right, please let me know if I have wronged anybody, I would like you all to discuss and comment on my family". This was the most popular way to end one's talk. Everyone asked others to openly criticize and comment in public. Then, Gerel, the head of the Women's Society took the lead and encouraged the rest of the people give their opinions on Domsh and her family. Many people thought that she was clean enough, her children are grown and take care of the household, and she was praised for having stopped quarrelling about pasture and being cruel and aggressive. After everyone expressed their views about her and her family Gerel asked people to raise their hands if they all agreed to give her all the ten stars, then to raise their hands if there were any objections. Everyone agreed to give her the ten stars.

Then there was one case about pasture and unfinished fencing. People know that fencing around private land is expensive and for that reason several households had not

finished it yet. People said that they should understand this situation and should not be too hard on them and give them another chance to finish. But there was another interesting comment about pasture for Zaidüi, Mönkjii's wife (they are in their late fifties and counted as elders). Everybody knew that Mönkjii was helping some Hoton Muslim people to buy horses. Mönkjii was their guide in the area and found them horses to buy. He took 50 RMB (about 5 USD) for each horse. People did not disagree with him making money, but they disapproved of him keeping those horses on his pasture. They have small pastures that are unsuitable for horses, which destroy the grass, and they need much larger pastures. Even though it was his private pasture other herders were concerned and worried about the state of his land.

There were two incidents of marriage problems and divorce. One of them began with an argument between sisters. This was Ulaanbaatar's (elder brother of Ja. Bat) family. His wife Tungalag was at the meeting and she presented her family situation and admitted that she had done one thing wrong – she had slapped her younger sister, Mönktsetseg when they were arguing. Mönktsetseg had a fight with her husband Weidün, who used to drink heavily and beat her so they were divorced. However, after the divorce they started to get together again and have more fights. Tungalag, told her not to repeat all those fights, she was angry and she was obliged to tell her younger sister what a mistake she was making. Then, they argued and Tungalag (the elder sister) slapped Mönktsetseg. Mönktseteg argued that this could not be the right way of 'pedagogy' (*surgan kümüüjüüleek arga*). People did not take her complaints seriously since she was not beaten and injured, but everyone agreed that slapping was not the right thing to do. The meeting warned Tungalag not to slap and gave her all the ten stars. However, Gerel, the Women's Society leader, considered others' opinions asked everybody whether they all agreed not give Mönktsetseg the eighth star, because she had divorced and did not obey and have good relations with her sister. Mönktsetseg and Weidün have a son and daughter and since the divorce they were counted as two families, the husband with his son as one family and the wife with her daughter as another. Weidün's family did not get the eighth star either because of the divorce and the domestic violence.

There was another similar dispute between two brides of the same family. They argued about almost everything including water supply, pasture, fencing, talking behind each others backs, marriage problems, jealousy and so on. Tserenduma, the younger bride also fought with her husband Mönkbaatar, who drank and insulted her. Therefore she was then thinking of a divorce. At the meeting the argument turned into a big fight between

the two brides, they started crying and shouting at each other and Tserenduma started smoking. Amongst the Deed Mongols no woman smokes and drinks alcohol, she is the only woman I have ever seen smoking and I have since heard that she also drinks. No-one said anything about her smoking at the meeting, probably because everyone was aware of the atmosphere and the fact that she seemed very down, and nobody wanted to say anything more to upset her at that moment. During this argument a drunken middle-aged man came into the *ger* and passed by everyone and sat in the *hoimiir* next to the village leader Süker. He looked quite angry and did not say a word. Later, I found out that he was Mönkbaatar, Tserenduma's husband. After a while Süker asked him what he was doing but he would not say anything. Then the leader became a bit angry with him and told him that he could not disturb the meeting by coming in drunk. He told him that he was the first person to have disrespected the public (*olon niitiig kündelsengüi*) by coming to the meeting drunk. I thought that the drunken man would fight with the leader or at least say something to justify himself, but he said nothing had a drink of tea and after a while he left. Except for Süker no one said a word, they were all quiet and just watched. I wondered whether it was because they were all women and Süker was the only man with authority. Were all the women following the customs of respect and not saying anything against the man leaving the talking to the only male leader? Also, I asked myself whether the angry and drunken man realised that he was disrespecting the meeting and the people in the meeting. Did he admit his disrespect by silence and the quick departure? Did the village leader have enough power to make the angry and drunken man realise that he was being disrespectful? Apparently there can be different answers and explanations for these questions. However, a Deed Mongol would answer 'yes' to them all. If 'yes' then it means that respect is not just an old custom and performance, instead it is a powerful and active aspect in a relationship. This type of incident made me believe that respect is powerful and hierarchical. After Mönkbaatar left, Süker, the village leader concluded the case and said that since they did not have the power to penalise and punish, all they could do was to beg them not to drink or fight too much, and to try maintain harmony.

At the same time one of the five officials made notes and wrote down everything that was said at the meeting. As I have briefly mentioned before, they also have the notes from the previous year's meeting to compare the situations and see what changes have made. Gerel, the leader of the Women's Society, led the meeting, opening and closing discussions and asking people to raise their hands if anyone had objections to the decision and to take votes for collective decisions and agreements. It took a long time to discuss

the ten rules and for everyone to comment on the families for each of forty two households. The meeting finally finished after midnight.

After the meeting I asked Süker when they were going to hold the village meeting. He said that there would not be one this year, most things had been discussed at this meeting and there were not any other new announcements, laws, rules or problems to discuss. However, about two weeks later, there was a Party Meeting where only members of the party participated. There are twenty-five party members, usually men, in the Shish village. The meeting was arranged for 12 noon but there were not enough people there to start. By five in the afternoon, there were fifteen members, more than the half required so the meeting started. Elders who are party members as well and the two leaders, party leader and village leader, were sitting in the *hoimür*, and the party leader, Tserenküü presented some party rules and announcements. Compared to the previous meeting it did not last long at all and nothing was discussed, probably because everything was discussed in the women's society meeting. The main thing they talked about was the announcement from Dulaan Xian to complete the vaccination of the herds by the 15th of October. If there were any incidents of infectious diseases because of late vaccination then the official announcement said that the herds of the neighbouring households must all be killed, and the family that had not followed vaccination rules would pay for all the losses.

The discussions at the Women's Society meeting were also about men. They discussed all family affairs not just those concerning women. I felt that men should participate too and thought that they would discuss the 'ten stars' in the village meeting. I checked with Bergen, who said that it was always discussed at the Women's Meeting not in the Village Meeting. I wondered if it was particular to this village but she gave me lots of other examples of villages that discuss the 'ten stars' at the Women's Meeting. This led me to consider that women are powerful in this community. With the agreement of the men they represent the whole. In this case women are the head of the household. They are at the meeting to discuss the reputation of the whole family and the red board with the 'ten stars' is the embodiment of the family reputation. The ten requirements control the whole family both in the public and private sense. One can tell what problems a family has by looking at the board placed somewhere high in the *hoimür* in every family. Since there are not many ways to control, penalise and punish Deed Mongol herders, one of the

only things the government can do is to appeal to their innermost values; their sense of respect and reputation (cf. also Chapter One for reputation).

Caroline Humphrey and Urgunge Onon explain that life was strictly regulated in cross-cutting ways, by social rank, by the subordination of women to men, by the respect accorded to the old age, and by genealogical seniority in the clan system (1996: 23). In the early twentieth century in the Daur, unlike in the contemporary Deed Mongol, relationships were strictly hierarchized. Brothers did not have easy relationships, since the junior had to defer to the senior and could be physically punished by them (Humphrey 1996: 24) and the father's words were unquestionably obeyed even a wife could not go against her husband's order (1996: 25). Thus some feminists have argued that women in patriarchal societies have been induced to adopt depreciatory images of themselves. They have an internalized a picture of their own inferiority, so that even when some of the objective obstacles to their achievements fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new opportunities. And beyond this they are condemned to suffer the pain of low self-esteem (Taylor 1992: 25–26). I do not think that Deed Mongol women or the younger people suffered in this way. For women, especially young women, being of the lowest rank does not mean that people do not respect them. They are the least respected but least respect cannot be confused with disrespect. Senior people must show respect of common courtesy for people in a lower rank. Being further up the hierarchy does not mean that they can treat people below them with disrespect. There are certain customs that younger people must follow in order to show respect such as seating order, form of address and so on. But generally people in the lower ranks are quite equal to their seniors and elders, they can argue against, criticize and openly express their opinions to them. On the other hand, elders, men, or anyone in higher ranks do not attempt to oppress people of lower rank. For example, in my family the husband and wife were equally important in different ways except within the strict customs of respect. At the open discussion in the meeting women criticized men who drink and beat their families, and they joked and talked with the village leaders and the attitudes I observed implied a general sense of equality.

One last point I should underline is the importance of 'collective power' and how people are loyal and open to it. It decides everything, and solves everything, and individuals are seen as powerless in the face of 'collective power'. This is what I will now analyse.

3.1.2. Collective power

'Collective power' is a literal translation of the Mongol term *olon hüch*. *Olon* means "many", more specifically in this context it refers to 'people', and *hüch* means, "power". The need to define the idea reminds me of the Mongolian philosopher and political scientist Ts. Erdemt's idea about the "gathering and focusing power" (*hüchiig huraan tövlörüüle*) that I quoted in the introduction of the thesis. He argues, that "power can be empowered by following the main stream of the flow of power and gathering it, but not resisting and distracting it" (Erdemt 2002: 34). Alvin I. Goldman (1986) accurately describes the idea as follows.

Suppose that you and I, both healthy and reasonable normal men, are standing behind a stalled Buick. If either of us alone pushes at it, the car will not budge; but if we both push simultaneously, it will move. Let *E* be the issue of the movement of the Buick (in the next several seconds) and let *E* be partitioned into two outcomes: (*e*) it moves, and (not-*e*) it does not move. If both of us want outcome *e* to occur, then we shall both push at the car and outcome *e* will take place. If both of us want not-*e*, neither of us will push and not-*e* will happen. Thus, if we jointly desire either outcome, that outcome will occur. Thus this is good reason to conclude that two of us have *collective power* w.r.t issue *E* (Goldman 1986: 170).

Following Talcot Parsons, Michael Mann (1986) defines collective power as a means "whereby persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature" (Mann 1986: 6). In general, this is what Mongols mean by the term "collective power". I agree with Goldman in the matter of "joint power", but not on the analysis of the same "desire". I suppose people can have different desires but can still support each other to fulfil each other's desire.

Research done by David Sneath, an experienced and rising anthropologist of Inner Asian studies, helps to explain the Mongol notion of 'collective power'. In his argument about *Imperial Statecraft: Arts of Power on the Steppe*, he brings out a special method of governance and calls it "collective sovereignty". Under this term he explains that rulership and power was distributed to the members of the ruling group with local lords having independent power. "Rulership was, in many ways, a common project of the

ruling house, line or clan, represented at its head by the sovereign ...this also frequently gave rise to a system of appanages, by which the imperial polity was divided between the heirs and the senior members of a ruling house into personal domains, as in the Türk and Mongol empires...But although this undoubtedly meant a weakness for the imperial centre, it also reflects the strength of the collective sovereignty of the ruling houses – the victory of aristocracy over autocracy”³. Essentially the idea and function of what I call the ‘collective power’ and what Sneath calls “collective sovereignty” is the same. The main and only difference is that one is about the empire and the “ruling house” which is at the macro level while my discussion is about a village leadership and power organization which is at the micro level.

‘Collective power’ may have two different functions. Collective power built up by the presence of many people can be used to fulfil a common desire. People unite under the same desire and oppose the third agent that is not part of the group. In other words, it is a relationship between groups, not a function within a collective (see Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3 External functions between groups of people

Mongol teachings suggest that when a group has solidarity and harmony then the group is powerful in its external relationships with other groups. For example, when people fight against nature or any external enemies as Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 2004) describes in his commonwealth (here, I see one commonwealth as one group of people) and Leviathan. He talks about the unity of people with their “common will” to be protected. (The next part of the chapter will discuss the difference between the Deed Mongol collective power and the Hobbesian commonwealth and Leviathan).

The internal functioning of collective power concerns relationships between members of one group. In the external functioning of a collective power a certain achievement is beneficial for everyone in the group, while in its internal functioning, a

³ This is a quotation from the Introduction to his forthcoming edited volume on statecraft.

⁴ A and B indicate group and agents in the relationship.

⁵ Letters indicate people.

certain achievement is usually for the benefit of one or a few members only (Figure 3.4). For example, in terms of any kind of achievement of a member of the commonwealth or a group, it is much easier for the person to succeed with assistance from other members of the community. Therefore, it is very common for Mongolians to say that “I am doing well with help/power of other people” (*olnyhoo buyanaar sain baina*). In this case, a particular achievement of the collective power benefits the wellbeing of a certain individual member of the group and is not necessarily profitable for others (while in the external functions, people unite under the same desire, and the outcome is equally profitable for everyone). However, in these relationships, each member of the group receives some kind of support from the collective power of the other members. As one receives support then he/she is obliged to support others in return, as in the exchange of gifts. It is a certain way of collaborative living as a group without leaving anyone out, which is quite a socialist notion and I will return to this point later. In this sense ‘collective power’ can solve many different problems of its members.




Figure 3.4 Internal functioning of collective power

Take the case of collective power, a powerful collective versus a powerless individual. Without the collective an individual would not have powerful protection and support. Members of the collective fight to help someone achieve their individual desire, it is an obligation for a powerful collective to help and support its individual members. Group members are obliged to support each other since any of them who participate in the collective support might one day need some kind of support themselves, therefore, it is an exchange of support. To conclude, power does not only work to actualise one's own desire, but also to actualise someone else's desire through obligation. I am not talking about a political obligation where people have a duty to obey the sovereign, but it is a mutual obligation between people in a society. I will discuss this further in the section on reciprocity.

My main concern is the internal functioning and mechanism of the group. I will analyze how people try to construct such things as harmony and concord (*ev*) inside the group. If they do not have concord then they say that people would not listen to and be helpful to each other. I suppose that there are various ways to achieve concord, but my main claim is that it is necessary to be respectful to the individual members of the collective and to follow the majority decisions of the collective. In this way the collective can be politically powerful as its members follow it and support it. But the power in a collective does not rest with one person or a ruler instead it is everyone, because, as I have described there are no strong powers in the village to oppress and dominate. In their view even the powerful people such as leaders and elders must submit to the collective power (power of all members). The collective power consists of both powerful and powerless people. In a sense, everyone is powerful by virtue of being a constituent element of the collective power. Through respect for and strengthening of the collective power people reinforce themselves, because that power works also for the individual members. Further this leads to the Deed Mongol idea of *bülkemdél* (a view that harmony builds solidarity), which is similar to what happens in the Hobbesian commonwealth.

3.1.3. *Bülkemdél* and a commonwealth without Leviathan

After living in the Shish village for almost a year this (village meeting) was the first time I became aware of the conflicts between people in the village. I thought that in order to analyse power in the discourse I would find cases of disagreement, but I did not witness any because they do not discuss them. Instead I was often told about being harmonious and *bülkemdél* (a view that harmony builds solidarity), the opposite of conflict⁶. Later I realised that peace and harmony, instead of coercion and resistance, is another way to approach power in the relationship. Since the topic of coercion and resistance was not popular in the community I had to turn to their viewpoints for my analysis of power. R. Dentan accurately describes a similar situation in the Semai community in Malaysia.

⁶ In 2005, in the election of the President of Mongolia, candidate N. Enkhbayar, who later won the election, had some campaign literature "Concord is Powerful" (*Ev Khüchtei*). The idea of the campaign literature is "Mongolians are powerful when concordant". This was just after the important leaders of the Democratic Party united with the Communist Party.

Normally, they think, life in a group is peaceful. Monkeys travel in “gangs,” like people, said Ngah Hari of Mncaak: “but monkeys fight.” The “but” is typically Semai. Humans keep the peace by respecting each other’s desires⁷.

I will argue that *bülkemdél* or in other words ‘fight against fighting’, is an inseparable element of ‘collective power’ and commonwealth. In other words, *bülkemdél* is a detailed description of how ‘collective power’ is built and how it works. In its broadest sense it includes different ways of constituting and preserving ‘collective power’, such as harmony, solidarity and respect. Then I will compare it to the commonwealth that is analysed by Hobbes. Every individual makes a contract with the sovereign ruler who represents every individual’s will. This social contract builds a “commonwealth” as Hobbes ([1651] 2004: 117-120) calls it. Rousseau (1999: 63) calls it a “corporate and collective body”. Deed Mongols call it *bülkemdeh* – “to be one solid”. Following on I will compare two different types of commonwealth. I will argue that the difference is that in the Deed Mongol commonwealth individuals have, as Hobbes would say, a “social contract” with the ‘collective power’ which is the power of people.

Etymologically, *bül* and *bülkem* (*bülgem* in Mongolia) means a ‘group of people’ that have something in common such as an identity, purpose, will etc. For example, *ger bül* means family in Mongolian. Then, *bülkedel* and *bülkemdeh* means ‘to become a group’, ‘to keep the group’, ‘to be in the group’ and it also means to be understanding, friendly, harmonious with others. Erdemt told me that it means friendly (*nöhörsög*), harmonious (*eye nairtai*), and he gave me a popular example that it means “one whole nation is harmonious like one family”. Similarly, *Zochi Lama Gaga* (see Chapter One for more information about him) told me that it is “to be concordant with each other without quarrels and breaks”. His example was “to recognise an elder brother as an elder brother and to recognize a younger brother as a younger brother” (*ahaa ah gej düügee düüi gej yavah*). Moreover, he explained to me, that this means, “to respect the elder brother and love the younger, and solve problems and anyone’s failures without anger and fight”. He said that people can start *bülkemdél* simply from a little negotiation to resolve conflicts for example when someone’s herd accidentally gets into the neighbour’s pasture then the neighbour should not immediately become angry at what has happened, people should forgive each other and be more tolerant rather than being angry and aggressive. He thinks that in his Kurimt village of Banchin Shan Hoshuu, even though people always

⁷ Quote from an unpublished paper.

emphasize the importance of *bülkemdel* all the times, it does not work well and is “not stable” at all compared to the past when he was young. With “not stable” he meant, “one day people are *bülkemdeltei* and the next day they fight”. Therefore it is difficult to say that they are *bülkemdeltei*. In order to put it into practice, as mentioned, the village even has an official position for a “harmoniser” (*eyeldüüleḡ gishüün*), who is responsible for pacifying and mediating in fight and conflicts. Elders and parents always tell the younger to keep the *bülkemdel*. This is familiar in Buddhist teachings as well as in Mongol folklore and communist propaganda.

At first, I thought that *bülkemdel* was a socialist idea originating from Chinese communism, which is true to some extent. Among the ‘ten stars’ the third proscription on the board concerns the “national *bülkemdel*” (Mon. *üüdesnii bülkemdel*, Chi. *min zu shou fa*), which underlines the importance of harmony and peace between the nationalities. A similar duty addressing the importance of harmony and unity is also presented in number eight. Unlike the proscription number three, the number eight is about a *bülkemdel* on the smaller scale of a community namely, in a family and village. It says that people should have “harmony in the family and in the neighbourhood” (Mon. *ger bülteigee negdej, ail hörshsteigöö evtei baiḡ*, Chi. *jia he lin mu*). This means that to build peace and concord is the policy of the communist state. All the duties listed on the board are also reinforced by the local elders’. At a wedding ceremony for example, everyone at the celebration has a chance to speak starting with the eldest relatives of the couple. The elders give advice on the duties of the ten stars. Almost all the elders address the importance of *bülkemdel* and respect.⁸

However, I later realised that it was more than just communist propaganda. While there are many materials suggesting that *bülkemdel* is somehow crucial to Chinese communism, at the same time there is another source of information that pulls the idea of *bülkemdel* from the past and the Mongol understanding. Therefore there are two similar *bülkemdel* amongst the Deed Mongols one is the communist ideal, which further encourages people to be loyal to the party, and the other is local traditional knowledge that does not refer to the Chinese communist party. Later I will refer to the former as ‘with Leviathan’ and the latter ‘without Leviathan’.

⁸ While I was in the field I was invited to two weddings in October and November 2003. Deed Mongols consider weddings as one of the three most important celebrations in a lifetime. Wedding feasts are usually very traditional except for the reciting and giving of the marriage certificate of the Chinese government.

I would expect that the original Mongol notion of *ey ev* (concord/harmony) and *ev negdel* (solidarity) became even more popular and practical in Chinese communism. There are many Mongol proverbs that encourage friendship, concord, harmony and the power of the collective. For example, Mongols say that “the power of many [people] is like a sea without a bank” (*olny hüich olomgüi dalai*), “gathered magpies are more powerful than tigers going one by one” (*tsuvarch yavsan barsaas tsuglaj suusan shaazgai deer*), “if two people are harmonious then they are solid as a metal castle, if twenty people are not harmonious then they are fragile as a broken castle” (*hoyor hiin evtei bol tömör herem met bat, horin hiin evgüi bol evderhii herem met hevreg*) and so on. People would quote the proverbs in cases of conflict, as described in the section on village meeting. In addition to proverbs there is a famous Mongol story about the ancestors of Chinggis Khaan. Even though they did not use the terms *bülkemdél* or *tangarag* they still imply the same idea. I quote from the *Secret History of the Mongols*. After the death of her husband queen Alan Qo’a gave birth to three more sons, and this aroused conflict against the two previous sons.

One spring day, after boiling some dried mutton, she made her five sons...sit down in a row. She gave each an arrow-shaft, saying: ‘Break it.’ They broke the arrow shafts easily and threw them aside. Again, she took five arrow shafts and bound them together. She gave the five bound shafts to each in turn, saying: ‘Break them.’ Each tried, but none succeeded.... Alan Qo’a spoke to her five sons: ‘All five of you were all born of this same belly. Alone, you can be broken easily by anyone. Together and of one mind, like bound arrow-shafts, none can easily vanquish you’ (Onon 2001: 42-43).

“The sons heeded her advice, helped each other in every way, and later became the most famous and powerful family in Mongolia and in the world” (Stuart 1996: 42). There are many other examples of Mongols’ high valuation of *bülkemdél*. The Zochi Lama Gaga told me that the term *bülkemdél* appeared only after the communists won the civil war and defeated the Kuomintang in 1949. He said that the Deed Mongols used the word *tangaragtai* (literally means to owe an oath) for *bülkemdéltei* before the communist revolution. I suppose that people imagined the solid relationship to be something being pledged even if no actual pledges took place. This tells us that Deed Mongols had a particular of conception of *bülkemdél* and it is not only a communist rationale adopted

from Chinese political ideology. In this way, as illustrated in the Introduction, Deed Mongols sometimes combine particular communist ideologies that they consider as fair and reasonable with their traditional ethics. Caroline Humphrey (1997: 33) argues that social values such as justice and altruism are weakly internalised, compromised by the existence of an alternative understanding of how the world works. Moreover she notes that “even communist ethics, which was notably inspired by social values, was also assimilated by the Mongols to their preference for the morality of the self, resulting in images of a world inhabited by people ‘good-in-themselves’”. *Bülkemdel* is a perfect example of such a combination and this is one of reasons why it is still a powerful exemplar in the community.

What is the purpose of *bülkemdel*. In the past people enhanced internal power through establishing solidarity within the group in order not to be defeated in war and so on, but in the present, one might ask why people would need *bülkemdel* in a Deed Mongol village. Obviously, nowadays there is no war amongst the Deed Mongols.⁹ Because of this *bülkemdel* is more about relationships within the group. It is a criterion by which the Deed Mongol communities judge good or bad people. As described in the arguments that arose at the Village Meeting, people who do not have *bülkemdel*, or in other words who quarrel and fight were seen as bad, while people who are *bülkemdeltei* are harmonious and respectful to other people, and to the collective.

Hobbes’ use of commonwealth is quite similar to the idea of *bülkemdel* in the Deed Mongol community. However, they have their differences, Leviathan is about a whole nation or country while the case of *bülkemdel* discussed in this thesis concerns a village. Therefore, before the theoretical discussion, I stress that I am analysing the arguments at the micro level which other theorists usually apply at the macro level, as mentioned earlier in relation to David Sneath’s ideas on “collective sovereignty”. In this way my argument contributes to and helps in the reconsideration of the theories from a different angle.

The communist type of *bülkemdel* that refers to party loyalty is similar to Hobbesian commonwealth. However, unlike Hobbes’ commonwealth, *bülkemdel* in a Deed Mongol village does not only apply to the creation of the state or ruling power. It is more than that, the idea of *bülkemdel* concerns everyday practice between people or

⁹ However, they are, to a certain extent, fighting to preserve their Mongol identity which is endangered by the growth of the large nations such as Chinese, Tibetans and Hoton and Salar Muslims (cf. also Chapter Four).

between members in the group. In that sense *bülkemdel* is analogous to a large degree to the idea of respect. In the discussion of the commonwealth, Hobbes skipped the analysis of relationships between members of a commonwealth, and focused mainly on the members' relationships with the absolute ruler. It is an interesting exercise to compare Hobbes' commonwealth, which creates a Leviathan, with *bülkemdel* which is not necessarily about the construction of a sovereign ruler. In the following, I argue that a commonwealth on the village scale does not necessarily build a Leviathan, that is, the Deed Mongol *bülkemdel* is a commonwealth without a Leviathan. If we consider the Leviathan as a powerful A, then the latter statement means that the Deed Mongol commonwealth *bülkemdel* does not constitute the A (who is a sovereign ruler and Leviathan). I argue that the *bülkemdel* constitutes a different type of A, unlike the Leviathan and absolute sovereign ruler. The different A is the power of the collective built by individuals. It is a power of people not of a ruler. Therefore B here means every individual, and A means a collective power of the people. However, if we take the village *bülkemdel* in relation to the Chinese state then the powerful A or the Leviathan is the Chinese state. Following this logic, the Leviathan in the village is supposed to be the Village Party Leader and the Village Leader. As discussed in the Chapter Two, the leaders are not powerful enough to be absolute rulers, instead the people see the collective power as the main power. In other words, the village is a democracy existing at a level beneath Chinese authoritarianism (cf. also Chapter Two).

All together *bülkemdel* or commonwealth have two main functions, the relationship between members (B to B) and the relationship between the members and the ruler (Leviathan) (A to B or B to A). The Deed Mongol *bülkemdel* in the village usually addresses the B to B relationship, while Hobbes focused on the B to A relationship. A commonwealth creates a sovereign or absolute power. It is a B to A function. As previously stated, harmony and solidarity of all members establishes a collective power and passes the power to an absolute ruler and creates sovereignty and a Leviathan. In this case the collective power is not a collective power anymore it is inherited by a single person. It is the power of the Leviathan and the sovereign ruler. Another question to be asked on this level is "where is the Leviathan in the Deed Mongol village?" This kind of small *bülkemdel* or commonwealth does not create a Leviathan, because creating an absolute sovereign power is not the purpose of the Deed Mongol village *bülkemdel*. Even though it is listed in the 'ten stars' board distributed by the higher authorities, in everyday life *bülkemdel* is quite detached from the Chinese government, it does not focus on the

Chinese state. Instead it is more attached to the traditional political ideology and the collective people's power. Similarly, Locke ([1698] 2004) describes: the supreme power is in the community and in people.

[...] there can be but *one Supreme Power*, which is the *Legislative*, to which all the rest must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a Fiduciary to act for certain ends there remains still *in the People a Supreme Power* to remove or alter the *Legislative*, when they act contrary to the trust reposed in them. [...] And thus, the *Community* may be said in this respect to be *always the Supreme Power* [...] (Locke [1698] 2004: 366–7).

The absence of a Leviathan is also evident in local decision-making both in the village and in the family (cf. also Chapter Two for decision making). It is what is referred to in the traditional phrase *bügdeeree heletsvel buruugiii* (when everybody discusses an issue then the decision is not false and no one will be guilty). Even though they have leaders and elders who have a lot of influence on the decision making they always listen and follow the decisions agreed by the majority, as I witnessed at the Village Meeting and discussed in the section on democracy in Chapter Two.

The absence of a Leviathan in the *bülkemdél* leads me to consider the classifications made by Michael Mann (1986). In Mann's words it would be a "diffused [collective] power" contradicting the "authoritative [collective] power". The "authoritative power" means power with a Leviathan. In Mann's words a commonwealth without a Leviathan is a collective power without an "authoritative power". According to Mann, *authoritative power* "comprises definite commands and conscious obedience. *Diffused power*, however, spreads in a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentered way through a population, resulting in similar social practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded. It typically comprises, not command and obedience, but an understanding that these practices are natural or moral or result from self-evident common interest" (Mann 1986: i, 8).

A collective power without a Leviathan retains the collective power where it originated (from the collective/people), and is not inherited by a sovereign ruler. In a Foucauldian (1980) sense this is power not possessed by anyone or anything, especially in the sense of not being possessed by any government or ruler. As an alternative to the Hobbesian mode the collective power of *bülkemdél* becomes an instrument to make

people behave well. The collective power of the commonwealth based on B to B relationships does not become a repressive power, because it does not aim to construct a powerful A, in the sense of a sovereign ruler. Instead it creates another type of powerful A which is the people themselves (the collective), united through mutual respect as Locke described. In other words, this is a collective power without resistance. I do not mean that there is no disagreement in social relationships in the village. Instead, I mean that when we talk about power in a relationship we do not always need to talk about resistance. There are power relationships that negotiate without resistance.

In Chapter Two on leadership I focused on respect between two people or two groups. However, in the example of *bülkemdél* one has to deal with a 'net of respect', where everybody respects one another. Everyone in the community participates in the 'net of respect'; everyone receives some kind of respect from everyone else and shows some kind of respect to everyone else. There is another important point that I should underline at this stage. Unlike many other practices of respect, in the collective form of respect, or in the *bülkemdél*, there is both 'respect in hierarchy' and 'respect in common courtesy'. In the Deed Mongol *bülkemdél* people, obviously, respect elders, leaders and men, and this is essential in all kinds of relationships. In addition, people also follow common courtesy. For example, the powerful people, elders, leaders, and men cannot treat their juniors, villagers and women dishonestly. The powerful are expected to show the respect of common courtesy. Later I will further analyze the reciprocity of respect.

3.1.4 Inequality beyond equality in the peaceful hierarchy

The ethnography presented at the beginning of this chapter addresses another issue that relates to equality. The above discussions about collective power of village people without an absolute central authority and domination might lead readers to believe that the Deed Mongols in the village are all equal. This is not so, instead they are unequal and hierarchical in their own way. This part of the chapter explains how they can be unequal and hierarchical when there is no absolute domination and coercion.

In the Chapter Two I argued that respect and the Hobbesian "social contract" are similar in the sense of being a constituting power. Then in this chapter, I suggested an idea focused on the B to B relationship and the absence of a Leviathan in *bülkemdél*. That looked at the difference between the Deed Mongol *bülkemdél* and the Hobbesian

commonwealth. My next disagreement with Hobbes is about equality. While the commonwealth discussed by Hobbes is the one of equals, the Deed Mongol *bülkemdel* is not equal. I will explain why “social contract” is not always about equal rights. Moreover, by discussing Sennett’s (2003) idea of equality in respect, I will show how some types of respect with equality are similar to social contracts and some are not. While a few types of respect, in an equal relationship such as friends’ respect for each other and the ‘respect of common courtesy’ (cf. also the Introduction for more information), is equal, many other types of respect are usually unequal.

Following political theorist Carole Pateman’s (1997) claim that “the social contract is fraternal, I am sceptical about Hobbes’ idea of the “natural equal right of everyone”. Pateman claims that contract theorists did not defeat the patriarchalist tradition of society where a father king rules his subjects and his subjects are like his sons. She claims that the social contract is still patriarchal. According to her, “civil society” or “the public” – which has the contractual relationship with the sovereign ruler – is a male sphere. It is distinct from private life and women, man’s sphere is civil society and public. Pateman argues that the “individual” in Hobbes’ writing that makes the contract is a man not a woman; therefore the social contract is still patriarchal. Moreover, she writes that the patriarchal society has two dimensions; the paternal (father/son) and the masculine (husband/wife). The contract theorists rejected paternal rights, but they absorbed and simultaneously transformed conjugal, masculine patriarchal rights (Pateman 1997: 47). Contract theorists overcome one of the dimensions of patriarchy, which is the rule of father over son, but keep the second dimension of man’s rule over woman, and women still do not have equal rights to men. Pateman calls this the fraternal social contract. I agree with Pateman in the discussion of masculine power over woman, where Hobbes failed and conceived it as an equal right. However, I argue that Pateman is not universally correct to regard fraternal relationship as equal. She thinks that after killing the father king his sons can build equal rights for themselves. In many cases probably the eldest son will succeed the rule of the father king. In other words, even the fraternal relationship has a leader or an elder brother who probably has a priority and more right than the others. Among the Mongols the relationship between elder and junior, and the age differences can never be equal (cf. also Chapter One for age difference). In the absence of the two dimensions of paternal and masculine, there are always other aspects of inequality, and in the Mongol community it is elder and junior inequality.

The above discussion shows the impossibility of the existence of such a thing as an “equal social contract” in the Deed Mongol community. In the example of a Mongol kind of commonwealth there are always people in higher or lower positions and there is always someone who is respected more than others. In particular the respect of hierarchy, unlike the respect of common courtesy, has something to do with inequality. Similarly, R. Sennett (2003: 63–4) argues that inequality is an inescapable fact of social life and it (inequality) is a reason to respect or not to respect someone. He illustrates another type of inequality that is different from age and gender. He claims that social solutions seem more apparent in considering the inequalities which tarnish the three modern codes of respect: make something of yourself, take care of yourself, help others (cf. also Chapter One for further information about earning and failing to earn respect) (Sennett 2003: 260). Amongst the Deed Mongols, in addition to the inequality of age and gender, they also have the type of inequality discussed by Sennett, as he maintains that the above three are inevitable in any society and becomes the main source of inequality in a society. However, I should underline that this inequality, at least the inequality in the Deed Mongol community does not conflict with peace and the reduction of resistance and conflict, because it is an ‘innocent inequality’, because it does not inflict repression, coercion and violence. The respected people in the Deed Mongol community are elders, leaders and men who make a success of their lives, take good care of themselves and help others. People respect them with a ‘hierarchical respect’. On the other hand, it does not mean that people disrespect others who do not achieve the above three aims, as described by Sennett. Instead people also respect them with the ‘respect of common courtesy’. More precisely, people care more about the *yos* (rule and custom) to accord respect, rather than the issues of really earning or not earning respect (see Chapter One and Four for respect for the *yos* custom).

In this point I should clarify the distinction between the two different cases of respect, one is the ‘respect of common courtesy’, which emphasizes equality with a hidden inequality, and the other is the ‘respect of hierarchy’ which evidently shows inequality. The respect of common courtesy encourages people to see everyone equal as a human being (cf. also the Introduction for the further information about the common courtesy and equality as a human being). However, apart from considering people equal as human beings, in specifics people are not equal in different ways. People are elder and junior, man and woman, poor and rich, educated and not educated and so on. Then,

altogether it means that both of the cases of respect are unequal; respect of common courtesy is implicitly unequal, it sees every human being as equal even though they are not equal in different ways, and the hierarchical respect is explicitly unequal, it focuses on the differences and inequalities between people. For example, juniors respect elders because they say that seniors are not equal to juniors. Here, the explicit reason to respect is inequality.

3.2. Reciprocity of respect

Extending my main theory of power without resistance, in this section, I will argue that the implicit and explicit inequalities of respect reduce repression and resistance, and strengthen harmony and solidarity in society. This is clear in the case of the 'respect of common courtesy', even though it hides inequality; it eases social relationships and can build harmony (*ev*). However, it is more difficult to argue that the latter, 'respect of hierarchy' with the explicit expression of inequality can build harmony. I will then expound how unequal respect can build harmony through exchanging profit.

Reciprocity is one of the crucial aspects of respect as it is with gift exchange. So far I cannot think of any examples of non-reciprocal respect, simply because it is a relationship between at least two parties. Therefore there are always some kinds of exchange between the agents. Instead I can think some cases of least reciprocal respect. Respect in a virtual relationship without any actual relationship between the two parties is least reciprocal. For example, Deed Mongols respect the historical figure Gūsh Khaan, or people respect a leader of the country, popular writer, or someone who is good. Moreover, many people respect their dead parents and ancestors. Maybe this would not be called respect in some other cultures, but in Mongolian people use the same word *kündleh* (*hündleh* in Mongolia) in this situation. This is reciprocal because the person who respects conceives that the respected agent somehow gave something, at least an impression, which inspires respect in him/her. This is least reciprocal because the respected person does not know and does not react to the respect. I suppose that this is another type of sincere respect, because it does not regard any profit.

I confirm that many other cases of respect are more reciprocal. The Deed Mongols exemplify this idea. When I started my fieldwork I thought that people repaid respect with respect. Later I found out that it was not always the case. I did not believe it when Naji, the secondary school teacher in Dulaan Xian, first told me that respect works

upwards and not the other way around. He explained to me that in a downwards manner they do not say respect but “love” (*hairlah*). In this context “love” (*hairlah*) does not actually mean “love”, but instead it means support, protection, care, blessing and so on. Then he quoted the phrase ‘*iksee kündelj nyalthasaa hairlah*’ (cf. also Luta 1986: 95)¹⁰ which means “respect elders and love juniors”. At that time I could not figure out why elders can’t respect juniors. After several days, at the *gachaga* of Züün Hoshuu, I met an old lama Mönköö. He said the same thing about the exchange of respect and “love”. Later, I checked this with my friend Erdemt, Baba’s youngest brother, and he also said that it was correct. I could not understand this until I realised that they were all talking about the respect of hierarchy, which is a type of respect that is popular among the Deed Mongols. In general, according to the variation of respect there are two main ways to exchange respect. One is exchanging respect with respect, and the other is exchanging respect with something else useful and efficient such as love, support, protection, care, blessing, luck and so on. First I will explain how respect can be exchanged with respect.

I can think of three different ways of exchanging respect with respect. As stated earlier, hierarchical respect works only from lower to higher, powerless to powerful, junior to elder, women to men etc., but not in reverse. This might give the misleading impression that an elder does not respect a younger person in the hierarchical sense. One might think that logically people can’t respect each other hierarchically. This would be an incorrect conclusion. Because an elder person might not hierarchically respect a younger in terms of age, however the elder could hierarchically respect the younger not in terms of age but in terms of knowledge, achievement, wealth and so on. Here, two people regard the one as higher than the other in different ways. Therefore, different rationales of hierarchical respect could be reciprocal.

The second example of exchange of respect with respect is between hierarchical respect and the respect of common courtesy. One can respect the other in a hierarchical sense while the other respects him/her in common courtesy. For example among the Deed Mongols, unequal people always have to think of common courtesy. People do not like a powerful person taking advantage of his power over the powerless. Deed Mongols would say that it is a bad thing to do, and as they say “a weak bullies another weak” (*muu muudaa deerelhiüü*). According to the Deed Mongols, a person who bullies is not really powerful, he is weak. More precisely, he is weak because he is unable to gain sincere

¹⁰ The same theory is very popular among other Mongols. I will discuss another version of the same idea in the Chapter Four in the case of state and civil society.

respect and therefore power, through the theory of the production of power and respect. Therefore, powerful people should act, not with domination but with a common courtesy and with self-abasement (cf. also Chapter One for self-abasement). In this way the 'respect of common courtesy' is all about exchanging respect with respect. Also, two people of a similar age with particular reasons to respect each other can exchange respect with respect. It happens often amongst the Deed Mongols between the elders or two leaders of similar status and position. In all such cases there is always something that makes the two people equal, in terms of status, gender, age, talent and achievement.

The third and last way is obvious. Unlike hierarchical respect, 'respect of common courtesy' is not hierarchical. It works from lower to higher and also from higher to lower, in both ways, and it is always about respecting each other. In this way the exchange of respect with respect is usually about equality or about the effort to decrease the unequal gap between agents in the relationship.

On the other hand, the unequal type is obviously in the case of 'respect of hierarchy', and people exchange respect with something else, as mentioned. 'The something else' can be 'help' (Sennett 2003: 64), which is "love" in the Deed Mongol understanding. Sennett listed three ways of earning and failing to earn respect. One of the three ways he presented is to 'help others' (see Chapter One for the first and second ways).

The third way to earn respect is to give back to others. This is perhaps the most universal, timeless, and deepest source of esteem for one's character. ...Nor is self-sufficiency enough to earn these kinds of esteem; the self-sufficient person [the second way of earning or losing respect] is ultimately of no great consequence to other people, since he has the mutual connection, no necessary need of them. Exchange is the social principle which animates the character of someone who gives back to a community (Sennett 2003: 64).

Similarly, when L. Højer (2003: 112) analyses hierarchical modes of relatedness and exchange in the north of Mongolia he also addressed the importance of the "obligations to give and request goods and services, and therefore often inseparable from pragmatic and economic concerns". This is analogous to the example I analyze in the following, which is the exchange of respect with "love", or 'help' in Sennett. My theory is that the 'powerless respect the powerful and the powerful love the powerless'. It is developed

from the above-mentioned Deed Mongol phrase “*iksee kündelj nyalhasaa hairlah*” which means “respect elders and love juniors”. It is an unequal and hierarchical relationship. According to my idea of the production of power and respect (see Chapter Two), the powerful supply “love” and the powerless respond with respect. The exchange can be found in different ways in this case. For instance, powerful elders “love” powerless juniors by taking care of them, and the juniors respect the elders by obeying them. In the Deed Mongol society, every parent and child relationship is an example of this exchange.

Further classification has to be made for profitable, reciprocal and hierarchical respect. Two major groups can be described, one of them is a direct and intentional reciprocity, and the other is an indirect and non-intentional reciprocity. The first one is intentional; people sometimes show respect for the powerful in order to fulfil a certain desire, or to get something profitable through demonstrating their respect. In the intentional case, the return of the respect comes directly to the powerless from the powerful. Compared to this, some other practices of respect are non-intentional. It means people show respect without regarding to any profit, but the profit usually comes later in a different way, maybe from a different person. In the non-intentional reciprocity the return of the respect is indirect. I have several examples to explore in the following three cases for intentional and another three for non-intentional contexts. In both of the types, the reciprocity of respect and “love” (*hairlah*) is essential. First I will illustrate the examples of intentional reciprocity of respect¹¹.

3.2.1. Intentional reciprocity of respect

Many people tried to explain to me the difference between the “Chinese respect” (*hitad kündetgel*) and the “Mongol respect” (*mongol kündetgel*). This was one of the popular answers I had when I tried to find out what they meant by respect. People who told me about this difference were not herders in the countryside but were always people in town who worked with the Chinese, for example, Naji the secondary school teacher in Dulaan Xian and Lishin, the head of the Disabled People’s Society in Golmus city. They said to me that the Chinese people respect a *darga* who is a chief, leader and someone in the

¹¹ The question of the reciprocity of respect is quite similar to the discussion of gift exchange and arguments on the free gift. The same question can be asked in the case of respect whether respect can be free. Most of the cases of respect are intentionally or non-intentionally obligatory to return which is similar to the obligation of gift exchange in Mauss (Mauss 1970).

official leading positions. The reason for this respect is because the *darga* is a 'useful' (*ashigtai, heregtei*) person to treat well and show respect to, and for the Chinese it does not matter what kind of person the *darga* is, he can be dishonest, rude, untalented, uneducated and arrogant. It also does not matter whether the respectful person likes the *darga* or not, which means that the flattering attitude can be fake. The only matter of importance is that the person should be useful to the flatterer. They had a strong understanding that the Chinese people think of their own ends only. Naji and Lishin called this kind of respect *doligonoh*, which means kowtowing and flattering. According to them, when they lived in a Chinese society they had to act the same without regard to their true feelings towards the *darga*. On the other hand, the *darga* also wants people behave in this way. Therefore, in order to keep one's job, achieve a higher position, or not get into trouble, and to keep good relations with the *darga* one has to act like this. Naji even thought that this was one of the reasons why the Deed Mongols never get high leading positions, because Mongols are not as good at flattering as the Chinese. Ganweidun, an elementary school principal in the Banchin Shan Hoshuu, was complaining about the leaders, saying that they do nothing for people but only flatter the higher leaders in order to improve their own positions. They are supposed to support and work for the people and earn respect from the common people, but instead they work for themselves and for the higher leaders and abandon the common people. For example, in Banchin Shan Hoshuu the Tibetan herders were moving into the Mongols' pasture, which I will discuss in the Chapter Four. Ganweidun complained that the local leaders did nothing to protect the Mongol herders. All the higher leaders are Tibetans and Chinese and none of the few Mongol leaders dared to fight with the Tibetans, because they know that they would lose the fight. One of the Mongol leaders who did fight in one case ended up being fired. Alternatively Naji and Lishin said that Mongols' respect regards not usefulness and prosperity for the self, but talent (*av'yas*), knowledge (*medleg*) and intelligence (*uhaan*) of people. As Lishin said Chinese respect rests on the 'official position' (*alban tushaal*) while Mongols' respect rests on wisdom and talent.

I was not sure about the nationality division between these two respects. After several months, I met Erhee, an Inner Mongolian young man who works in Mongolia. We had a long conversation about the Chinese and the difference in Mongolia. It was surprising for me to find out that Erhee said the same about the "Chinese respect". He said to me that one of the nicest things in Mongolia is that *darga* people do not require others to show them lots of respect and it is not necessary to perform the flattering

“Chinese respect”. Then I wondered whether there really is such a thing as a “Chinese respect” that regards profit. Since, I did not do enough fieldwork among the Chinese to answer the question I will call it the ‘intentional profit regarding respect’. I am sure that this type of respect can be found elsewhere in non-Chinese communities too.

In this way powerless people intentionally show respect for a powerful person in order not to lose their position or to get a better one, to gain support, or to complete any other kinds of actions and sort out any problems. This is common in the relationships of authoritarian powerful leaders, because they have more practical power compared to the powerless leaders in the village, as mentioned in the previous chapter¹². This not only occurs between a leader and villager, but it can happen between any powerless and powerful people. For example, a junior can use the same tactics toward an elder or a woman towards a man.

The same local theory of respect and “love” also helped me to understand the relationship between man and the natural elements such as trees, mountains, animals, rivers etc. Deed Mongols have two different but related notions: respect nature and protect or “love nature” (*baigal hamgaalah, hairlah*). When they say ‘respect nature’ they mean something different to ‘protecting nature’. As I mentioned in the introduction, in Van Hoshuu, an old man whose name is Choinid, a ‘benediction singer’ (*yeröölch*), told me that Deed Mongols originally used to worship everything between heaven and earth. Similarly, Naji told me that in the past Deed Mongols used to think that everything has a ‘spirit master’ (*ezentei*); mountain spirit, water spirit, sky spirit, earth spirit, fire spirit, and animal spirit master and so on. If people make them angry then the spirits punish people with natural disasters. For example, as Naji said, if there is a fire, nowadays people will investigate to find out how the fire happened, but in the past people questioned why the fire spirit got angry and so on. Therefore people tried not to disturb the spirit master by not cutting trees, polluting rivers and hunting animals. Naji located the notion in the past, however, there are lots of examples that this notion is still current. When I was staying with Gaga, the *Zochi* Lama, in his house in Banchin Shan Hoshuu, he frequently had visitors from all around the Deed Mongol Hoshuus. One day a middle-aged man of Züün Hoshuu came to see him. The man had some kind of skin disease and a sore on his lower leg. He said that he had had it for about a year and had tried various medications and nothing helped. Gaga read a sutra for divination and told him that he got

¹² As I argued in the Chapter Two, village leaders do not have actual political power to influence people while township leaders have actual power to influence. See Chapter Two for more information.

the sore because he had polluted natural water, maybe a river or a lake and made its spirit master angry. The man admitted that he polluted a river, but he did not want to say more about it.

There is an exchange of respect in the relationship in between the spirit masters of nature (nature spirits), man, and nature such as mountains, animals, rivers etc. People personify nature, spirits and deities and show both 'non-performative' and 'performative' respect for spirit masters and in return the spirits bless people or supply them with good fortune and good health. Spirits and deities are considered to be powerful and people are the powerless, so, people respect the spirit masters and in return for the respect the spirit master responds with 'blessings' (*iveeh*). In the tripartite relationship the most powerful ones are the spirit masters of nature then of man, and the least powerful is nature (plants, animals, mountains, waters etc.). According to the theory of respect and "love" (*hairlah*), man should respect the spirit masters of nature (*ezen*) by worshiping them, because they are powerful and can harm humans. On the other hand, man has to "love" (*hairlah*) nature (Luta 1986: 93), because nature, trees, mountains and rivers are powerless in front of man and man can destroy them. For the reciprocity of man's respect for spirits, spirits "love" (*hairlah*) man (herders) by giving good nature, with no winter or summer disasters. An important point that should be clarified here is the intention in the reciprocity. This is an intention that regards actual profit that returns to the performer. Unlike when people show respect for elders, for instance at the New Year celebrations, they do not have any intentions or expect anything back (cf. also Chapter One for intention) (see Figure 3.5).




Figure 3.5 Cyclical relationships of man, nature spirit and nature




Figure 3.6 Cyclical relationships of man, deity of animal husbandry and nature

It is similar in the third case of herds, herders and *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry). According to the theory, herds are powerless and man has to protect (*hairlah*) them, also at the same time herders have to respect the deity of the *malyn zaya buyan* 'good fortune in animal husbandry' in order to have more herds and so wealth (Figure 3.6). A Local writer, Luta, writes in one of the Deed Mongol journals about how they "love" herds (*mal süргеe hairlah*). In Deed Mongol folklore, the five kinds of domestic animals (horse, cattle, camel, sheep and goat) are regarded as treasures, and people "love" herds (*mal süргеe hairlah*). Nomads have practically no need of real jewels and treasures but only the five kinds of animals. For example, in praise of sheep they say:

"We cover our *gers* (felt tent) with your white cotton wool
 We feed ourselves with your strong (nutritious) fat meat
 We clothe ourselves with your soft fur skin
 We heal our diseases with your tasty nourishing soup"

(Luta 1986: 94).

Here, the question is what is the *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry)? Sometimes it is a particular deity but sometimes there is no particular deity involved. In Banchin Shan Hoshuu, for example, a *Zochi* Lama Gaga worships a god called Zambala for the *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry).




Figure 3.7 Images of herd animals made of barley at the worship of *ovoo* (*oboo*)

People make images of herd animals namely, yaks, sheep, goats, horses and camels with 'red mud' (*ulaan shavar*) or with *bambaa* (also called *zambaa*) which is made of barley

meal (see Figure 3.7) and put them in front of the Zambala or any other deities that protects herds and give good fortune. In Züün Hoshuu people do not worship separate deities for animal husbandry but the spirit of the sacred mountain San Owoo plays the role of the deity of animal husbandry¹³.

There are other ways of asking for *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry). Herders perform many different rituals showing respect to the *malyn zaya buyan* through the herds, not directly to any spirits. Therefore, from the superficial point of view the practice looks as if people are respecting the animals. Here, the problem is that both respect and “love” of man is practiced, not on two parties such as a deity and the herd, but on one agent only, which is the herd. Then the herd is firstly just the herd, but it also represents the spiritual conception of *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry), which is not imagined as a particular deity (Figure 3.8). In the following, I will present some examples of showing respect to the *malyn zaya buyan*.




Figure 3.8 Cyclical relationships of man, deity of animal husbandry and nature

To receive *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry) herders perform various rituals of respect for the *ak mal* (uncastrated animals)¹⁴. For example, on the eve day of the traditional New Year *Tsagaan Sar* people offer *deej* (first bits of food and drinks which should be offered to the most respected body) of *gyalaa* (pressed and dried curd), *shuumar*¹⁵ (see Figure 3.9) and milk tea. As an elder woman Ibjin of Baruun Hoshuu told me that they put small amounts of the offerings into the month of the *ak mal*. Now in some parts the Deed Mongol people have stopped performing this ritual.¹⁶

¹³ Mongols worship 99 Tengens (Heavens), each stands for a particular aspect of the society. Among them Zayagchi Tenger is the one that protects herds and grants good fortune in animal husbandry (Dulam 1989: 79-83).

¹⁴ Uncastrated male animal, such as a stallion, bull or ram. Literally *ak mal* means an ‘elder animal’ in Deed Mongolian. In other parts of Mongolia it is also called *etseg mal* meaning ‘father animal’.

¹⁵ It is a mountain and a sea made with food which is the representation of a mythic mountain and sea. The mountain is made with *bambaa* (also called *zambaa*) which is made of barley meal, with butter on the top and the sea is made of *gyalaa* around the mountain.

¹⁶ Also Chimiddorj of Taij Nar Hoshuu told me a similar story.

In other rituals the same gifts are offered to elders, deities and any other respected bodies. Also many families worship the skull of an *ak mal*. In my experience it is usually the skull of a ram or yak bull. Naji (Nasano chir, secondary school teacher in Dulaan Xian) has a ram skull in his place (see Figure 3.10).



Figure 3.9 *Shuumar*

He explained to me that people worship the skull of an *ak mal* from their own herd. When the *ak mal* dies, they decorate the skull and hang it at home to summon good fortune in animal husbandry. Ibjin's family in Baruun Hoshuu worship a wild yak's skull. They say that they found it in the mountain and brought it home and decorated it. Alternatively, when an *ak mal* dies people put the head on the *ovoo* (sacrificial stone cairn) or on the *suhai* (tamarisk). It is obvious and popular to put them on the *ovoo*. *Suhai* (tamarisk) is the most respected tree in the region and people use it in sacrificial logic to make an *ovoo* (sacrificial tree cairn) and the *haraats* roof-ring of the *ger* 'felt tent' (cf. also Chapter One for *ger* roof-ring) and so on.¹⁷




Figure 3.10 Skull of ram

There is another good example of respecting the *malyn zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry). Herders cut the ears of one-year-old animals to make a mark of ownership and all the small pieces of ears have to be treated with great respect, in order

¹⁷ In the east of Mongolia Buriad shamans make a drumstick of a *suhai* (tamarisk). The drumstick is a whip of the spirits' mounts.

not to loose the *malyu zaya buyan*. In Ibjin's place, the old woman in Baruun Hoshuu, and also in Sereeter's in Van Hoshuu, the ears were kept on the sacrificial altar in front of the shrines, which is one of the most respected places in the house.



Figure 3.11 Pieces of lamb and goat ears hanging on the post at the Baruun Hoshuu Monastery

Ibjin said that in the past people used to hang these pieces of ears from the *haraats* (wooden roof-ring) of the *ger* 'felt tent'. As discussed in Chapter One, the *haraats* (wooden roof-ring) is the most respected part of the *ger* where only the *hadag* 'the ceremonial silk scarf' is tied. Alternatively, as Sereeter said herders also put them on top of the sacred mountain, or any other sacred places where not many people would step on them. Similarly, Ibjin said that they also take them to the monastery to hang from the post of the sacred flag (see Figure 3.11).

There are many other customs and taboos that show the same idea

and all these practices have the clear intention of exchanging respect with *malyu zaya buyan* (good fortune in animal husbandry).

3.2.2 Non-intentional reciprocity of respect

The three examples of the non-intentional reciprocity of hierarchical respect are relationships of an elder and junior, man and woman, and village leader and villager. I claim that the reciprocity and regard to profit is non-intentional in the above examples. People do not consider these to be reciprocal relationships which this leads to their unawareness of profit from the relationship. Apparently, if people do not understand that the hierarchical relationship is reciprocal then how they could expect any profit. Similar to gift exchange (Mauss 1970) it is obligatory, and in the Deed Mongol community the

obligation is understood as a custom but not a profit (*yos*) (cf. also Chapter One and Four for respect for the custom). Rather than actually respecting or 'loving', as discussed earlier, in most circumstances people act in order to follow the custom (*yos*). In that sense, the non-intentional reciprocity of hierarchical respect shares boundaries with the 'performative respect'. However, the respect and "love" is not only 'performative', or only the completion of a custom. In many circumstances people also sincerely respect and "love", which is the 'non-performative' type. With or without the custom (*yos*) people still respect or "love" their respected and loved ones. This case puts the non-intentional reciprocity of hierarchical respect on the boundary between the performative and non-performative types of respect, and also between sincere and insincere.

The junior-elder relationship is a wider version of the child-parent relationship. The difference is that the former is quite a public relationship within the whole Deed Mongol community arena while the latter one is in the family arena. The relationship works not only within each household, that is, elders and parents do not only "love" the children in their family, instead all the elders are parents to all the children in the village, as described in the ethnography of the Village Meeting. People always say that it is very bad to treat one's own children differently to other people's children. Elders are supposed to see all children as if they are their own. If they see their neighbours' children doing something wrong or in trouble then they are supposed to be responsible for them. Therefore, the village is seen as one big family, which is evident in the Village Meeting. This protection and care of children is the beginning of the reciprocal relationship of junior and elder, and it is profitable for juniors and children. In return juniors always have to respect elders without making a division between their own family elders and the ones outside the family. Respect here means to obey, think of elders as higher, give elders all the most respected things mentally and materially, and look after them when they get very old.

Traditionally the relationship between a man and a woman works in a similar way to the junior-elder relationship. In this kind of traditional patriarchal society man is recognized as powerful and woman as powerless. Therefore, the powerful men have to "love" the powerless women, and women reciprocate by respecting men, in same way as juniors respect elders. However, amongst the contemporary Deed Mongols man and woman are not much different, and have the same contribution to the household. They still maintain the tradition of a woman seeing man as superior, and it is observed in rituals

and everyday life. But in other cases for example, when they discuss the 'ten stars' the woman represents the whole family on behalf of the head of the family.

My claim is that although people do not intend any reciprocity and profit, there is actually reciprocity and people receive profit from the reciprocity in indirect ways. I mean indirect, because people can receive the return of respect or "love" from anyone at anytime. The reason for this is that the mechanism of reciprocity is in the whole village arena. In other words it is not only a one to one relationship, but it should be understood as part of the whole collective arena. Reciprocity is not only something between the two agents in a relationship. For example, when an elder 'loves' a junior then the return can come from another junior, because everybody is involved in the one practice. Then the practice can be carried out by anyone towards anyone at anytime. That is why it is indirect because the performers and receivers are always not definite. However, it can also be direct to some extent. For example, in the family respect and "love" between woman and man, and children and parents they receive the profit from each other. They are fixed agents of the relationship.

The reciprocity and profit in the relationship is also analysed by E. Durkheim in a different way. The two types of respect, 'respect of common courtesy' and 'respect of hierarchy', can be seen as similar to Durkheim's (1984: 84-85) "mechanical solidarity" or "solidarity by similarities" and "organic solidarity" arising from the "division of labour". Lewis Coser in his introduction to Durkheim writes that Durkheim believes that while "mechanical solidarity" could indeed only thrive where human beings were engaged in essentially similar activities, organic solidarity could develop from spontaneously arising consensus between individual actors who, just because they were engaged in different roles and tasks, were dependant on one another. While mechanical solidarity was founded on likeness, organic solidarity arose because of complementarity between actors engaged in different pursuits (Durkheim 1984: xvi). "Mechanical solidarity" is similar to the 'respect of common courtesy', and both of the two bring up solidarity through similarity. As discussed earlier, the basis of the 'respect of common courtesy' is being a human being, in other words, being the same and equal. People respect each other for being similar. Alternatively, the 'respect of hierarchy' is similar to Durkheim's "organic solidarity". In both of the cases people are dependent on one another and they establish solidarity through an exchange of different pursuits.

3.3. Conclusion: Building harmony from innocent inequality and hierarchy

In the previous chapters I have tried to argue that there is a hierarchy in the Deed Mongol community but at the same time the power and hierarchy in the community is not a total political power. They are actually on the border between formal, unequal performative and hierarchical and informal, equal, non-performative and non-hierarchical. I argue that because they can cope with being on the border between extreme political situations, the relationship in the community is very flexible and any relationship can easily slip to either side of the border. I suppose that this enables them to create a community that I would like to call the 'peaceful hierarchy'.

In 2006, my colleague Katherine Swancutt did a short period of fieldwork among the Deed Mongols and accidentally ended up in the same village as me. She focused on the folk games and Süker, the village leader, happened to be the champion and specialist of one game. When she came back she asked me whether Deed Mongols are seriously respectful. She told me about one of the incidents when younger people acted disrespectfully towards an elder. Süker was playing the game with someone else in the middle of the crowd and people were watching and talking about the game, and some were telling the players what to do. An old man told Süker what he did was wrong and he should have done something else. Then Süker pointed and told the old man that he did not understand and so he should shut up.¹⁸ This might seem to be a disrespectful manner towards an elder and it would have been disrespectful in a formal context. That is why Katie asked me whether they are really respectful. However, to me, this sounds like a typical informal relationship of the Deed Mongols. No one regards this kind of easy flowing of jokes and fun as seriously disrespectful. Also Süker, as a powerful figure in the village, can be seen as close to the rank of elders and therefore he can make jokes and fun of elders (cf. also Pedersen 2002: 150–5).

Similarly, Namjil the elder of my household to some extent does not intervene in the household life. Erdemt once explained to me about the formal retirement of elders in the household. When elders grow old and children become old enough to make their own decisions elders give away all their responsibilities and leadership to their children when they marry. Namjil passed on all his wealth to his six children and now he is not responsible for anything. He made this decision because he trusts and knows that his

¹⁸ Personal communication with Katherine Swancutt, Cambridge, January 2006.

children will do well without his presence. If not he would not have given up his position in the first place. Once he is retired he is no longer in charge and he does not compete with his children. Even if he wanted to be in charge he is too old and incapable of doing it. However, it cannot be understood that his children do not listen to him at all, in fact younger people still regard their old parents respectfully. These positions of the retired elder and someone who is newly in charge are on the thin border between being powerful and powerless towards each other. None of them are actually more powerful than the other. Therefore, they are in a way almost equal and they both listen to each other. This is the same as David Sneath's claim that the power and polity of the imperial state was "divided between the heirs and senior members of the ruling house". This is the same in the relationship between spouses. Even though they follow strict ritual performances, in actual life women were not regarded as simply a companion of men. Baba the father of my family always discussed everything with Bergen, his wife. In this way no one is totally powerful and domineering. Geoffrey Samuel¹⁹ correctly portrays life of pastoralists in K k Nuur as "relatively egalitarian and stateless societies" (Samuel 1993: 145). This comes back to my discussion of 'powerless power' in the previous chapter, where I discussed the powerless leaders. In this way power is distributed to the people of the *b ilkemdel*. These conditions of powerless power, and exchange of respect and obedience to one another makes it possible to avoid and ease conflicts. This sort of flexible and fluid relationship is also illustrated by Caroline Humphrey in her examination of Mongol morality. She argues, there are two distinct situations one is of the strict custom and rules and other is the morality. Mongols do not only follow rules based on a background understanding that is principally embodied rather than rationalised (Humphrey 1997: 29). Instead they also consider the reasonableness and accept the alternatives as I quoted her in the discussion on *b ilkemdel*, which is a combination of traditional Mongol and Chinese communist ideology. She concludes that morality in Mongolian is "the location *par excellence* where individuality may be explored and the sense of the self's moral being enhanced" (Humphrey 1997: 44). As such, in addition to the fixed hierarchical respect, Deed Mongols also respect each other as unique selves, like the independent local lords in the "collective sovereignty" described by David Sneath. This can be interpreted as a function of the respect of common courtesy.

¹⁹ Professor of religious studies at Lancaster University in England.

There are some other awkward relationships such as between an elder and a young leader, or a young man and elder woman. The question is who respects whom? As far as I noticed in terms of the 'performative respect' people follow the strong custom of gender and age. That means even though someone is a leader he has to respect elders, and even though a woman is very old she has to respect men however young they are. For example, in terms of the 'non-performative respect' elders usually respect young leaders and that is the reason why elders choose them as a leader. On the other hand young leaders must respect elders. It is very bad if a young leader does not respect the elders, he would not be a leader in the first place. Similarly even though a young man has a higher privilege than elder women, he must respect the elder women. Young leaders respect for elders and young men's respect for elder women is not recognized in the ritual (because in the ritual the respect has to be the other way around), but it is in every other possible everyday practice and common courtesy. It is another case of exchanging respect with respect. I declare that the 'performative respect' is strictly hierarchical, while the 'non-performative respect' can be hierarchical and non-hierarchical.

Man has a double responsibility to respect and to "love" (*hairlah*). More precisely, everyone is powerful and powerless at the same time to various extents. This means that people are powerless in front of some people or to something and also they are powerful in front of some other people. Both of the approaches of man towards powerful (respect) and powerless ("love") build concord and harmony. Even though they are hierarchical and unequal there is still peace. The mechanism of respect producing peace pervades all the village functions of kinship, politics, religion and economy too. In other words one can find various types of respect in all relationships such as in politics, religion, kinship and economy. Clearly, some families are wealthier or poorer than the others. A status of poor and rich does not make a difference in the relationship of respect. However, people are inclined to sincerely respect rich people, and are quite critical to the poor. The reason for this is that rich people usually work hard, and they are *hetsüü* people, as the locals say. The term literally means 'difficult', but it refers to being clever and quick-witted. According to the local reasoning, to be rich is good and rich people deserve respect. However, there is no special courtesy or any customs of respect for the rich or poor.

Even though there is a sharp hierarchical distinction and inequality the local mechanisms of sincere respect, respect of common courtesy and their reasonableness controls the hierarchy and do not allow much repression and coercion. Respect has a network in the village that includes every member and provides the basis for building

peace and harmony in the commonwealth *bülkemdel*. However, I should add that the mechanism and reciprocity of respect does not always work. It is what people aim for, it is what people want to and try to build, and sometimes it works but sometimes it does not (cf. also the Conclusion). I suppose that in the Shish Village where I lived the aim works quite well enough to feel the absence of repression and resistance for a certain time.

For them respect is an element in the social relationship that covers the whole village and everyone has a responsibility to respect and support each other. In this way respect is a preferable and popular attitude in the social relationship, it eases domination and resistance and creates harmony in the Deed Mongol village. To put it briefly, this is another version of my key phrase 'respect produces power', which is 'respect(s) produce collective power.'

Respect for the State

Construction of the state on present humility and pride of the past

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. Abstract and practical forms of the state

The state was the most difficult subject to discuss with people and most of them were very careful to talk about either of the two states. It is a political issue if they encourage the subject of the “Mongol State”, so when they talk about it, directly or indirectly, they comment on the Chinese State. Even though this situation is less serious in many parts of China, as far as I know Kök Nuur is still a very communist place. Therefore, the Deed Mongols have requested that I generalize on the ethnographies rather than presenting detailed descriptions, peoples names and so on.

In this chapter I will argue that Deed Mongols experience two states (*tör*) which are completely distinct from each other. Both of them exist in different ways. One is the Chinese State and government, which actually exists, and the other is the Imperial Mongol State, which exists virtually, in people’s minds. In order to explain how I come to such an argument, I will explore the Deed Mongol’s view of their present political situation, traditional political ideology and their impressions of the Mongol State in the past. Then, I will use some anthropological theories of the state to analyse the ethnography.

There are at least two clear aspects to such a body as the state. One is the system and institution, which I call the ‘practical state’, and the other is the idea and abstraction of the state, which I call the ‘abstract state’. Philip Abrams (1988 [1977]: 58) calls the former “state-system” and the latter “state-idea”, and following him, Timothy Mitchell (1999: 76) describes them as a “material force” and “ideological construct”. The first concept refers to “the network of institutional arrangement and political practice” (Mitchell 1999: 76). More precisely, George Steinmetz (1999: 9) illustrates it under the title of “state formation” and “policymaking”. The Deed Mongols had several different states of this type throughout their history. They had the imperial state of Gūsh Khaan in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, if one agrees that it was a state, but Deed

Mongols certainly regard it as one, then the Manchu Qing state, the Chinese Republican state, and the Communist Chinese state from the Maoist period to the present day.

On the other hand the state is also an idea produced by a society, according to Abrams "it is then reified – as the *res publica*, the public reification, no less – and acquires an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice" (1988 [1977]: 58). For Abrams (1988 [1977]) the abstract state is a "mask". "The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is" (Abrams 1988 [1977]: 82). Many other anthropologists and political scientists illustrate the abstract state in different ways. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1940) sees it as a "fiction", Michael Taussig (1992) claims that people react to the abstract state by "fetishising" it, and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002) notes that people "fantasise" it. All these theorists share a similar idea that the abstract state is produced by the ideology, reification, abstraction, imagination or fantasy of the people, while these authors have an analytical debate about whether the concept of the abstract state is or is not a false consciousness. Following Marx's idea of reification and ideology, Radcliffe-Brown, Abrams and Taussig compare the abstract state with "god" and claim that the state is a false consciousness. On the other hand Navaro-Yashin (2002), following S. Žižek's illustration of cynicism, argues that a "state-idea" is not a false consciousness. The key phrase of the argument is the Marxist formula "they do not know it, but they do it" which is supported by ideas of Radcliffe-Brown, Abrams and Taussig. But following Peter Sloterdijk, S. Žižek (1989: 33) and Navaro-Yashin (2002: 160-61), I reference the cynical reason that "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it". I will come back to this discussion later in the conclusion. I will argue that the Deed Mongol's abstract Mongol state is not a false consciousness.

I am looking at two sides of the each of the states, the Mongol State and the Chinese State, in the Deed Mongol community, and in total I should expect to deal with four different states: the practical Chinese state, the abstract Chinese state, the practical Mongolian state and the abstract Mongolian state. Since the practical Chinese state has changed several times then the abstract Chinese state must have been changed. I am sure that all these states have influenced and affected each other, especially in the state of imagination. In this chapter I will argue that Deed Mongols consider two of the above four as serious, the practical Chinese state and the abstract Mongolian state, while the other two, the abstract Chinese state and the practical Mongolian state, are not as active and popular as the practical Chinese state and abstract Mongol state. The practical state

which will best help me to understand the abstract Mongol state is not the Chinese practical state, but more the Mongol practical state in history. This further emphasizes the importance of history in the construction of the abstract state. Accurately, T. Mitchell (1999) points out the necessity of history. "To be more precise, the phenomenon we name "the state" arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, non-material form. Any attempt to distinguish the abstract or ideal appearance of the state from its material reality, in taking for granted this distinction, will fail to understand it. The task of a theory of the state is not to clarify such distinctions but to historicise them" (Mitchell 1999: 77).

It is not right to argue that Deed Mongols do not have any kind of abstraction about the Chinese state. But I can definitely argue that it is weaker and less popular than their abstract Mongol state. On the other hand, it is not right to argue that the Deed Mongols do not have a practical Mongol state at all. It depends on how we define the practical state. If we include old customs and rules as part of the practical state, then, Deed Mongols still have remnants of a practical Mongol state alongside its abstract form, even though the practical Mongol state does exist for them in the reality. I will illustrate this in the section about the remains of the imperial Mongol state among the contemporary Deed Mongols.

The notion of the abstract state has deeply penetrated people's minds over the centuries and takes its own shape as something that people call the state. Therefore, depending on history, the present political situation and culture, different people have different notions about the state, as George Steinmetz (1999) argues when he states that the state is cultural. Social objects and practices are inextricably cultural and cannot be understood outside their subjective meaning. Objects like the state or the economy are not just causally determined by cultural systems, but are themselves fully "cultural" (1999: 27). In order to analyse people's ideas about the state one has to be aware of the historical outline of the relationship of state and society, and understand how such a notion of the state is built up in people's minds. As a result of very different life experiences the state could exist in people's mind as a custom, ritual, deity, pride, nostalgia, fear, disgust, etc. Amongst the Deed Mongols aspects of the Imperial Mongol State remained as various rules, customs, pride and nostalgia. The ideology was built up through respect for that state. Therefore, respect is, in this case, a technology of the construction of the notion of state. Then, the question is what the source of the respect for the state was.

4.1.2. Re-birth of the state from the present decline and the reminiscence of the past

First, I will try to list aspects of the state that might command respect among the people. This includes the rise of the Deed Mongols' power in the past and its present decline. I will analyse the present political situation of the Deed Mongols under the repression of Chinese and Tibetan development, which makes them nostalgic for the powerful Mongol state of the past. Moreover, the combination of the two, the rise in the past and the decline in the present reconstructs an abstract Mongol state.

Contemporary Deed Mongols see themselves as the last few generations of a dying group of people under the rapid development of China and Tibet. They have to be either Tibetan or Chinese in order to survive, but not Mongolian. This leads them to reminisce about the long and powerful history of the Mongol State. This reminiscence and pride in the past is the source for the construction of the abstract Mongol state. Apparently they are not interested in and have no emotional energy to engage with the abstract Manchu or the Chinese state. I cannot argue that throughout their history Deed Mongols did not seriously consider the Manchu and Chinese states and they do not have any kind of perception about such a thing as Tibetan state. There is little ethnography amongst the present Deed Mongols that discusses the Qing state or the Chinese state, but there is a lot about the Mongol state. For instance, the main subject of discussions about the Qing state is Gūsh Khaan's grandson, Luvsandanzan's heroic rebellion against the Qing Empire. With their history as a community that had existed under several different states I expected to deal with complex scenario. However, they do not have much that can be identified as an element of any of the above states, except clear divisions between the practical Chinese state and the abstract Mongol state. I presume that all these possible states are consolidated into the two states they have now. I can argue that in the present situation, because their Mongol identity is threatened they miss the Mongol state, not the Manchu or Chinese Republican states. In order to understand the abstract Chinese state properly it would be better to explore a Han Chinese community. I suppose this is a result of their strong nationalist approach. For the Deed Mongols the foremost important issue is not the state but whose state it is: Tibetan, Manchurian, Chinese or Mongolian. Next, what matters to them is what is Mongol and not Mongol. The current situation of the Deed Mongols has developed their sense of Mongolness and this has further reinforced the growth of their ideas about the abstract Mongol state.

The Deed Mongols shared a long history with the other Mongol communities, from their origin dating back to the thirteenth century and the Empire of Chinggis Khaan, to the seventeenth century, but the construction of their abstract state is clearly influenced by their history since the seventeenth century. Therefore, I will present two groups of attitudes that have influenced respect for the state, namely the 'cult of the state' and 'positive aspects of the state'. Through the attitudes represented in both of the groups, I will show how people believe that the state avoided using force and coercion to control people, and I claim that this belief arouses people's respect for the state. This is the same as discussed in Chapter Two, if the powerful A or the ruler utilizes force and repression then B or the people resist, but if A exercises support and protection then B respects A. As a result, people can have negative or positive attitudes towards the state. It is only natural that if the ruling party or the sovereign were cruel and dishonest with the people then it would engender negative thoughts about the state, whilst the nurturing and caring characteristics of a state leave positive thoughts. Following this logic, the abstract state built in people's minds can be negative, positive, or a mixture of the two. However, in this case I am going to present the positive ideologies about the state. I must emphasize that I am not attempting to prove and neither do I believe that the historical Mongol state was always positive but I will show how people remember it as something very positive. On the other hand the conception of respect for the state in the past has been adopted by the contemporary Deed Mongols. The Deed Mongol respect for the state is a combination of two similar but different issues; one is nostalgia and reminiscence of the state reinforced by the rise in the past of the Deed Mongols and their decline in the present; and the other is the tradition of worship of the state. Mongols had a long tradition of respecting the state, which I call the social reproduction of the state. In this respect, to some extent, many Deed Mongols also respect the Chinese state as well as the Mongol state.

4.1.3. Social reproduction of the state

In the second half of the chapter, I will show how the Deed Mongols kept the tradition of respect for the state. This concerns the virtual existence of the state after the collapse of its actual existence. The abstract Mongol state originated from people's belief in the positive attitudes of the state, and the cult of the state and Khaans. All the folk narratives

and proverbs show that people believed that the state was caring and protecting (cf. also Introduction, Lündendorj 2002: 14 and Erdemt 2002: 34). The people's belief that the state is a positive thing arouses their respect for it. This belief in the positiveness of the state has two different aspects, one concerns the cult of the state and the attitudes of people to conceive of the state and the Khaans as supreme religious leaders (Güsh Khaan is a title received from the 5th Dalai Lama, meaning that he is a religious leader and Deed Mongols call him Gegeen Güsh Khaan which means "Enlightened Güsh Khaan) or equal them to Buddhist deities (Chinggis Khaan is represented as a wrathful deity Ochirvaan in Buddhist texts, for more information see Heissig 1980: 59-69) or as being blessed by deities or more precisely heaven (Heissig 1980: 47-9, Pürev 2002: 115-25), and the other is the secular aspects of the state such as law and order. Later in the chapter I will provide some evidence for the cult of the state and consent for the secular actions of the state. I claim that respect is one of the keys to the existence of the abstract remains of the state. If people did not respect the state then the abstract state would not exist in the same way.

The theory of a practical state and an abstract state is the first theory I will adopt in this chapter. Following the same pattern, the ethnography of the chapter, especially the respect for the state, supports another similar theory of the state that concerns the inseparability of the state and society. Following Michel Foucault's idea of the extension of state power most of the above writers underline the importance of not separating the state and society in the study of the state and power. In his methodological precautions Foucault first talks about the forms of power that penetrate people's everyday lives.

In the first place, it seemed important to accept that the analysis in question should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general mechanisms through which they operate, and the continual effects of these. On the contrary, it should be concerned with power at its extremes, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions. Its paramount concern, in fact, should be with the point where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention (Foucault 1980: 96).

Or as Y. Navaro-Yashin declares that “there is no space that is not arrested with one or another face of the state” (2002: 2). This is like the Mongols phrase “the state has thousands of eyes” (*tör tümen nüidtei*) (Dashdorj 1964: 80), referring to the power of the state.

Following Foucault, Mitchell stresses the importance of the state-society relationship and questions the “limits of the state” (Mitchell 1991: 84). “If so, how does one define the state apparatus, and locate its limits? At what point does power enter channels fine enough and its exercise become ambiguous enough that one recognizes the edge of this apparatus? Where is the exterior that enables one to identify it as an apparatus?” (Mitchell 1999: 76). Navaro-Yashin (2002: 134-135) takes the discussion further and claims that, through activities in their everyday lives people reproduce and strengthen the state. Similarly Deed Mongols also reproduce idea of the state through their everyday life. The most important point, except the inseparability of the state and society, which Navaro-Yashin proposes, is her approach to studying “support for the state”, not resistance to the state. This is the next crucial point of this chapter, which I call the ‘respect for the state’. Navaro-Yashin is right to note that “...the ethnographic gaze has often been turned to what is today called resistance in anthropological accounts: resistance to power, to colonialism, to the nation-state. What has been little studied, however, is the more significant, peculiar yet extremely commonplace, practice of active support for the state on the part of the people, or participation in nationalism” (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 129). As mentioned in the Introduction, Mongolian political scientists such as N. Lündendorj (2002: 14, 17) argue that resistance to the state is essential in western culture while respect and esteem for the state is essential in oriental culture.

According to the difference of cultures people’s approach toward the state in the in the West is different than in Oriental societies. In the West people do not respect and esteem the state as the Oriental people, instead they usually consider the state as a servant and subject of people. They do not see it as something of its own [of a civil society], instead, they see the state as someone else’s institution, coercion, and a power of domination (Lündendorj 2002: 14).

It is probably too extreme to claim that Oriental people offer no resistance to the state and Western people have no respect for the state and it is not a good idea to make a clear distinction between the West and the East in this way. However, it is a reasonable

distinction to make, at least between the West and the Mongols, as far as we know. In other words, I can say that Mongolians respect the state more whilst Westerners are more critical of the state, which concurs with my main argument about power without resistance but with respect.

4.1.4. Remains of the state: the state's power plus the people's power

When people build an illusionary state through their "fiction" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940), "reification" (Abrams 1988 [1977]), "fetishisation" (Taussig 1992) and "fantasy" (Navaro-Yashin 2002) they do not let the state completely disappear. More precisely, in the Deed Mongol case, people's positive attitudes towards the state such as the "respect for the state", or "support for the state" (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 129) through an abstract or "ideological construct" (Mitchell 1999: 76) of the state leads to an interesting point which I call the "remains of the state." Even though, the material form that it first took on, as Mitchell (1999: 77) maintains, does not exist, the Imperial Mongol state still lives among the Deed Mongols as an abstraction. Navaro-Yashin (2002: 183) calls it "the afterlife of the state". According to her, state has an afterlife because it is a "fantasy".

It [state] is what is surviving all efforts at consciousness and interpretation. If it hadn't this potential for phantasmatic recovery, the state would have disappeared long ago. It would not have survived the crashes and crises. The state seems to be stronger than its theorists imagined.... We fix, rebuild, and maintain the state through our real everyday practices. It is because the state remains as an object and because we are still subjected to it that we resort to fantasy. Despite our consciousness about it as farce, the state as an object persists (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 186, 187).

Following the same path, I argue that respect creates a completely different type of state, an abstract and imaginary state, divorced from the existence of the actual state. In this case state is not a sphere of the ruling group, it is a sphere of the ruled group. It is no longer the power of a ruler being exercised over the people, but it is an imaginary power produced by the people. If we see the state as A and society as B, then there is no actual A. It is B's imagined power over B. Because the power is imaginary there is no actual power that punishes people (cf. also Chapter Two for the absence of punishment) when

they do not follow rules and customs of the imaginary state. In other words it is another example of the 'powerless power', as I discussed in the Chapter Two. The powerless power does not have a real political power and system of punishment, however it is powerful in its own ways.

To conclude the theoretical development of the state, it is quite logical that it arose from the claim that the state is more than an institution, system, and ruling body. The theory suggests the state can also be an idea and abstract thing and furthermore, the abstract state was declared to be a production of the society. Finally, because it is a product of people it never disappears. It remains from generation to generation and as such it has an afterlife.

From a different angle, the remains of the state are the result of people's perception of the reciprocity of "love" and respect, as argued in Chapter Three. First, I will illustrate how A or the state supports and "loves" B or the society, and supplies conditions for the origins of the respect for A, while the following part is about B's respect for A in response to A's support and "love". A different version of the phrase "respect elders love juniors", discussed in the Chapter on *Collective Power*, can be found in a different context in the relationship between the state and people. For example, in folk teaching *Oyun Tülhüür*¹, there is a phrase *degedüs-i hüüdülejü doordasu-i asara* which literally means "respect [social] superiors and nurture subordinates" (Damdinsüren 1959: 54).

The key phrase for this chapter is: respect produces the state's power. Mongolian political scientist N. Lündendorj also proposed a similar argument that "people unite with the state in deference to the cult of the state and this enhances the power of the state" (Lündendorj 2002: 35), as result the state has an afterlife. Social respect for the state still persists even after the actual state. In other words, there is no more material support and protection from the practical Imperial Mongol state they respect. Even though, there is no actual reciprocity (cf. Chapter Three for reciprocity) and no actual A, people continue respecting the state, because the respect is very sincere and loyal. People still follow rules and customs of the former state, and this is an actual power of the virtual state reinforced by people's respect. Therefore, the power of the state originates from and is embodied by

¹ *Oyun tülhigür* means the 'key of mind' and it is a folk book of wisdoms. In the past when young people learn to read and write they used to study this book first. It is a collection of many wise phrases and poems. There is no author or date of publication. People believe that Khaans, like Chinggis Khaan, and high intellectuals revealed the phrases. There is another book called the "Wisdoms of the Chinggis Khaan" (*Chinggis Khaany bilig surgaali*), but again it is not proven that Chinggis Khaan wrote it.

the people. This can be the case in the actual state too, not just in the abstract state, as Navaro-Yashin (2002) presents in the example of the Turkish state. The state has a real political power which is the sovereign power, in addition to this, people makes the state's sovereign power even more powerful for themselves through their respect. In other words it is state power plus people's power. With people's power I do not mean as Radcliffe-Brown writes, that "there is no such a thing as the power of the State; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals – kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses and voters" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940: xxiii). Instead, I mean, ordinary people who reinforce the power of the state by respecting it. They would be "voters" in the words of Radcliffe-Brown. By respecting, moreover, it even creates a virtual power that is divorced from the actual one. N. Lündendorj (2002) presents the power of the state as consisting of the ruler (Khaan), government officer (*tüshmel*), and people (*ard tümen*). He explains that state power and peace does not only depend on the wisdom and power of the ruling Khaan, but instead it must consist of three parties, the Khaan, government officer, and people (Lündendorj 2002: 41-2). In that sense state power is a mixture of many different powers (see the conclusion of this chapter).

4.2. Origins of respect for the state

4.2.1. Deed Mongols' idea of the state in the battle between Mongol and non-Mongol

It was surprising to see how most of the Deed Mongols were very nationalist (*iündesherheg*). I mean nationalist especially in the sense of making a distinction between Mongol and non-Mongol. Here, non-Mongol in the narrow range applies to Chinese, Tibetan, Hoton and Salar Muslims. Growing up as a Mongolian it is very common to adopt nationalist ideas mostly referring to Mongolness. I used to consider myself to be slightly nationalistic, but this perception has completely changed after spending a year in the field among the Deed Mongols. Compared to them I am not a nationalist at all. Maybe nationalism is too strong word to use here to describe the desire to maintain Mongolness. Anyway, my main focus is the state but not nationalism.

This kind of nationalistic approach is common among the younger generations, especially at university. When I first came to Xining, the capital of Qinghai Province, Professor Tserenbal, my main contact in Xining, took me to his university (Qinghai

Nationalities University), to introduce me to some Deed Mongol students. I met a few students who were formally dressed with nice suits and ties, which is the correct way of showing respect in Mongol culture as described in Chapter One, they were quite nervous and excited to shake my hand. One of them was my friend Erdemt (I lived with his elder brother's (Baba) family and his father, Namjil). Later found out that I was the first Mongolian and only Mongolian from Mongolia they have ever met. He later told me that since Professor Tserenbal told them that I would be visiting, he had been preparing and waiting for the moment. Later, I realised that this was respect not only for me, but also for the Mongolness. People were very proud to have me and see me there because as they considered me to be a "genuine Mongol" from a Mongolian State, the independent country.

My friends used to call me a "genuine Mongol" (*Jinken Mongol*). In many ways Deed Mongols considered me to be a true Mongolian, because I am from the country of the Mongols, while they see themselves as people living in the country of Chinese and therefore not truly Mongol. In reality it is difficult to say who is a true Mongol and who is not, and what true Mongolness is. But the Deed Mongols studied in this case apparently give much importance to the issue of an independent country and the state, and especially the fact that people in Mongolia do not have to learn any other languages for their everyday survival, like Tibetan and Chinese in Qinghai. On the other hand, they often complain about themselves that they are not Mongol enough. Many people such as university professors, students, and herders say "once we became a black Tibetan and second became black Chinese" and there is not much "genuine Mongolness" left. They love Mongolness and have a great respect for it, because according to them this is what they lack. They detest Tibetans, Chinese and Muslims who they consider to be almost equal to an enemy that steals their land, destroys their culture and more importantly their "genuine Mongolness" (cf. also Bulag 2002 for attempts of the Manchu, Chinese and Muslims, to reduce nationalities conflict by the unified worship for the Kök Nuur Lake).

First and foremost they do not like the Muslims, firstly because the Muslims are famous for being *holzön* (cheating and dishonest). The Deed Mongols would tell me that they are crazy about money and would do anything to get it and they often say that they are worse than the Chinese in terms of cheating and they also say they are *buruu nomton*, which means "the wrong book" referring to the fact that their books start from the back (from the back for them). The Deed Mongols also suffered attacks by Kazak bandits during the 1940s, as briefly mentioned in the introduction. The Deed Mongol academic

H. Tserenbal (1995: 310) writes that those Kazaks came from Xinjiang. He proposes two reasons for their migration to K k Nuur. One is that they might have escaped from the tyranny of Sheng Shi Tsai [the name is transcribed from a Mongolian script version]. The second suggestion is that the spread of the communist party and fight against the feudal rulers pushed them out of Xinjiang and they came to K k Nuur and Gansu seeking the protection of their fellow Hui Muslim army which was powerful in the region.

Everybody talks about how the Kazaks came and killed people and stole their herds. Namjil, the grandfather of my family, told me that there was a famous monastery *Z iinai H ree* (Monastery of the Z in) in the place where I stayed. It was only about 500 metres away from our summer pasture. Now only a very small hill remains, people call it *Maaniin G vdee* (the hill of the *mani* prayer)². There used to be an annual celebration at the monastery and people brought offerings of wool and butter which were placed all over the monastery and when the Kazaks attacked the monastery and burnt it down with fifty eight monks and lay people inside it, the offerings made it burn all the more fiercely (cf. also Tserenbal 1995: 310-315). I was told that the Kazaks shot people as they came out of the monastery and people from my village say that only three of them escaped from the monastery and survived³. This was one of many attacks. People in the West of the Tsaidam valley of Taijinar and Z in Hoshuu suffered more than the others and they had to migrate to the east. Many people told me how the Kazaks tortured and murdered their ancestors for instance by tying peoples arms and feet to four posts in the ground and then leaving them until they died of dehydration. Until I read the notes of the Japanese agent who secretly lived in Z in Hoshuu and surrounding areas in 1945 and pretended to be an Inner Mongolian pilgrim monk, I thought that they were exaggerating. Hisao Kimura met few of the survivors of the same scene.

...one of our new neighbours, garrulous and tough-looking middle aged man named Shara Hund, was found of showing off the one on his solar plexus...Tearing open his robe to expose the nasty wound that looked impossible to survive, he launched into his tale ...He had been a victim of the same attack as she, and like her [Za-huhun] had been shot point blank when he had tried to make a run for it from the burning temple: but he had had the misfortune to regain

² In the past it was the place where lamas gathered and held rituals of *mani* prayer (*maani hurah*).

³ There are eight Deed Mongol Hoshuus in Haixi Zhou (prefecture), all of them published an encyclopedia of the Hoshuus with a detailed description of everything to do with the Hoshuu: history, customs, pasture, herding, geography, landscape, people and so on. The first one was published in 1995.

consciousness while the raiders were still looting the monastery and torturing the wounded to death.

“I tried to keep still, not moving a muscle,” he went on, pausing for effect. I was glad he had chosen a sunny morning for his rendition. “A crowd of them had built a fire and sat around it eating and drinking – and were taking pot shots at the corpses of my friends. I saw horrible things that night, and I prayed for a shot to kill me quickly. But the actions of my past lives decreed that I should live and witness scenes from the deepest hells, and live with the memory. Can you imagine seeing a living man having the skin peeled off his face like he was a dead animal, and the sounds he makes as he dies in agony? Can you imagine the kind of people who cut off the arms and legs of their living victims just to watch them squirm as they die, or even worse split open living bellies and tear out the guts. We would not do that even to animals we slaughter. The memory will haunt me all my days.” Nevertheless he seemed to relish his narration of the tragedy (Kimura and Berry 1990: 71-72).

At that time Muslims lead by Ma Qi and his second son Ma Bufang took control of K k Nuur, Gansu and Ningxia Shens (Provinces) (cf. Bulag 2002: 47) and they would not protect the Mongols and fight against their fellow Muslims. Instead the saviours were the Communist Chinese army in 1949.

It was interesting to find out that they do not like Tibetans either. In Mongolia and Inner Mongolia Tibetans have a quite good reputation and they are religious brothers. However this is not the case in K k Nuur. At the beginning of my fieldwork I had a tour around the province and I went to the south inhabited by Golog (Chi. Guoluo) Tibetans, neighbouring the pasture of the Deed Mongols. When I came back people told me that I was lucky that I had not been murdered. At first, I thought that they were joking but actually they were only partly joking. Later I discovered the truth, Professor Tserenbal told me that the Golog Tibetans hate the Mongols because in 1950s the Chinese Communist party sent the Inner Mongolian cavalry to defeat the strike in Golog. Also there was a big fight between the Tibetan and Deed Mongol herders over land and pasture. Deed Mongols in Haixi Zhou (prefecture) complained that Tibetans took all the grassland and pushed the Deed Mongols into the desert in the Tsaidam valley, which they now inhabit. I have heard many other fascinating stories about fights over pasture. When I was visiting a monk, *Gaga Zochi Lama*, in Banchin Shan Hoshuu, I was told that Tibetans just come to the Mongol pastures and settle there even though it is privatised with fences.

One morning they would find a Tibetan tent on the edge of their pastures, the Deed Mongols would come and ask them to leave their private land. The Tibetans would not usually refuse and would agree to move away in the next couple of days, but after a week there would be hundreds of animals and after months they would not leave at all. When the Deed Mongols complain to the authorities they are always on the side of the Tibetan herders, because almost all the higher officials are Tibetans or Chinese, and only a few are Deed Mongols. The few who fought to defend the Mongol herders would be likely to be fired and lose their jobs.⁴ Therefore people can do nothing but lose their pastures and contain their anger. Conflict over pasture with Tibetans is not a recent thing. U. E. Bulag (2002: 39) writes that from the mid-eighteenth century onward, the weakness of the Mongols encouraged the Tibetans to cross the Yellow river to occupy Mongol pastureland. Bulag confirms that the Tibetan expansion was initially encouraged by the Manchu court as a tactic to reduce Mongol power.

Fights over pastureland are not only between Tibetan and Deed Mongol herders. In Züün Hoshuu they have the same problems with the local Chinese villages. Shish village where I lived shares a border with the Chinese peasant villages. In the mid 90s Chinese peasants started to own a few animals and began to herd them in the pastures of Shish village. The leader of the village, Süker and many other people warned the Chinese not to herd in their pastures there. The Chinese did not listen and did not cease, therefore, Süker gathered some young people from the Shish village who lead all the Chinese herds away from the pasture and in doing so mixed up all the sheep of different households. The local Chinese were extremely angry with Süker and soon after that they beat him so badly that he was in hospital for several weeks and people say that he is lucky not to have died. The problem became really serious and they complained to the Dulaan Xian government who decided to give some of the Mongol pastures of Shish village to the Chinese, so not surprisingly the Deed Mongols always complain that solutions for these arguments are never positive for them.

This is not the only conflict between Tibetans and Deed Mongols, almost half of the Deed Mongols who inhabit Henan Xiang in the south east of the province (around 35,000 people), do not speak Mongolian but almost 90 percent of the population, all except some old people, speak Tibetan and Chinese. People in Haixi Zhou, where I stayed, witnessed the trauma of the other half of them turning to Tibetan, and they are

⁴ I have a whole story and names of people, for reasons of privacy I am obliged not to reveal them.

aware of the fact that it might be their turn next. They say that when the time comes they will probably adopt Chinese if not Tibetan. The most popular question they ask me is whether I understand when they speak. Deed Mongols are always very excited to find out that we understand each other and are really proud of keeping their language. There is no Mongol secondary school in Xining, the capital of the province and I was told that there are only a few Deed Mongols living in there. Professor Tserenbal and his wife Oyuntsetseg, also a lecturer at the same university, explained to me that Deed Mongols do not live in Xining because their children do not learn enough Mongolian there. They were quite worried about their son, Nandin, a 16 year old boy, who understands Mongolian and speaks a little. This means that they have to stay in their local villages to keep their native language alive. Unfortunately, many of them are unable to stay there and become herders any more because all the pastures are privatised and occupied. One of the two children (according to Chinese law, in the countryside minorities can have two children) must leave the place while the other can stay in the pasture and become a herder. For example, in my family my friend Erdemt, the youngest son of Namjil, was a student in Xining. He has his share, about 200 animals, which his elder sister, Hong Hua (Mon. Ulaantsetseg) and her husband, Ja. Bat takes care of, but he does not have any pasture. He and many others like him have to leave their villages and their culture and find another way of making a living. Where do they go? They go to town and become Chinese, which is a painful reality for many Deed Mongols to face. To survive in China means to become Chinese. Deed Mongols would say that in Mongolia people can go to the cities and still be Mongolian, but their own Mongolness is in danger as they lack their own authority and their own country. Many Deed Mongols told me that they were very proud of Mongolia, the country with the name Mongol. They also say that when they fight with Tibetans they say that there is a state and country called Mongolia⁵, while there is no such thing for Tibetans, and Tibetans can say nothing.

According to them, the absence of the practical Mongol State as an institution, system and authority in the Deed Mongol region is the main key to the loss of their Mongolness and their pasture. This leads them to the great yearning and deep respect for the Mongol state. The situation provides the psychological and emotional basis to build

⁵ The Deed Mongols attitudes towards the state of the Halh Mongolia do not address the conflict between Halh Mongols and Oirad Mongols. Originally, Deed Mongols are Hoshuud people one of the four Oirad Mongol clans. Gūsh Khaan from Oirad and Tsogt Khaan from Halh fought in Kōk Nuur and Gūsh Khaan won the war and stayed in the area. In Ulaan xiang, now there are many people who claim to be Halh and decedents of Tsogt Khaan. However, Deed Mongols limit the conflict between the two Mongols with Gūsh and Tsogt and see the Mongolian state as something that all the other Mongols have to be proud of.

up the 'abstract Mongol state' as something glamorous. As such, Deed Mongols reproduce the Mongol abstract state through a positive tension, which I will discuss later. To conclude, this re-birth of the state is a combination of the critical decline of the nation and the great historical past.

Even though not many people are involved, Deed Mongols also have an abstraction of the Chinese state based on history, experience and the present system, institution and political practices. I noticed many things about the abstract Mongol state but not so much about the people's idea of the Chinese state. However, there are two distinct attitudes towards the Chinese state, one negative and the other positive. Most Mongolians, which includes Mongolians, Inner Mongolians and Deed Mongols, share a dislike for the Chinese. The present precariousness of the Deed Mongol identity is a result of these conflicts. People understand that they are losing their culture, they are powerless in front of the other nationalities, because they do not have their own authority or their own state, instead they have the state of the 'others'. A similar situation existed under the state of the Manchurian Qing Dynasty. Luvsandanzan (1692-1755) (cf. also Buringbayar⁶ 2002: 205), the grandson of the Gush Khaan (1582-1656)⁷ (cf. the Introduction and Buringbayar 2002: 196-197), is another national hero of the Deed Mongols. He was one of the leading nobles of his time and was the leader of the strike against the rule of the Qing Dynasty (cf. also Hi 1996: 302-340). In 1723 the Qing Dynasty defeated the strike and around eighty thousand Deed Mongols were killed (Hi 1996: 338). For historical reasons such as this the Deed Mongols consider the Manchurians to be an enemy.

When people are under other's states, obviously they do not have very positive attitudes and ideas about the other, in this case the Chinese, state. For the Deed Mongols it is a power that diminishes their culture and transforms them into Chinese or Tibetan people. Therefore they often hesitate to use phrases that praise the Mongol state as it can be seen to refer to the Chinese state, which is practically their state. Once I was invited to a feast at the new house of Tseder, eldest sister of Erdemt, in Dulaan. I was there when the people were preparing and decorating the house. They were trying to think of appropriate phrases to write on some red paper and hang on either side of the entrance. Erdemt asked me to think of any good phrases, I suggested some very popular phrases dedicated to the state such as *tör tивshin baig түмен амгалан баиг* (let the state be still

⁶ Chi. Buringbayar is a leading local academic. He is originally from Inner Mongolia and now lives in Kök Nuur. He has many publications about the Deed Mongol history, folklore and literature.

⁷ Ruler of the Hoshuud (name of the ancestors of the Deed Mongols) Empire (1636-1723) in Kök Nuur and Tibet.

and the people be peaceful), which we would have used in Mongolia. But he insisted, because they do not have the practical Mongol state, and instead the term could be seen to indicate the Chinese state. This attitude might be more common among younger generations, while other people like the old party members have positive attitudes towards the Chinese state and always advise juniors to respect the *tör yos* state customs and laws (cf. also Respect for the state custom *tör yos*), referring both to the old Mongol customs and the new Chinese State rules. Some people, especially elders generally respect the state without making a serious distinction between the national divisions. In general, I have heard many people, including my family, say that the Chinese state actually works really well, takes good care of the people, really improving the economy and developing the country. In this situation the people then respect the other states too. This is their consent to the state which I will discuss more in the section on people seeing the state as a positive entity.

To sum up, there are two groups of people with different notions about the states – elders and youths. Some elder people, above the age of 40, usually respect both of the states. They have a communist view and are loyal to the state and party, but they not only respect the Chinese state because they are loyal communists, but also because it is their tradition to respect the state. The younger people criticize the Chinese state and respect the imaginary, ritualised, abstract Mongol state more than the practical one. By showing more or less respect, people make these states more or less powerful for themselves. Here, the idea of power is not related to the real power of the state, rather, it is about how people perceive the state and build an imagined power around it. So whether the state is imaginary or real it can be more or less powerful in people's imaginations. For example, in younger people's minds the imaginary state is more powerful even though it does not exist and has no real power.

Now, returning to the discussion about the reminiscence of the historical Mongol state, and these dreams constructing an abstract state, which was previously described within the contemporary political situation. The reminiscence does not have to have originated at the present time, and could have been started even earlier, for example, just after the invasion of the Qing Dynasty and the fall of the Hoshuud (another name for Deed Mongol). I can only assume this from the above-mentioned rebellion against the Qing Dynasty, but do not have materials to show past attitudes.

4.2.2. Cult of the Mongol State⁸

Before going further let me briefly introduce a discussion that poses the question of whether or not the Mongols really had a state. I will simply follow the majority who claim that the Mongol Empire certainly had a state. Since this is not my main concern I will give brief information and further references. David Sneath complains that Deleuze and Guattari, and structural-functionalist anthropology “treated pastoral nomadic society” as an ideal type with general characteristics to be discerned from the whole range of actual pastoral societies” and regarded them as a “pre-state society organized with by principles of kinship”. Sneath gives a clear description of the four features of Mongol State: aristocracy, heavenly mandates, collective sovereignty (cf. also Chapter Three for collective sovereignty) and decimal military-civil administration and confirms that Mongols certainly had a state in the 13th and 14th centuries. “Mongolia was not so much a land of barbaric tribes as much as a land of lords and their entourages. The great noble houses of the steppes were at various times patrons of religion and the arts, sophisticated political operators and gifted military leaders. Such aristocracies are a central feature of the first Inner Asian polity for which we have historical records, the Xiongnu empire of the third century BCE, and they remain so in every successor state for which we have significant records, until the twentieth century” (Sneath in press). Later in the chapter I will discuss aristocracy and political sophistication as important attributes that the Deed Mongols praise and respect.

J. Boldbaatar (2005: 4-5, 9-12), a leading Mongolian historian, opposes the similar idea that Chinggis Khaan’s state was a pre-state or early-state as proposed by some Mongol and Russian historians’ and claims that Chinggis Khaan had a state with democratic elements. He illustrates several points that are sufficient to prove that it was a state. First are the consultative bodies, named the Great Khiriltay [Great Assemblies], and the Council of the Wise Men which were empowered with prerogatives of electing the Great Khaan, which is covered in Sneath’s writing as a “collective sovereignty”. His next illustration is the decimal organization of his troops into the *arban* (squad or ten men), with ten *arban* forming a *zagun* (company, or one hundred men), which in turn, formed a *minggan* (battalion, or one thousand men). Another crucial question is whether Mongols

⁸ For information about the cult of the state in Mongolia I wrote an article *Cult of the State: State in the Culture of the Mongols* (2004). In Mongolia the cult of the state is more to do with the spirituality of standards and spirits of the Khaans as well as the cult of the Khaans in a secular sense as it is amongst the Deed Mongols.

had a state law and imperial code. He notes that a Mongolian scholar B. Sumyabaatar has just found the Korean copy of the Great Yasa or the Great Code (Ih Zasag). C. Atwood (2004: 264) confirms that, "at the coronation of Chinggis Khan's son Ögedei Khan (1229-41), the new khan proclaimed for the first time the "Great Jasag" (Ih Zasag) as an integral body of precedents...while adding his own". According to him by the time of Möngke Khan (1251-59) the *jasag* (law) had become a body of written precedents consulted at the great assemblies (*Quriltai*). Moreover, Boldbaatar comments on the issue of a unified taxation system arguing that "economic practices of the sedentary and nomadic societies should not be measured by identical criteria and all the features of the contemporary taxation system should not also be superimposed on the medieval period" (2005: 12), which becomes one of the main claims of T. D. Skrynnikova (1997) to argue that its economic system was not fully integrated so that Mongol Empire did not have a state.

The meaning of the phrase 'cult of the state' could mean several different things. This is a direct translation of the Mongol term *töriin shütleḡ* which means cult of worship and cult of the state, but does not give a clear distinction between practical, abstract or perhaps spiritual states because the cult of the state in Mongol culture is a complex phenomenon which covers aspects of all three. Before going further, I will define what I mean by 'spiritual state' which differs from the 'abstract state'. It is suitable to regard them as interrelated and inseparable. However, at the very basic level, I will use the term 'abstract state' within the scope of my description in the introduction referring to the Deed Mongols' social psychological reconstruction of the Mongol state - respect and obedience to the philosophy, polity, strategy, wisdom and so on, which is mostly believed to have originated from the Khaans of the Mongol imperial times and sometimes from the deities such as the Eternal Heaven (*Mönḡ Tenger*)⁹, and praise for the Mongol Khaans. On the other hand, the cult of the state mostly refers to the spirituality of the state, its guardian spirits, heavens (*tengers*) and spirits of the Khaans. The extent of the presence of abstraction or spiritualism in the cult of the state varies in different societies. In the

⁹ In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, during the years of the Mongol Empire *Mönḡ Tenger* (Eternal Heaven) was the main deity and guardian of the empire, which had an enormous effect on the cult of the state. S. Dulam (1996) maintains that prayer texts state that *Mönḡ Tenger* (Eternal Heaven) was a symbolic form of 'supreme mind' (*deed oyun sanaa*), 'supreme action' (*deed orchil*), and 'supreme truth' (*deed unen*) and 'resource of intellects' (*oyunii urgali*). Following him, N. Lündendorj (2002: 25) illustrates that terms such as '[empire] under the power of Eternal Heaven' (*mönḡhe tngri-yin küciün-diir*) from the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries meant 'to rule the empire with the supreme mind'. Furthermore, according to N. Lündendorj (2002: 35) the Mongol cult of the state was based on the worship of the *Mönḡ Tenger* (Eternal Heaven), because it was the source of political thinking. Becoming an inseparable part of the empire *Mönḡ Tenger* (Eternal Heaven) was one of the reasons people believed in and worshipped the state as an abstraction (B. Dulam 2004: 108).

following, I will argue that because of the strong communist anti-religious influence, Deed Mongols in contemporary Züün Hoshuu are more likely to be influenced by the abstracts rather than the spiritualism of the Mongol state.

The Mongols' cult of the state was established and developed through the history not only of the state but also generally throughout the history of the Mongols, in a sense including both the state and society. There are various socio-cultural aspects and elements throughout history, which influenced the establishment and evolution of the cult of the state. Therefore, I prefer to use the word 'origins' in plural form, denoting the wide range of influences. The Mongolian philosopher Ch. Jügder (2002: 105) writes that the long and complex tradition of the state eventually becomes the cult of the state. According to him, the Mongol cult of the state originated at the time of the Huns in Central Asia, who believed their king to be the descendent of heaven. However, the historical materials of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries introduce more precise ethnography about the cult of the state. The cult and the idea of the state were based on and consisted in at least three inter-related cults. The Mongol cult of the state (*töriin shütleг*) has a foundational relation, first, to the cult of the *Mönh Tenger* (Eternal Heaven) [cf. S. Dulam 1996, 2006 and Lündendorj 2002], the main deity of Chinggis Khaan and his empire, second, the worship of the white and black sacred standards (flags) (*töriin har, tsagaan süld*)¹⁰ [cf. Sharaldai 1999 and S. Dulam 2006] in relation to Chinggis Khaan's ancestors, and third, worship of Chinggis Khaan and other Khaans¹¹ after their death (Dulam 2004: 108). The Deed Mongol cult of the state is not same as it is in Mongolia. They do not even use the term *töriig shüteh* 'to worship the state or cult of the state'. However, since the cult of the state is such a broad phenomenon, it does not necessarily mean that they do not have such a thing at all. Deed Mongols do not have a strong perception about the Eternal Heaven or the state standards. Their cult of the state can be better understood in terms of the deep respect for the Khaans.

When people talk about the cult of the state they do not exactly refer to a definite thing. I suspect that in different Mongolian communities a similar phenomenon can

¹⁰ Worship of the 'state standards' (flags) (*töriin süld*) also has an essential role in the cult of the state. Chinggis Khaan had 'white and black standards' (flags) (*har, tsagaan süld*) referring to peace and war and used to raise the white one at times of peace and the black one at times of war...The abstraction of the standards can be illustrated by two stages. The first stage is more specific, the standards (flag) have spirit masters (*ongon*) who are the souls of the previous Khaans, ancestors of Chinggis Khaan, and the second stage is more general, the standards symbolise the 'spirit of the state'. In the latter, the standards are conceptualised in an objectified way, it is a symbolic object which contains the spirit of the state...In this sense, the standard (flag) is a spirit not only of the state, but of all Mongols (B. Dulam 2004: 108).

¹¹ Mongols do not only worship Chinggis Khaan, they also worship his queens and sons.

mean various things. In monasteries and on *ovoos* Deed Mongols often have two posts, one has sun and moon on top representing the heaven, and the other has black yak hair and a trident (*seree*) with three points and they call it *tug* (standard or flag), and sometimes the sun and moon is on top of the trident of the standard (Figure 4.1).




Figure 4.1 Standard at the monastery of Baruun Hoshuu

The *tug* (standard) is a mixture of Chinggis Khaan's white and black standards. Traditionally, the black has one metal arrow on top, while the white has the fork on top. But those of the Deed Mongols are black and have a trident of the white standard of Chinggis Khaan. Jayan (cf. also the Introduction) the keeper of the new monastery of the Züün Hoshuu explained to me that the monasteries and places where they worship the wrathful gods of Ningma-pa Buddhism such as Chojin, Yamandag and Gombo keeps the *tug* as a sign of this. He also said that the *tug* is a weapon of those gods. In this way they do not make a connection to the cult of the state.

However, Deed Mongols have the other elements of cult of the state. Families keep pictures of Chinggis Khaan and sometimes Gūsh Khaan¹². In the ritual prayers they often mention their names together with the names of the deities and give them offerings, which I will describe in detail later in the Chapter. Another crucial aspect is that they see Gūsh Khaan as a religious leader, not only political, in the same way as many Mongols see Chinggis Khaan. They call him *Geegen* Gūsh Khaan, and *geegen* means 'enlightened'. The term is usually used to denote religious figures, reincarnated lamas and so on. Being seen as an enlightened religious leader is apparently inseparable from his political position as a Khaan of the Hoshuud State (cf. parts on the history and the literature review in the Introduction for more information about the Hoshuud State and Gūsh Khaan).

¹² I have not seen any pictures of Gūsh Khaan except the well known picture of a Mongol man leading a tiger with chains (*Mongol hūn bar hōtōlnō*). Some Deed Mongols claim that he is Gūsh Khaan. In other parts of Mongolia it is well known as Dugar Zaisan.

In the sense of being a combination of many possible things the cult of the state is similar to deference analyzed by Bloch (2004). The above three aspects of the cult of the state are surely one of many others. There is no single thing behind the state (*tör*) which people worship. It is only academics that are trying to clarify what is behind the idea of state, but in reality people worship it without being able to define it.

A very common experience among anthropologists who ask why someone is doing something in a particular way in a ritual is to be answered by such phrases as “It is the tradition,” “It is the custom of ancestors,” “It goes back to early history,” and so on. Now, these apparently frustrating answers are nonetheless interesting in many ways for they combine explicitness concerning deference and awareness of imprecision about who exactly is the originating mind behind the practice (Bloch 2004: 74)... Rituals therefore are acts of repetition and quotation. Such a remark places ritual within what externalist philosophers have identified as a central aspect of human thought and communication and which has been called by some “deference”, that is reliance on the authority of others to guarantee the value of what is said or done. What makes such an observation particularly interesting for an anthropologist is that deference fundamentally alters the relation between understanding and holding something to be true. It seems common sense that to hold something to be true one must also understand it. This, however, is not the case when deference is involved, especially when deference is linked to quotation (Bloch 2004: 69).

Deference is *deedleh* in Mongolian and it means to consider something superior and therefore to respect it. *Deedleh* is another Mongolian word that equates with *hiindleh* respect. The cult of the state is similar to Bloch’s use and interpretation of deference, and it is one of the main reasons that people respect the state. More precisely it is the origin that people respect without knowing and understanding it. Interestingly, the ritualized situation of unawareness creates both the performative and non-performative respects. For this reason many people sincerely respect the state, while many others just perform respect without claiming sincerity. However, respect and deference do not always emerge from the “not understanding” situation. The following examples of other sources of respect for the state show that people also know something about the state to respect it.

4.2.3. Positive attitudes about the Mongol State

Before analysing the positive attitudes, I must clarify what I mean by the term. It has two potential meanings, one is, people's positive attitudes about the state, and the other is the state's positive attitudes towards the people. What I am going to explore is people's positive attitudes about the state's positive attitudes towards people, since, we do not know whether all the positive attitudes of the state described in folklore were true in reality. People usually say that Chinggis Khaan and other Khaans expounded all the wisdom. Obviously, because it is folklore, most of the materials I am going to use do not have authors and years of revelation, but what we know for certain is that it represents what people think of the state. I am not trying to prove whether the imperial state had those positive attitudes or not, instead I will describe how people think of the state as such. Also I cannot prove that all the good attitudes of the state towards the people in folklore are wrong and that the state was not positive towards people. Therefore, the materials are on the boundary between the state's attitude and people's attitude about the state. In that sense the Mongols' political ideology is based on the perceived interplay between the state and the society.

I will discuss three features of the Mongol state, which people consider to be positive state attitudes and which I claim are the other sources of their respect for the state. The three features are (1) the state tactic to capture people's *setgel* (sentiment), (2) the state's *hair* (love) towards people and (3) the state law as ritualized traditional custom (*yos*). These ethnographies will illustrate the people's idea of the Mongol state as not only oppressive, or only as a spiritual and ritualized idea that they worship without understanding, but also the secular and positive aspects that create people's respect for the state. This is similar to Gramsci's idea of "hegemony". Specially, one certain form of "hegemony", which Joseph V. Femia¹³ (1981: 46) discovers from Gramsci's writings and calls the "integral hegemony", as the one similarity to the main policies of the Imperial Mongol State. "Integral hegemony" is a "moral and intellectual unity, issuing an 'organic' relationship between rulers and ruled, a relationship without contradictions and antagonisms on either a social or ethical level" (Femia 1981: 46). I suppose that this condition of the ruler or the state arouses respect from people. Moreover this part of the

¹³ Joseph V. Femia is a professor of Political Theory at the University of Liverpool. His main areas of interest are Marxism, democratic and anti-democratic thought, and Italian political philosophy.

chapter is about the wisdoms (*bilig*)¹⁴ of the Mongol Khaans, which in Gramsci's words is the "intellectual and moral leadership", one of the two constituents (the other way is domination and coercion) of the hegemony.

Mongolians always considered the use of power and force as the last and most disparate way to solve a problem. People often say *durgüid hüchgüi* means 'no desire no power' and they use this phrase to indicate that to force someone against their will does not produce a good result. One can achieve things through force for a certain period but in the Mongols' conception the achievement will always be fragile with the potential to break, because force arouses resistance. More precisely, the phrase means that use of power cannot change one's desire or *setgel* (sentiment, mind, heart and feeling). Instead of using power people should find ways of influencing one's *setgel*. A teaching attributed to Chinggis Khaan says that in order to build a government (*zasag*) "one should capture people's *setgel* not the body" (*biyiig n huraatlaa setgeliing n huraagtun*). It is a well-known phrase all Mongolians know. Moreover, he says:

To conquer people is the way
To conquer the world,
To conquer *setgel* is the way
To conquer people
To conquer peoples' *setgel* means
To conquer the world,
To lose peoples' *setgel* is
To lose the world conquest,
Subordination not adoring the inner *setgel* but
Adoring the superficial figure is false
Subordination is subordination
When peoples' *setgel* are adored (Lündendorj 2002: 33)
(for Mongolian version see Appendix E).

The teaching concludes that "a Khaan is a real Khaan when people sentimentally consider him as a Khaan before one becomes a Khaan" (Lündendorj 2002: 34), as with the village leader's position in Chapter Two. Classical Mongol teaching of politics

¹⁴ The Mongolian term *bilig* means wisdom, mind and thought. *Bilig* covers Mongolian folk teachings, narratives, phrases and so on.

declared that the use of power is a negative aspect of the state, because it only captures peoples' body and arouses resistance in peoples' *setgel* (mind). To touch people's *setgel* is the method to arouse sincere respect from people, and peoples' respect leads one to power, as I discussed earlier. I think that the people's belief about the state's refusal to use power, or perhaps the state's actual refusal to use force, was sufficient to build a base of respect in peoples' *setgel* (mind) for the state. In order to capture peoples' *setgel* Khaans gave "love" (*hair*) to people. I am using the term "love" as opposed to state repression, with the similar but broader meaning that I discussed in the chapter *Collective Power*. In the folklore, a teaching of Mongol Khaans says that:

To love is the most important skill
Among the thirty-five skills of a Khaan
Even though a Khaan is sovereign
Without a *setgel* of love
He is shallow and powerless to everything
(*Hagan hümiin-u guchin tabun erdem-ün dotor-a*
Hairalahu sedhil neng erdem
Hagan hümiin hamag erhe-ii tegüsbechü
Hairalahu sedhil ügüi bolbasu
Hamug-tur arga ügüi hönggen bolmoi) (Damdinsüren 1959: 54).

As I argued in the previous chapter the reciprocity of respect and "love" reproduce one another. The reciprocity that builds harmony and peace also works in the relationship between state and society. I argue that state's tactic to give "love" to people arouses respect from people. In a broader sense the state's "love" means the welfare of people. It is the same idea that Foucault (1991) discussed in his analysis of "governmentality".

Population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of the all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health etc.; and the means the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all in some sense immanent to the population...(Foucault 1991: 100).

He distinguishes sovereignty from “governmentality”. According to him the end of sovereignty is the exercising of sovereignty not the benefit of the people, while the end of “governmentality” is “convenience” for each of the things that are to be governed. In that sense, for Foucault the tactics of the Mongol rulers documented in folklore would be the art of “governmentality”. The Imperial Mongol State was obviously a sovereign with an absolute deity, Eternal Heaven, and a ruler, Khaan. In other words, as people now perceive, the Imperial Mongol State was a sovereign with the art of “governmentality”. Both of the ends of the sovereignty and “governmentality” were essential to the traditional Mongol State. This suggests to certain extent that Foucault was not right to argue that “governmentality” is a feature of modernity, the technology of welfare, education, census taking, etc. Some key elements of his idea of “governmentality” were present in the non-modern imperial Mongol State. It is also evident in words attributed to Chinggis Khaan in a seventeenth-century chronicle.

Might my actual state will weaken
While *ald*¹⁵ body of mine takes a break
Might my all people be anxious
While whole body of mine takes a break
Let my *ald* body be weary if wearies
Let my actual state not be weak
Let my whole body suffer if suffers
Let my all people not be anxious (Luvsandanzan 1990: 123)

In the poem, he emphasized the welfare of the two things; one being the people (*uls*), as in Foucault’s “governmentality”, and the other being the state (*tör*), as in sovereignty. The combination of the two, or in other words the “love” of the secure and powerful state is another reason for people to respect the state.

This refusal to use power and the non-coercive persuasion that captures peoples’ *setgel* versus the use of power that captures peoples’ bodies in folklore and chronicles is a key for the two types of empirical laws, formal and informal. Here is the crossover of folklore and reality. Some Mongolian social scientists utilize materials that show that the Imperial Mongol State had positive attitudes. A Mongolian political scientist N.

¹⁵ The distance between the tips of the fingers of the two arms extended to either side.

Lündendorj (2002: 48) writes that Chinggis Khaan used a combination of two types of law. One is the formal state law (Mon. *arga* and Chi. Yang) *Ih Yos [Ih Zasag]* (The Great Government) to govern the external relations of man, and the other is his wisdom (Mon. *bilig* and Chi. Ying) to govern the internal aspects of man referring to *setgel*, mentality and morality. According to him, Mongols considered coercion as inhuman, while influencing people's *setgel* and to help them to rationalise is the human way (2002: 154). Moreover, N. Lündendorj (2002: 150, 154) declares that in the thirteenth century Mongols combined two tactics, coercion (*albadlaga*) and persuasion (*itgüüle*), to govern. The formal state law (Mon. *arga* and Chi. Yang) *Ih Yos [Ih Zasag]* was coercive while the Khaan's wisdoms (Mon. *bilig* and Chi. Ying) were persuasive.

There is another point of view that the law was not coercive to some extent. Many Mongolian political scientists and philosophers agree that originally the laws of the Mongols were based on customs (*yos*) and rituals (*zanshil*). N. Lündendorj (2002: 146) writes that the formal law *Ih Yos [Ih Zasag]* of Chinggis Khaan was a "live law" (*amid huuli*) and product of peoples' [civil society] mentality that was "based on ritualized elements and customs" (*zan zanshilyn hem henjeemd suurilsan*) and was greatly influenced by the everyday life of people of that time. Similarly, Ts. Erdemt (2002: 157-158), Mongolian philosopher and political scientist, maintains that the greater contents of the formal written law were based on ordinary customs (rituals) – expressions of peoples' belief – which were performed in families. Therefore, the traditional Mongol origination and implementation of law was from the bottom of the society to the top, without coercion. Developing the case, he asserts that the same technique was also used to implement new laws. In other words, the state tried to make new laws into everyday customs. There are two similar cases, one is the quotation of customs in law or the ritualized old law, and the other is the ritualization of new law. According to Ts. Erdemt, this ritual aspect of law became the main reason for people to respect and obey the law, and the implementation of laws was surprisingly successful. Moreover, he is critical of Mongolia for now introducing foreign laws unchanged, without accommodating them to the Mongol culture. Because they are not based on Mongolian culture the new laws are unrealistic and impractical (Erdemt 2002: 158). I claim that when a law which was originally based on the "oral law" (*aman huuli*) of people, becomes a tradition or the other way around then it is less repressive. The ritualization of law that makes it less repressive and further leads people to respect the state.

The above discussion does not necessarily refer to the Deed Mongols but to Mongols in general. When the Deed Mongols think of the abstract state they think of Gūsh Khaan, and then Chinggis Khaan, and they connect themselves to the rest of the Mongols through these names. It is not only the names, but the traditional political ideology that they represent which are their chronicles and folklore. On the other hand, unintentionally – without making a direct link to the Mongol state, local politics and leadership (in Chapter Two) exchange “love”, and respect (in Chapter Three) and tactics to gain respect and power (in Chapter One) work in the same way through the traditional political ideology of the state which they re-construct in their minds. People do not have explicit materials to impart this knowledge, it is implicit in folklore, rituals (I will present some cases later in the chapter) and Mongol books, which people absorb when they grow up as Mongols. They are aware of the conflict between Gūsh Khaan and Tsogt Khan on the north bank of the Kōk Nuur Lake and historical conflicts between their Oirat ancestors and the Halh Mongols of Central and South Mongolia (cf. also Introduction of the thesis), they regard it as contradictory and they perceive their former Halh enemies as one of the heroic Mongol groups that every Mongol must be proud of. They do not make distinctions between, for example, the Oirat and the Halh political ideologies.

4.3. Respect reproduces state power

4.3.1. Respect for the state custom *tör yos*

Obeying customs is a perfect example of the performative respect for the state. The Mongol term *tör* has two meanings, one “state” (*tör*) and the other “custom” (*yos*). Therefore, the term *tör yos* can be understood in two ways, a “custom not necessarily referring to the state” or a “custom and law declared by the state”. The state custom can belong to any state, for example, new and old states. Mongols have a strong tradition of respecting the customs *tör yos*, which develops from the experience of respecting the state law. If people respect the state then it is logical to respect its customs, laws and decrees. Mongolians are also very conservative, they consider their history, ancestors and past as very crucial and they have a deep respect for them, as previously mentioned. Customs are traditions created by ancestors and are fundamental things that people have to respect in their society. Therefore in both of the senses of being of the state or of the

ancestors, *tör yos* (custom) is important in all circumstances. The idea of respecting rules and customs brings up an interesting case of a triple relationship. In the earlier discussion of 'performative respect' I wrote that people have to show respect for some people without depending on their consciousness. Now, I realize that this is not a proper explanation, because I saw the case with reference to only two parties. The obligatory performative respect can be understood in another way as a relationship between three parties such as a (1) person, (2) custom and (3) the second person. In this case respect is not only an interaction between the two people, but also it is about the *tör yos* (custom). Respect for the other person then can be explained as not only respect for the other person but it is also respect for the *tör yos*. When I was in the field, I went to participate at a village meeting. At the meeting an old lady called Jagu, mother of Ja. Bat the groom of the family that I lived with, came to the *ger*, where the village was organizing a meeting, and sat below me. I asked her to move up and sit above me, which is considered to be good manners, even though everyone knows that an old lady sits below a young man. She insisted and told me that it is not only a matter of whether she respects me or not, but more than that it is an issue of whether she respects the *tör yos*. As she said, even though she does not respect me she has to respect the *tör yos*, according to which men sit above women, and she must follow it by sitting below me or even a very young boy. Moreover, she said that she does not even sit above her sons in the privacy of their own home, where one would expect to take less notice of the *tör yos*. Then the second person, for example me, who is not used to the custom and has just the opposite custom of expecting any elders to sit above them, also have to follow this custom. Although I truly respected her and did not want her to sit below me I had to respect the *tör yos* as well, and let her sit below me. Thus the *tör yos* blocks the direct relationship between the two persons and limits the expression of true feelings.

At first, I did not believe that there was any connection between customs and the state when she told me that the customs they perform are a "state law" (*töriin huuli*). I could not believe that the state make laws to enforce "respect for elders and love for juniors". After some research I was surprised to find that she was right. One of the first state laws of the Mongols, *Ih Zasag* (The Great Government) passed by Chinggis Khaan, had an article about the respect and "love". The law says that everyone must "respect elders and support the poor" (*ötgösiig хүндэлж ядуусыг тэтгэх heregtei*) (Saishaalt 1987:

496)¹⁶. This has the same meaning as the phrase “respect elders and love juniors” discussed in Chapter Two, apart from the word “poor” or clearly “poor people”, instead of the word “junior”. There are many other versions of the phrase, in one version of the formal law the article refers to the larger group of people as a social class, while the another version in the village is at the kinship level. The version of the “informal law” (wisdom-*bilig*) attributed to Chinggis Khaan was “respect superiors and nurture inferiors” (*degedüis-i hüüdüülen, dooradus-i asara*). Here, superiors *degedüis* and inferiors *dooradus* definitely indicate social class, but can refer to any upper and lower levels, for example, ancestor and descendent. Moreover, H. Tserenbal (2003: 87), a Deed Mongol scholar, in his analysis of the official law (*Höh nuuryñ chuulgany tsaaz*) of Gūsh Khaan’s Empire (1655-1723), maintains that the contents had an article about respect for parents and love for subordinates. The remnants of the state laws are still with the Deed Mongol villagers who still perform the laws but without the repression of the actual state. Their continuation of this practice shows that they still truly respect the old state, which is evidence for state power created out of people’s respect for it, but without its actual existence.

In the tripartite relationship, the most powerful party is the *tör yos* or the ‘abstract state’, and secondly, it is a man who is the next most powerful figure whose power and domination is declared by the *tör yos* to sit above women. Man appears powerful in the seating order, but he is less powerful than the *tör yos* and obeys its rules. Customs in everyday life do not have a real political power as perhaps they had in the past. If someone breaks the custom of seating order then there is no punishment it will just not look right to the people (see Chapter One). In other words, the *tör yos* and the man’s power that it imparts are examples of ‘powerless power’ (cf. also Chapter Two for powerless power). In this example, by respecting customs that do not really have real power, people reinforce the powerless power of customs with their respect.

This brings out another definition for the state. Mongols consider the state to be not only supernatural and spiritual power, but also the proper way of life in a society, an intelligent way of living together as a community. The state as a custom (*tör yos*) shapes the society, creates order (*emh tsegts*) and reason into human life as part of a group. In that sense, Ts. Erdemt (2002: 193) defines the *tör yos* (state custom) as the essence and “soul” (*amin süins*) of the country and its people (*tör uls*). T. Mitchell presents a similar

¹⁶ Also see Ts. Erdemt (2002:131) and N. Lündendorj (2002: 147).

claim, but in the example of the modern state “appearing as a structure containing and giving order and meaning to people’s lives” (Mitchell 1999: 90). Compared to the spiritual approach to the state, this is a practical version of the abstract state. But compared to the practical systems of the state this is an abstract power produced in people’s minds because they consider it to be something that is right and necessary and it exists with or without the actual existence of the state. People respect *tör yos* and consider that it is an extension of the historical Mongol Empires and Khaans (as Foucault illustrates capillary of the state power). This is another important factor in the constitution of the abstract state.

4.3.2. Respect for the state in feasts

Feasts (*nair*) are not just like European’s dinners and parties, they are major public occasions in Mongolian Society. The same idea of the respect for the state is also evident in the feasts (*nair*). All through the year Deed Mongols hold various feasts. Many of them have similar rites for different celebrations. One of the things common in feasts is the presence of the state. For example: weddings, child’s first hair cut (*örvöö ürgeeh*)¹⁷, new *ger* or house and as Sarangerel and Yuki (2002: 76-92) write, elders’ anniversary (*nasutad-un jil alhagulhu*) have similar rites including the “Benediction of Bayan Sön” (*Bayan söngiin yerööl*) and the “three state songs” (*töriin gурvan duu*), both show respect for the state. This prayer benediction is a general introduction to most of the feasts and is followed by other benedictions for the special occasion that is being celebrated.

Bayan Sön means ‘rich alcoholic drink’ and the ‘alcoholic drink’ or *sön* referred to is fermented mare’s milk (*chige, airag*), or ‘traditional vodka’ made from milk (*arki*), and nowadays it refers to Chinese vodka.¹⁸ *Sön* (traditional Mongolian vodka) is the most sacred and respected drink to use in Mongol customs. At the beginning of feasts, a *yeröölch* (singer of benedictions) recites the benediction and sprinkles the *sön* for the Imperial State, Chinggis Khaan, Güsh Khaan, other nobles, Buddhist deities and spirits

¹⁷ Mongolians celebrate their children’s first haircuts, which take place at the age of three, by holding a feast.

¹⁸ Deed Mongols have almost ceased to produce ‘fermented mare’s milk’ and the ‘traditional vodka’. It is mostly because of the lack of pasture. They need to have a large pasture in order to have a horse or cow to produce a large amount of milk. The private pastures they have now are not big enough and the landscape is not suitable for horses and cows. About the meaning of the word see M. Üsürünggüi (2003: 1-2) and Setsenmönghе and Gerel (2003: 36).

(cf. also Setsenmönghē and Gerel¹⁹ 2003: 153-160, Üsürünggüi²⁰ 2003: 1-2). Throughout the year I heard different versions of the same prayer, and whenever I asked them to recite it for me so that I could write them down, they responded that they are all collected in the books edited by local academics, which is to some extent true. However I was able to write down certain sections during the feasts. For example, at one of the local weddings the following version was recited by a local singer of benedictions, Ulaanbaatar, it says that Gūsh Khaan is a reincarnation of the wrathful god Ochirvaani, and he was the religious and political leader.

Let us become nice and peaceful!

Originated from the Heaven of the thirty three Hurmast

Held the state and religion of people of

Khaan of an intellect of three counties

Had a great support for the Yellow Religion [Buddhism] of Zonhov [Tsong-kha-pa]

Gathered all deities, wisdom and power at once

Holy master Gūsh Khaan, reincarnation of the Ochirvaani with great fortune

His and his descendant noble's eternal white state

Let it very nicely rise in ten directions

For that, pronouncing and sprinkling the choicest part of your holy clear rich *sön*?

(for Mongolian version see Appendix F).

It includes the popular knowledge of history, religion and state. It also claims “your *sön*” meaning that it is granted from the state and Khaans. This is evident throughout the benediction and in all its versions. According to the contents of the Deed Mongol benedictions of Bayan Sön, feast and *sön* is something provided by the state. In other words, they consider feasts as a celebration of peace and happiness that are provided and established by the powerful welfare state. Following this logic, at the beginning of feasts they express their appreciation to the state and praise it. In another version the same meaning applies to Chinggis Khaan.

Let us become nice and peaceful!

¹⁹ They are academics from Inner Mongolian, teachers at the North Western Nationalities University, Lanzhou, Gansu Province. Gansu is the neighbouring province of Qinghai, where some of the Deed Mongol live. The authors studied and collected Deed Mongol benedictions.

²⁰ He is a Deed Mongol academic who collected oral literatures and published them. He was the main editor of the publication of the oral Deed Mongol literatures.

Great holy Chinggis Khaan descended from the universe
 Granted from the Heaven of ninety-nine Hormusta²¹
 Born from the lineage of the hero Yesühei
 Born from the tender queen Ögelün,
 Perfectly talented with the thirty five wisdoms without doubt
 From the flourishing white palace in heaven
 Generated all the succeeding leaders...
 By managing concord and wisdom
 United people with harmony
 Nine paladins and five nobles
 Four Oirads²² and forty Mongols
 Sprinkling the choicest part of your
 Lapping holy clear white *sön*
 Symbol of the wide feast
 To feast with the master
 Holy marshal Chinggis Khaan
 Let us become peaceful and sacred!²³ (Setsenmöghe and Gerel 2003: 190-191)
 (for Mongolian version see Appendix G).

Like Güsh Khaan, Chinggis Khaan is described as both a religious leader and talented political leader, which match the cult of the state and the positive aspects of the state discussed earlier. The benediction also addresses the popular notion that his unity was built with concord and harmony not with repression and cruelty, as maintained in Chapter Three, and this same idea can be found in different versions of the benedictions. There are different versions of the benediction in different Deed Mongol Hoshuus, and the contents of the benedictions are mostly about the welfare of the historical state and praise for the conquest of the Mongols.²⁴ It has a historical outline.

Let us become nice and peaceful!
 At the time when the Holy Güsh Khaan
 Lived in the north-east

²¹ Leader of the western fifty-five Heavens (*Tengers*) of the ninety-nine Heavens (Dulam 1989: 71-73)

²² Western Mongols, ancestors of the Deed Mongols.

²³ In around late 1980s and early 1990s Gereltsetseg, one of the two authors, recorded the whole version of the benediction and it was first revealed in 1993. She recorded it from Süriye, a singer of benediction, Güngtse village, Shibücheng Xiang (Township), Sübei Xian (County), Gansu Shen (province).

²⁴ For further reference see Gerel (2003: 153-160) and Üsürünggüi (2003: 1-2).

At the place called Kang Bulanggir Höndei Shirigi,
 When Buddhism was not spread in his place
 He was distributing benefaction to the poor
 Holy Gūsh Khaan heard that
 There was a fight among the Halh²⁵ and
 Halh Tsogt Haan
 Was making lots of harm to religion [Gelug-pa Buddhism]
 Holy Gūsh Khaan left his land
 Leading a great number of soldiers
 Defeated the Halh Tsogt
 United on his sovereignty
 Tibetan and Mongolian nations of Höhenagur [Kök Nuur]
 Spreading and developing
 The eternal white state with a powerful master
 To ten directions with glamorous success
 Sprinkling the choicest part of the
 Holy clear white *sön!*²⁶ (Üsürüggüi 2003: 79)
 (for Mongolian version see Appendix H).

The content of the benediction is exactly what happened in history, as discussed in the introduction. From this oral tradition people know where they are from and who they are.

After making the first offerings to the most respected deities, Khaans and ancestors, people officially start the feasts and drink the vodka starting from the eldest man. In other words, they include the 'abstract state' and spirits as part of the community and respect them in the same way that they respect a human being. In that sense it is correct to let the deities and Khaans have the first drinks and then the elders, young men, elder women and young women. Obviously, they do not consider the collapsed state as something that does not exist, instead even though they are aware of the fact that it does not actually exist as an organization they believe it exists as an abstraction. They treat the old state as if it still exists and they end the benediction with lots of wishes for the power and welfare of the state.

Today, let the state customs of the Holy Chinggis Khaan
 Be very nicely firm!

²⁵ Halh is one of the big Mongol ethnic groups who mostly inhabit the Central part of Mongolia.

²⁶ In 2004, Naranzüg wrote down the whole version from an elder Choinid, a singer of benediction, of Van Hoshuu, Ulaan county, Qinghai province.

Let the powerful state of the descendants
Of the unbeatable Holy Güsh Khaan be firmer! (Üsürünggüi 2003: 40).

At the next stage in the feasts, just after the benediction, people all start singing traditional songs. The first three songs are for the state. It is called 'three state songs' (*töriin gурvan duu*), such as 'By the side of the Khaan' (*Ezen hagan-u dergede*) (Bürinbayar 1986: 797-798) and 'State master nobles' (*Törü-yin ezen noyod*) (Bürinbayar 1986: 846). It is for them a national anthem. In the song people sing if their admiration for the state and their respect for its laws and decrees.

The masters of the state are the holy nobles
They are sons of the heaven with perfect destiny
We encircle your central state
We greet your perfect peace
 We receive your glass like clear wisdoms
 We respect your tender and wise decrees
 We accept your mirror like wisdoms
 We respect your apparent and wise decrees (c. f. also Bürinbayar 1986: 846)
(for Mongolian version see Appendix I).

After the "three state songs" people can sing other songs about nature, their parents, history, friendship and so on. In general, during the feasts people drink with the state and sing for it. This is also a clear example how people link the origin of the *tör yos*, wisdom and order of the society to the Khaans, or as T. Mitchell (1999) calls it "the state effect".

All the above materials clearly declare the existence of the Mongol State in people's imagination and in the rituals. The state is not only symbolic and imaginary, but it is also quite practical, people still follow its rules in everyday life. The state is still powerful among people not as an external entity dominating and constraining the society but as an internal mechanism influencing society through people's respect.

Apart from matters relating to rituals, people usually do not talk about the abstract Mongol state, and they do not draw any kind of parallel between this description of the Mongol state and the reality of the practical Chinese state they actually live in, they usually ignore this subject and treat them as completely different and separate from one another. Discussions about the abstract Mongol state outside rituals, for instance in

everyday life where it is not suppose to be addressed, would potentially arouse a serious political contradiction and could be interpreted as anti-Chinese nationalism by party officials. There is the justification that if it is in the ritual, as they can claim, that this is just a traditional ritual and nothing more.

4.4. Conclusion

I have two concluding remarks about the state in the case of the Deed Mongols. Firstly, the state is a complex entity consisting of various actual and virtual elements. Following Steinmetz's (1999: 27) idea that "the state is cultural", Mitchell (1999: 77, 84) claims that "the state is a product of processes" and it has to be "historicized". The Deed Mongols' case of the state clearly shows it is historically constructed. Anthropologically speaking, if the state is a culture and history, then, it must be a diverse thing, because culture and history are very diverse and indigenous. My comment is that different people have different types of states. But when we come to the conclusion that the state is a product of people's thinking, then, it is even more diverse. Obviously, various peoples' minds produce various types of states. Therefore, in order to analyse such a thing as the state we need many different theories. One single theory is not enough to explain all the various states of different cultures. In addition to this, there is another point, which makes a state miscellaneous. The state itself consists of various elements, for example: ideas, processes, institutions, territory, people, law, customs, teachings, wisdom, and even a god and so on. The people understand that there are many different ideas of state that are not generally agreed, as Y. Navaro-Yashin accurately writes, "there is no such unified entity as the state" (2002: 179).

My second point is that the Mongol state amongst the Deed Mongols is a form of cynicism. They understand the Mongol state in society in two specific ways one in terms of the cult of the Khaans or deference to the Khaans and their achievements, and the other is in terms of the traditional customs and wisdom of the state, or "intellectual and moral leadership" (Femia 1981: 24). Returning to the discussion of "they do not know it, but they do it" or "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it", which I briefly presented in the introduction of this chapter. Following Marx, Radcliffe-Brown (1940), P. Abrams (1988 [1977]) and M. Taussig (1992) would have concluded that the Deed Mongol abstract state is a "false consciousness", because "they do not know

it, but they do it". Following E. Durkheim (impure sacred) P. Abrams (1988 [1977]: 79-80) and M. Taussig (1992: 114) more precisely argue that state abstraction is like a god. Moreover, P. Abrams defines the state as "the opium of the citizen" (1988 [1977]: 82). They might be correct to a certain extent, because many people are not aware of what is behind the cult of the state. However, they are not completely correct. Because cult of the state or the abstract state of the Mongols is not only about a "god", as I discussed earlier, but it is also about the *tör yos*, state knowledge, philosophy and wisdom which manages chaos, gives order and meaning to people's lives. Ts. Jamtsarano, one of Mongolia's leading researchers in the 1920s, proposes a similar argument in the example of Buddhism. He argues that "seeing that the basic aims of our Party and of Buddhism are both the welfare of the people, there is no conflict between the two of them. They are mutually compatible [...] *It is a special case that in Russia religion is the opium of the people.* What our lord Buddha taught cannot be equated with [...]" (Bawden 1968: 286) other religions. In addition to the belief in the existence of the god-like figure, people are aware of the classical and skilful ways of ruling, and the traditional teachings about the state, which were attested in the history of the Mongols by the success of Chinggis Khaan and Güsh Khaan. In that sense, the term *töriin shütle*, which I have translated as 'the cult of the state', can be understood as a 'cult of the right way of governing' or an "art of governmentality" in Foucault's words.

P. Sloterdijk and S. Žižek's catch phrase "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (Žižek 1989: 33, Navaro-Yashin 2002: 160-161) fits well in the case of the Deed Mongol 'abstract state'. More precisely, this "cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it" (Žižek 1989: 29). Following the same path, Navaro-Yashin (2002: 159-160) argues that her informants are not "falsely conscious," instead as she maintains they know the reality of the state but they pretend to be unaware of it. When people respect the state knowledge and wisdom (*töriin uhaan*) that originated from the Imperial state, they act "as if" they had the Mongol state. The intellectual and moral leadership, and traditional politics is not only a desire but it is the reality that people perform everyday in local politics.

Conclusion

I have three concluding remarks that I present in the following. One concerns respect considered cross culturally and by comparative analysis. The second is about the broad sense (or scope) of respect. I claim that respect is random, free and fluid, and therefore that respect is potentially involved in every relationship. My last comment is about the actual and virtual existences of respect.

I presume that the most elementary and basic feature of respect - to elevate someone or something - is intrinsic in different cultures and may be universal. We need further comparative studies to give a complete answer to this question. However, beyond the basics, the details of respect vary from culture to culture. In the Introduction to the thesis I claimed that the concept of 'the respect of common courtesy' is more common in Euro-American culture, while concepts of 'the respect of hierarchy' are common in the Mongol culture. My colleague and friend Jonathan Mair, who is also an anthropologist and a doctoral researcher in Cambridge, suggested to me that in modern English culture most people prefer to be treated as equal to the others, but not as superior, special or just different from others, which is just the opposite in Mongol culture, where people must address and recognize seniority and senior people cannot be treated as equal or regarded as the same as juniors. Probably Deed Mongol acts of respect in the hierarchies of gender and age would be regarded as disrespectful by Europeans or by other peoples with a different culture. More precisely, English women would not be eager to accept the idea that a man always comes before a woman, and would consider the resulting actions as disrespectful, while they are normal or even respectful among the Deed Mongols. Similarly, in English culture to treat or imply to someone that "you are old" is disrespectful. Jonathan Mair did his field research in Inner Mongolia and he told me about his mother's visit to the region. In Inner Mongolia people respected her and regarded her as senior, elder and a special guest. She received the special treatment and respect that most foreign guests receive. As Jon told me, she did not like it, because it made her different from others - which of course is correct in a Mongolian perspective and it is what respect of hierarchy does. She did not want any special treatment; instead she wanted to be treated equal and same as everyone else. As Jon explained, in the West people of high rank try not to elevate themselves or show off their status but prefer to be

normal, on a similar level to everyone else. So when the other people regard him/her as higher, this counteracts his/her attempt to be the same.

However, I also stated that I do not mean to imply that in English culture there is no respect of hierarchy. There are also examples of formal, ritualized hierarchical respect. During my writing up, I had a part-time job as a waiter at Trinity College, Cambridge, and although I did not have much time to work there, I noticed that the college members enact something similar to what I call 'performative, hierarchal respect' in the dining hall. Most of the colleges situate a "high table" in the equivalent of the Mongolian *hoimor* of the hall, the most respected part opposite the door, where Fellows of the college sit. The floor of the "high table" area is a little higher than the rest of the floor where students sit. At a formal dinner "formal hall", students come in the hall first and find seats, and this has to be done on time, before the fellows arrive. While students seat themselves in the hall Fellows gather in a back room. Just on time, the Manciple or the butler announces. "Master (if he is absent then the next senior Fellow is addressed), Ladies and Gentlemen, dinner is served," and invites the Fellows to be seated. When the Fellows come into the hall another waiter sounds the gong and all students must stand up, and remain standing until the head of the high table, who sits at the top of the table and is usually the Master or Vice Master or if both are absent then the next most senior Fellow, reads prayers in Latin. Sometimes students knock over benches, and make a loud noise, to show silent protest, or it can be an accident. This is communal eating; all the courses of dinner should be served once everyone finishes the previous course. The head of the table has eye contact with the Manciple and gives a sign to clear up and bring the next course. People should not eat too fast or specially too slowly. Once there was a guest at the high table invited by the professor who was heading the table that day. She was a former member of the college who had a degree and was supposed to know better, but that night she was always the last to finish each course, not because she was not a fast eater, but because she was talking and not eating, and made everyone else wait for the next course of the meal. By the last course, all the waiters and Fellows were waiting for her. She was talking, drinking wine and not even touching her dessert. Then the Manciple went to the woman and asked her whether she had finished. She looked very annoyed and replied she had not, and we all waited her for a while, but she never finished. The head of the table was disappointed and nodded to the Manciple to put the "grace cup", a silver jug on a silver tray, in front of him, which is the announcement of the end of the dinner, and one of the waiters sounded the gong. At this point everyone must stand up and the head of the high

table leaves the hall and the other Fellows follow him one by one in the order they were sitting. Students must remain standing until the last Fellow goes out. The woman did not stand up until the last Fellow left the Hall. The professor who was the head of the table was disappointed with her disrespectful behaviour and refused to invite her to the drinks after dinner, which are held in a different hall, the "old combination room". The general features of the formal dinner are exactly the same as the circumstances of performative respect among the Deed Mongols. There is a certain rule and order that everyone should obey in order to behave respectfully. Obviously what people actually do and how they do it varies. This I hope gives at least a little idea of how, while the value given to respect, especially hierarchical respect, may vary in different cultures, certain features such as performative respect can be similar across cultures.

'Respect' has a broad range of meanings and has many different types. I will pose the question of whether there can be an interpersonal relationship that does not involve, or potentially involve, in some kind of respect or disrespect. So far I have not found any in Mongolian culture, and I presume that even in very ordinary communications without actual respect people normally at least try not to disrespect one another. The attempt not to disrespect can be understood in terms of ethics and politeness, and ethics is another big subject where respect is relevant. In this context respect can be an expression between people involved in communication, but not necessarily as an actual act expressed in a relationship. Also, as I argued in Chapter Three, one can respect an ancestor, or someone or something with which one does not have an actual relationship. As such, respect is a product of emotion, which demands further research. The answer to the question "What to respect?" is free and fluid. People can respect anyone and anything.

The fluidity of respect also can be found in the expression of what I have called 'non-performative respect', in other words it requires us to think about the question of "How to respect?" The expression of respect ranges between the extremes of highly performative and non-performative acts, and it occurs not only through language but also in non-discursive ways. Throughout the thesis, the easiest task was to describe and analyse performative respect, because it is standardised and recognised by everyone; and the most difficult task was to explain something that is non-performative respect, because it is situational and fluid and depends only on the intention and explanation of the performer. There is no universal standard, or set of criteria, by which to show and express non-performative respect and sincere respect. The contingent and situational expression of non-performative respect is limitless.

The conclusion that respect is everywhere, including in British society where people are trying to demonstrate equality, leads me to another point that I must underline. This concerns the importance of studying respect. In my thesis, I only showed how theories of power and the examination of hierarchy can be illuminated if we bring in the analysis of respect. My research indicates the possibility that there might be many other ethnographic and theoretical studies that could have different conclusions if one considered the presence of respect in them. For example, in Chapter Three, I briefly discussed the "Chinese respect" where respect is an explicitly admired social value. *Some* anthropologists have analysed certain cases of ritualized performances of respect such as kowtow (*koutou*), yet this important act, pervasively present in pre-Communist China, has been relatively little studied. James Hevia's (1994, 1995) work analyses the kowtow in the context of court ritual and even international relations in the eighteenth century. In the same publication, Andrew Kipnis (1994) illustrates *koutou* (kowtow) in relation to subjectification, and argues that *koutou* is practice that allows one to participate in the construction of intimate and imagined subjects (Kipnis 1994: 2003). Yet these do not shed much light on the kowtow as an act specifically of respect and therefore it cannot explain the centrality of respect in the constitution of Chinese society.

My final concluding remark is a caution about the study respect. One has to be aware of two distinct but inseparable aspects of the nature of respect. One is the actual existence of respect in a society while the other is its virtual existence, a slogan for an ideal society. For example, my arguments about peace and harmony in Chapter Three are about the co-existence of virtual and actual respect. Both Mongol traditional and communist slogans say that harmony can build a better society, and I analysed the presence and importance of respect in these discourses. In both cases, one should not confuse what the slogans of virtual respect say and what the actual existence of respect within the society has done. People's perceptions and calculations with regard to the virtually existing respect do not necessarily match with the actual experience of respect in the society. Chapter Three shows to what extent the slogans and the virtual respect became the reality. In that case the idea that respect reduces resistance is what the virtual respect says and I showed that in the reality it does reduce resistance. However, while the virtual respect might say that respect can produce a society without any resistance it should not be understood that in reality the actual existence of respect can achieve this.

Appendix A: Other Mongols in Kök Nuur

Tsagaan Mongols (Chi. Tu)

There are several different names for the Tsagaan Mongols. I use this name simply because it is used by the Deed Mongols with the meaning "White Mongols", and also because, as Louis M. J. Schram (1954: 28) and Henry G. Schwarz¹ (1984: 109) state, they call themselves "Chagaan [Tsagaan] Mongol" while they call the other Mongols "Xara Monggol" [Har Mongol] meaning "Black Mongols". Moreover, Schwarz writes that Tsagaan Mongols living in Minhe (in the east of Qinghai) pronounce the term Mongol as "Monggor" which is clearly a version of the name "Mongol" (cf. also Schram 1954: 28 and Schwarz 1984: 109). Because of this, they are often also called Monggor (in Schwarz), or Monguor (in Schram, and in Li and Stuart). But Chinese call them Tu, which means "natives" and "barbarians" (cf. also Schram 1954: 28).² There are two different groups of Tsagaan Mongols in terms of their present location, one in Qinghai (in Huzhu and Minhe) and the other in Gansu Shen (mainly in Wuwei region and Tianzhu Xian). In 1982, China had a total of 159,426 Tu. The Qinghai Tu number 128,930 (80.9%) and some 12,567 (7.9%) Tu live in Gansu (Li and Stuart 1989: 75). By the year 2000, their numbers had increased to 187,562 in Qinghai and 30,338 in Gansu³.

In the course of the great Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century, the Tanguid Huang Chung were defeated and driven back into Tibet. The ancient frontier region of

¹ A teacher and scholar of East Asian studies, specializing in the history, political development, ethnic minorities, and languages of China and Mongolia.

² Many scholars of Mongolian and Tibetan studies used various terms to indicate them. Schram summarised as follows.

Huc and Gabet call the Monguors Dschiahour, interpreted as "sinicised Mongols." This is the term used by the Tibetans of the country. Prjevalski and Father de Smidt heard Tibetans calling them K'arlong. Potanin calls them Shirongols. Father Mostaert heard Mongols in Mongolia referring to them as Dolot; Prjevalski calls them Daldy (the same word), and the Monguors call themselves Monguor. Potanin stated that they are also called White Mongols, and Chzhahor (Schram 1954: 28).

I presume that the earlier Tibetan term "Dschiahour" and the last Potanin's term "Chzhahor" could have had a similar origin from the name Chagaan Mongol. *Chagan*, *chaga-* or *chaha-* usually means "white" in different Mongol dialects, and it sounds similar to "Dschia-" and "Chzha-". The last part of the names "-hour" and "hor" is similar to the Tibetan term "hor" which means a Mongol. Thus the combination of the two means "White Mongol", which is "white" in Mongolian and "Mongol" in Tibetan.

³ Tabulation on nationalities of the 2000 population census of China / compiled jointly by Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, P.R.C. & Department of Economic and Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, P.R.C.

Huang Chung was depopulated, and to replace those who had fled a number of Mongol commanders and their followers were moved into the region. Their descendants constitute the majority group within the present Monguor (Schram 1954: 21). The history of the Tu can be said to have begun in 1227 when the Mongol general Subedei occupied the area where the Tu presently live. When the Mongols arrived there, they found a few Tibetans, Uigur and Shato [people of Turkic origin]. During the period of the Mongol world empire, the Uigurs living in the Tu area were used as minor officials. Mongol officers and men began to intermarry with the local population almost as soon as they had arrived in the Tu area, so that by the time the Ming army conquered the area in 1371, the beginnings of the new nationality [Chinese recognise Tu as a nation] which we now call Tu had already been made (Schwarz 1984: 107).

Tsagaan Mongols speak in a language belonging to the Mongolian group of the Altaic family. Mongolian speaking Deed Mongols describe it as similar to their language and it can be easily adopted by any other Mongol speaking people in few months (for their language cf. also Smedt and Mostaert 1945, Schram 1954: 28-29, Schwarz 1989: 109-112). Unlike the Deed Mongols they are no longer pastoral nomads. They have sedentary lives in villages with agriculture. In terms of religion they are Buddhists and they also worship 'mountain god' and *lhavas* (oracles) invoke him in the annual worship (for more information about their religion cf. Schram 1957).

Baoan

Another group of Mongols who share a similar language and lifestyle with Tsagaan Mongols in Kök Nuur is the Baoans. There is a small number of Baoans in Tongren of Haidong Zhou of Kök Nuur but most of them live on the other side of the border in Gansu Shen. In 1982 they numbered 9,027, an increase of about 3,400 since 1959. By 2000 their numbers had increased to 15,170 in Gansu Province, and 635 in Qinghai Province⁴. About 7,000 to 8,000 of Baoans live in the villages of Dadun, Ganhetan and

⁴ 2000 nian ren kou pu cha Zhong-guo min zu ren kou zi liao / Guo jia tong ji ju ren kou he she hui ke ji tong ji si, Guo jia min zu shi wu wei yuan hui jing ji fa zhan si bian (Tabulation on nationalities of 2000 population census of China / compiled jointly by Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, P.R.C. & Department of Economic and Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, P.R.C.) Beijing Shi : Min zu chu ban she, 2003.

Meipo of Daihejia township [Xiang] and in Gaoli village of Liuji township (Schwarz 1989: 137, also cf. Li and Stuart 1989: 77) of Gansu.

There is not much information about the origin of the Baoans, but they are believed to be descendents of the soldiers of Chinggis Khaan (cf. also Schwartz 1984: 139). According to Henry G. Schwarz (1984: 139) historical sources indicate that at the end of the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century they lived in the Tongren area of Kök Nuur.

Baoans in Kök Nuur have a similar religion to the Tsagaan Mongols. They worship Buddhist deities and different 'mountain gods'. In the spring they hold annual sacrifices for "mountain gods". As I was told, in the ceremony the 'mountain god', 'his wife, children and the assistant deities of the mountain god' possess the *lhava* (oracle) and give predictions about the coming year for every household. Henry G. Schwarz writes that in the nineteenth century some of the Baoans in Gansu were converted to Islam.

Appendix B: Descendents of the feudal leaders

Apparently, Deed Mongols still have amongst them the descendants of their feudal leaders. The feudal leaders of the Hoshuu were called Hoshuu Noyon, and there was a Zaisan at the next level, which is the position of deputy-leader. Sons of the two leading feudal families still live in the area. Lümben aged 68, is the son of the Hoshuu Noyon. He lives in Delhii Hot the capital of Haixi Zhou, however he often comes to Züün. Tsültem aged 66 is the son of the Zaisan, and he lives in the Züünai *gachaga* (*gachaga* of the Züün). I knew both of them quite well whilst I was in Züün. Initially, no one told me their origins, mostly because it is not considered important any more and people no longer regard them as feudal. I was quite surprised that it had become so unimportant. Instead, people consider them as elders and people who know more than ordinary Deed Mongols. As soon as I arrived and told people that I was interested in their culture and tradition they suggested that I meet some particular people. Among these were Lümben and Tsültem. They did not hold any formal or informal positions of leadership and were not treated as more special than the rest of the elders, but they both have a good reputation in the area. Lümben knows a lot of history and explains customs and when I ask too many difficult questions people usually refer me to him. Tsültem is famous for two things,

firstly, he is healer and bonesetter and secondly, he has an interesting biography. In 1958, his father was arrested and killed together with Lümben's father and other lamas and leaders. At that time Tsültem was a student at the university in Xining but because of his feudal origin he had to leave university. He was arrested and seriously beaten. I was told that he had to visit all the Hoshuu households with tied hands and apologise for who he was and everyone was allowed to beat him or treat him badly. People usually hesitate to talk about this and Tsültem never mentioned it.

After the Cultural Revolution Tsültem became student of an old healer and bonesetter. Now he administers medicine, heals head injuries, inner organs and broken bones with massage. When I went to see him first there was a young boy aged about ten with a man that I thought was his father, but in fact it was his teacher. Then I guessed that he was one of the dormitory pupils. He had headache and vomiting so his teacher brought him to Tsültem. Tsültem measured his skull by putting a leather thread around his head. The thread is first tied in the middle and the knot placed in the nape of the neck then the two ends are drawn around to meet on the forehead; if the lengths are not equal then the head could be injured. One was longer than the other. Then Tsültem said that the problem was a head injury (*tarhi ködlöh*). The day before the boy had sustained the injury by falling from an exercise bar in the playground. Tsültem put a towel on top of the boy's head and put a metal cup upside down on top and hit on the bottom of the cup. He repeated this several times and then massaged his head with oil containing herbs. The boy started to cry and people everyone tried to cheer him up. Finally Tsültem tied a red thread around his head to keep the bone structure in the correct place. I wondered who would pay for this, but there was no payment, he practices for free. Tsültem has different patients Mongols, Chinese, Tibetans and Hotons and some people give him gifts or money. This is the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (cf. Humphrey 1999: 57-87 for more information about the fate of high status pre-revolutionary leaders in Russia and China).

Appendix C: San Ovoo, monastery and Hoshuu guardian

San Ovoo. Not long after I arrived in Züün, I was told that someone was going to worship the San Ovoo (see Figure A1). My family told me that the worship would not be big because it was a private family worship and not the annual Hoshuu worship. It was

the family of Lümben, the son of the last feudal leader of Züün Hoshuu, who were going to worship the San Ovoo. I met them all at the San Ovoo and Lümben told me that he and his family members have an illness (*övchin ireed*) and a lama divined and said that they needed to worship the spirit master of the San Ovoo, which his ancestors had done. He told me that the name of the spirit master of the San Ovoo is Renzentsorj, and since it is a custom not to say aloud respected peoples' and deities names (cf. also Chapter One) people call it San Ovoo.



Figure A1 Worship of the San Ovoo in Züün Hoshuu

There are two big tamarisk (*suhai*) cairns (*ovoo*) in front of the mountain. According to Lümben the first one was built about 350 years ago (historically when the Deed Mongols came). At that time people of the area were cursed and someone healed the curse and set the first *ovoo*. Soon afterwards the second one was established by the Banchin (Panchin) Lama or, as some others say, by the Dalai Lama. Züün is just on the main route of pilgrims to Lhasa (Mon. Zuu). One of the two Lamas rested there and sat on the big rock in front of the mountain and worshipped the mountain, read a sutra (*nom unshih*) and built

the second cairn (*ovoo*) (see Figure A2).⁵ Moreover, Lümben said that every mountain has its own sacrificial invocation texts – San Ovoo has one too. When lamas read the invocation text the spirit master comes down to the *ovoo* from the “world of gods” (*burhany oron*).

After the beginning of 1990s some elders and local lamas including Lümben decided to revive the worship of the San Ovoo. This is probably the only time that I felt that Lümben, the feudal governors son, had an important role in the community. But even here, he was equal to the other important elders, rather than in a special role as someone of feudal descendent.



Figure A2 Two cairns in front of the San Ovoo Mountain at the annual worship

The actual worship of the San Ovoo is the same in private family worship as it is in the annual public worship. Each September the people of Züün worship the San Ovoo. At least one person representing each family participates at the worship to ask for good fortune for the coming year. The worship starts at about ten in the morning and in addition to people from Züün, other people from Züün Hoshuu who live away from Züün gather from different places: from Nomhon, Dulaan, Delhii and Golmus. When they arrive at the *ovoo* they burn juniper (*arts*) for purification, circle the *ovoo* clockwise and worship the *ovoo* and then wait until the lamas come and start the actual ceremony.

⁵ It is interesting that they have two *ovoos* and did not just replace the first by the second. People do not know why it is like this or whether each of them has specific traditions of worship.

Whilst they are waiting for the arrival of the lamas, each kin group or household, maybe including some friends, set a fire and make tea with barley meal, butter and dried cheese (*tsöröm*) to drink with the home-made bread and pastries (*boorsog*) they bring for breakfast.

People bring tamarisk (*suhai*) and silk and *hadag* (ceremonial silk scarf) to offer for the *ovoo*. During the worship while the lamas read the invocation text, people put their tamarisks around the *ovoo* and bind them with the silk on the outside. In this way the *ovoo* grows year by year. People also bring two kinds of wheat, one is fried and burnt to make it dark which is called the “black wheat” (*har tutraga*) and the other is just dried wheat which is called the “white wheat” (*tsagaan tutraga*). When people worship and circle the *ovoo* they offer the white wheat to the *ovoo* wishing for the arrival of good fortune and throw the black wheat away from the *ovoo* wishing to discard all misfortune. They also bring vodka and candies to offer at the *ovoo*. They make figures of animals such as yaks, horses, camels, sheep and goats, and place them in front of the *ovoo*, asking a protection for their herds. At the end of the invocation text the lamas beckon the fortune. Everyone takes something like any kind of food, drink, or a plate of candies and sit around the lamas. Together they all follow the lama’s instruction and turn what they have in their hands clockwise and invoke the good fortune (*dallaga duudah*). According to them the food and drink that they passed around incorporates good fortune, and these have to be distributed to the family members who could not participate. Another way to raise their fortune is to fly *hiimori* (wind horses of good fortune). They climb to the top of the mountain as far as they can and throw *hiimori* printed on small pieces of paper in the air and call *horjooloo* meaning ‘let the *hiimori* rise’ (*hiimori mandag*). They finish the worship by going around the *ovoo* clockwise with their vehicles and horses calling *horjooloo* meaning “let the *hiimori* rise” in Tibetan.

After the worship they gather on the field next to the Mountain and sit and stand in a circle. The elders and leaders sit on the north of the circle, which is the respected part in the *ger*. One of the elders introduces all the newcomers, new brides and grooms, and announces all those who have married and moved away to different Hoshuus. If there are any public announcements such as invitations for weddings, feasts, ceremonies and celebrations, then they are made here. Then they have a small *naadmyn hural* (called *naadam* among many other Mongols, Tsagaan Mongols call it *naadun*), which traditionally consisted of wrestling, horse-racing and archery. For a while in the recent past, they used to bring guns instead of archery. But recently all the guns have been taken

away by the government and their use is banned. Since it is for the worship of a local *ovoo* the *naadmyn hural* is not as big as the one held once in three or four years which includes all the Deed Mongols of Haixi Zhou. Therefore they do not even call it a *naadmyn hural*. The big one is organized by the government of Haixi Zhou in one of the central Mongol towns such as Delhii Hot or Golmus Hot. The last one was held in Golmus Hot in 2005. People who came on horseback would race and about ten to fifteen young people would be chosen for the wrestling matches. At the very end people invite friends and relatives to come to their places for food and drink.

Dashchoilin Monastery. Everyone talks about the attacks of Kazak bandits in the 1940s. They killed many people stole many animals and burnt down the famous monastery of the Züün Hoshuu (Züün Hüree) with about fifty people inside it including lamas and lay people who were participating at the annual ceremony, which I will describe in Chapter Four.




Figure A3 Monastery of Züün

There were five old lamas who were still alive in 1990. They decided to re-establish the monastery of the Züün Hoshuu, and in 1991 (Figure A3), organized reconstruction work on a different spot about twenty kilometres to the west. The new monastery is now in the west end of the *gachaga*, and it is familiar to people as “Züünai Kiid” meaning the monastery of Züün rather than by its actual name. At the monastery I met Jayan, the monastery’s house-keeper, a 67 year-old Tibetan man who speaks perfect Mongolian. He is originally from Sichuan Shen, and became a monk when he was fifteen

years old. Then because of the revolutionary action he gave it up and became a student at the Qinghai Nationalities University in Xining, where he met and subsequently married a girl from Züün, moving there in 1962. At the end of his life, Jayan wanted to do some good deeds and decided to help the monastery – it is a voluntary job which he has been doing for five years. When I got there he was cleaning copper bowls of offerings, I joined him and we talked about the monastery. Altogether there are five fairly old lamas in their 50s and 60s, only three of whom had been monks for a long time and all the other monks were new. The *lovon*, head of the monastery, is Luvsantseren who was a monk at the monastery that was burnt down. There is also a *chanzad* who is responsible for receiving people's and offerings, distributing them to the monks, he writes down what kind of services and healings they (the clients) need and informs the monks. There are also two to three casual *nyarbu* who cook when the lamas perform ceremonies at the monastery. All the monks and staff of the temple live outside, some of them away in the countryside, and come to the temple when there are public ceremonies, therefore, most of the time the monastery is very quiet with not many visitors or monks there. Jayan is the one who is in the temple everyday and runs the daily worship by lighting candles, placing offerings and burning incense.

Throughout the year they held big ceremonies including the San Ovoo worship, but not many people participated at the other events. The monastery is very small, consisting of three buildings; one old, small one built in 1991 which looks like a private house, and a bigger new one that was about to open which looks more like a temple and there is a brick shed with prayer wheel in it.

Setev Choijin. The main deity of the monastery is the wrathful god called Setev Choijin. This is another guardian spirit of the Züün Hoshuu in addition to the spirit of the San Ovoo. Most of the other deities in the monastery are also the wrathful gods of the Nin-ma-pa sects of Buddhism. Namjil, the grandfather of my family told me about the magical *gürtens* who invoke Setev Choijin and go into a trance and send messages to people. However, there are not *gürtens* anymore. Setev Choijin does not have a long history among the Deed Mongols. As Jayan told me, sometimes before the old Züünai Hüree (Monastery of Züün) burnt down Luvsantseren, the head of the present monastery, took Setev Choijin from a Tibetan monastery called Gady, near Lhasa. Every month one of the five old lamas comes and officiates at the monthly worship for the Setev Choijin, where

not many people participate. Sometimes there is a private request to worship Setev Choijin either in someone's home or in the temple and for a particular household.

Appendix D: Economy - Moving, settling and herding

In terms of their working practices the Deed Mongols can be classified into three groups: herders, teachers and government officers (*gamba* or *kadar* - cadre). The majority of Deed Mongols are pastoralists who live in the countryside and herd mostly yaks, goats and sheep, and a few camels and horses that they use for transportation. They usually move three or four times during the year and sometimes more. Two of these are big movements, one to leave the winter pasture in June and the other returning to the winter pasture in December and the others are small-scale movements seeking pasture. The timing, number of movements and decisions on which pasture to use varies in accordance with how much grass there is each year, how large the herds are, the weather and so on. Before I talk about moving I will explain the major and minor settlements.

Land and herds were privatised in about 1984-1985 but before that the Deed Mongols had collective farms. The land remains officially the property of the state, and herders and peasants rent it in the long term. During the collective period there were already some borders between the pastures of different households and with privatisation people took control of those same pastures that they had always used. However, the story varies from Hoshuu to Hoshuu. In the Kurimt village in Banchin Shan Hoshuu, for example, people still complain that the leaders of that time took the best pastures for themselves. Households were obliged to build fences around their private pasture which is very expensive and there are still households who have not completed the fencing because of the cost. As my family told me, they used to have a small amount of savings but in the last couple of years they had had to spend it all on this type of renovation and maintenance. There are two main reasons to build fences, firstly, because the government ordered it, secondly, the Deed Mongols consider it useful to reduce conflicts and fights over pasture and create harmony.

In 1984 and 1985, the land privatised was for Namjil's one family with his three sons and three daughters. They originally received 600-700 herd animals, the average for one household in the area, but now the land has been passed to three of his children then

three families have to live off pasture with only the capacity to sustain one. Of this average herd size in the area usually one-third are sheep and rest are goats. The rich families have over 1000 animals and the poor households have only 100-200 animals. In this way, the privatisation of land has two major limiting factors: firstly, the households can never be richer than they are now as the maximum herd size is 700 and any more would destroy the pasture and turn it into a desert, secondly, only one of the two children in a family can inherit the pasture and the other one has to find another way of making a living. In K ok Nuur this usually means to become a student and find a job in Xining or in one of the Chinese cities, which would lead eventually, in the next generation, to their adopting Chinese or Tibetan culture because there are no Mongol schools in the cities. In order to live in the city it is necessary to compete with the Chinese to get a better job and life, and this encourages them to go to Chinese schools.




Figure A4. Private pasture

Households in the area usually have private pastures for four seasons. My family had two separate pastures about 25-30 km away from each other. The spring and summer pastures (Pasture A and B) were next to each other and smaller, while the autumn and winter pastures are attached and bigger than the summer and spring one (Pasture C and D). When to use which pasture for which herds is not fixed (see Figure A4). They consider the winter house (*övöljin*) as the main settlement. My family has two winter houses, one is old and small with the kitchen and main living area and it has a bedroom where I used to sleep; Namjil slept in the living area close to the fireplace. The other house is big and new, but it is rarely used. It has a kitchen and a big guest room that is used as a couple's bedroom. Adjacent to the new house there is an extension used for storage and on the other side there is a garage and a shed for new born animals. During the year the family regularly visit their house to collect or leave things. In June they divide the herd into two groups, one of mothers with their young. Usually around 200 animals move to pasture A, and settle there until around September when they move to the pasture B. Because pasture A and B are quite small (see Figure A5) the rest of the animals go to the mountains to the free open pasture with more grass which I will call E pasture (not in the figure). This is called *otor* among other Mongols but they usually refer to it as *uuland yavah* meaning 'going to the mountain'.



Figure A5. Moving back from the mountain to the steppe

In the mountains land is not privatised. However, there is an informal border between pastures. It is quite far away and difficult to reach, takes two or three days by horse or camel. Herds stay there until November or December. The settlement in the mountains

has to be changed every month, depending on the capacity of the pasture. Because Deed Mongols have small families with only two children, they often hire herders, usually they are Chinese, Tibetan or Hoton (Chi. Hui). These waged herders (*malchin* or *hoichin*) usually stay there for about 6 months and they receive 25 RMB per day when they work in the mountain and 10 RMB in the steppe. For most of the year, they stay in the camp with one of the groups of animals. There are some waged herders who have lived in the community for 15 years (for more about waged herders c. f. also Chapter One). 'This is an original solution to the problem for pastoralists today – how to combine the mobility of the herds with a more sedentary, developed, lifestyle for the herd owner. In other words, the solution in the Deed Mongol case is to re-establish a class system, the very system that the revolution was designed to destroy'⁶ (cf. Humphrey & Sneath 1999: 167-77).

The landscape of the Tsaidam valley is nothing like the green pastures around the K k Nuur Lake, it is a very dry sandy desert with lots of salt. It does not rain or snow as much as it does in the mountains where the Tibetans live, but there is still grass. Some people say that the grass grows because the area used to be a large lake and there is a lot of underground water. The salt on the other hand helps to melt the snows in winter. This is just the opposite of the Tibetan pasture where there is frequently a lot of snow. The Deed Mongols complain that Tibetans pushed them away from the green pastures to the desert but they say that in fact the desert turned out to be better than the green pastures.

In around October, usually Hoton (Chi. Hui) or Chinese merchants come to buy animals. On average households sell about 50-150 goats and sheep each year depending on the number of new-born animals. In 2004 my family sold 50 goats and 15 sheep. Another major trading period is May and June when the herders sell wool and cashmere.

The government is encouraging herders to settle and plant grass on the pasture and there is a project to build a warm shed with a glass roof unlike the traditional roofless sheds. The herders say that it is not actually necessary because the area is not very cold in the winter (maximum -20C) for nomadic herds. The construction cost is around 30,000 RMB and of which the government will pay one-third.

⁶ Personal communication with Caroline Humphrey, Cambridge May 2006.

**Appendix E: A poem about the techniques of governance attributed to Chinggis
Khaan in Mongolian**

*Delhii dahinyg ezlehüi n
Hümüniig ezlehüi dor bui
Hümüniig ezlehüi n
Hümünii setgeliig ezlehüi dor bui
Hümünii setgeliig olvoos
Darui delhii dahiniig olov hemeemoi
Hümünii setgeliig aldvaas
Darui delhii dahiniig aldav hememüi
Hümünii gadaad dürs oyun dagaj
Dotood setgel es shüitseniig huurmag hemeemoi
Dotood setgelees dagasnyg
Saya dagav hemeemoi (Lündendorj 2002: 33).*

**Appendix F: Bayan Sön benediction prayer by yeröölch (benediction singer)
Ulaanbaatar in Mongolian**

*Om saihan amugulang bolhu boltugai
Guchin gurban Hurmast tengeriin ornoos üüsej garsan
..... albat tor shaj[in] hoyoryg barisan
Gurban orny nomyn Khaan
Zonhabyn sharyn shajin[d] mash saihan achtai bolson
Hamag burhan Khaan hüchiig negen dor huraaj
Ulemj ondor tsogt Ochirvaani huvilgaan ezen geegen Güsh Khaan
Üren noyoduudyn mönh tsagaan tör
Arvan zügtee mash saihan delgerch yavahyn tuld
Rashaan tungalag Bayan söngiinei ten deejiig satsan aildhavchuu!*

Appendix G: Bayan Sön benediction prayer by yeröölch (benediction singer) Süriye in Mongolian

Oma sayihan amugulang bolhu boltugai!
Yeren eisün Hormusta tngri-yin oron-atsa egiüsügen
Yisühei bagatur-un ug-atsa salju garugsan
Yehe bogda Chinggis Hagan ogtargui-atsa baguju
Badranggui tsagan tngri-yin ordun-atsa
Osuldal ügüi guchin tabun erdem-i burin tegüsgejü
Olon hülge bügüde-yi zalgan tegüsgeged
Ögeliin zögeliin hatun-atsa salju garugsan...
Nayir belge [bilig] hoyor-yi uduridun
Yisün örlüg tabun taiji
Dörben oirad, döchin monggol
Ey-e-ber olon amitan-i huriyagad
Ezen-tei yehe nairalaju baihu-yin tulada
Örlüg bogdo Chinggis Hagan-u
Örgen yehe nair-un belge
Rashiyan melmeger yehe tsagan song-iin tani
*Degeji-yi tsatsun ailadhaba chuud!*⁷ (Setsenmöghe and Gerel 2003: 190-191).

Appendix H: Bayan Sön benediction prayer by yeröölch (benediction singer) Choinid in Mongolian

Ovm sayihan amugulang bolhu boltugai!
Gegen Giiüshi hagan zegün hoitu zug-tu
Kang Bulinggir Höndei Shirigi hemegchi gazar
Morilju baihu üyes-tü Nom shashin delgeregedüi
Ügegüchüüd-tü nigubtur yihe öglige-yi
Ögchü bayihu hejy-e nigen tsag-tu


⁷ In around late 1980s and early 1990s Gereltsetseg, one of the two authors, recorded the whole version of the benediction and it was first revealed in 1993. She recorded it from Süriye, a singer of benediction, Güngtse village, Shibücheng Xiang (Township), Sübei Xian (County), Gansu Shen (province).

Halha-yin dotor-a ebderel bolugsan hoyin-a
Halh Tsogtu Hagan hemegchi
Eliin gaoli bogda choir-a-yin shir-a-yin shashin-du
Mashi yehe hoorlal hijü bayina hemen sonusugad
Gegen Giiüshi Hagan öber-ün oron-atsa
Olan yehe tsereg-yi dagagulju morilagad
Halh Tsogt Hagan-i hilbar ügüi darugad
Höhenagur-un Töbed Monggol olan yehe ündüsüiten-i
Erhe deger-e-ben huriyagad
Hüchüütü ezen-ü mönghe tsagan törü-i
Arban züg-tü mashi sayihan
Tuushlagulun delgeregöljü bayihu-yin dumda
Rashiyan tunggalig tsagan song-ün tani
*Degeji-yi tsatsun ailadhaba chuud!*⁸ (Üsürünggüi 2003: 79).

Appendix I: Folk long song “State master nobles” in Mongolian


Törü-yin ezen noyod-un gegen
Tegülder zayagatu tngri-yin ürechüs
Töb sayihan törü-yi tani hashiju
Tegülder sayihan amar-yi tani ailadchu
Shil metü gegen-dü tani hürtejü
Shihir tsetsen zarlig-i tani hüندیlejü
Toli metü gegen-dü tani hürtejü
Todu tsetsen zarlig-yi tani hüندیlejü (cf. also Bürinbayar 1986: 846).

⁸ In 2004, Naranzüg wrote down the whole version from an elder Choinid, a singer of benediction, of Van Hoshuu, Ulaan county, Qinghai province.



Map A: Map of Qinghai

Map B: Administrative map of Qinghai



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